The Prime Minister is wholly justified in letting it be known once and for all that the army will not be withdrawn from Punjab so long as normalcy is not restored. But clearly it is time the government reviewed the situation in the state, including the role of the army lest this role become counter-productive.
The army was inducted into Punjab in early June for certain specific purposes – for flushing out terrorists and other criminals from the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar and other gurdwaras, ensuring that the Bhindranwale gang was not able to unleash large-scale violence against the Hindus in the state, and providing support to the civilian administration which had been infiltrated as well as demoralised and was therefore incapable of coping with the extremist challenge.
While the first task was over by the second week of June, the fear of violence against the Hindus continued because it was widely believed that almost the whole Sikh community had felt outraged by the army’s entry into the Golden Temple and the consequent damage to the Akal Takht, and that a large number of extremists were still at large. For all we know, we exaggerated the danger. But the government could not take the risk of exposing the Hindus to the danger of retaliation. So it was only proper that it decided to keep the army in the state. The Hindus there certainly welcomed the decision.
The problem has since eased. The Sikhs are still angry but they are angry with the government and not with the Hindus. It is possible to argue even now that withdrawal of the army can lead to revival of violence and danger to the lives and properties of the Hindus. But in order to eliminate this risk it should not be necessary for the army to be in overall command as it is now. Its presence in the background in a supportive role to the administration should suffice for coping with this problem.
The induction of the army into Punjab had become unavoidable in late May and early June. And there can be no doubt that it did a superb job in flushing out terrorists from gurdwaras, especially the Golden Temple complex. But let us-face it, army officers are not trained for the kind of role they are being called upon to play in the new circumstances. Indeed, the role involves risks which Mrs. Gandhi should find unacceptable.
Key Changes
First, going by the experience of Pakistan and other developing countries where the army has been called upon to assume overall charge of the administration, it can only be a matter of time before the officers and men are sucked into the maelstrom of corruption and other malpractices which are widespread in Punjab as in other states. They, like the rest of us, are ordinary men subject, like the rest of us, to temptation. They are distinguished from the rest of us by the fact of their discipline and relative insulation from society. To involve them in administration is to erode both these advantages.
Secondly, the continued presence of the army in the countryside can reinforce the feeling of alienation among the Sikhs. By its very nature, the army tends to act in a ham-handed manner and can easily offend the susceptibilities of influential individuals in villages. And since it has neither the necessary experience of dealing with small village communities nor the necessary information of who is who in a particular village, it is liable to be manipulated by clever operators who abound in Punjab as elsewhere in the country. These are not theoretical deductions. The generalisations are rooted in experience.
Finally, whatever one’s view of the state administration in respect of both its integrity and competence, there can be no question that it has to be revived and strengthened. And that is just not possible so long as the army is in overall command of the affairs of the state.
We have to take a hard-headed and practical view of the problem. We cannot scrap the entire law and order machinery in Punjab and build it anew. We can make some key changes. For the rest we have no option but to hope that in the new atmosphere resulting from the army’s actions and the Union government’s tough stance most police officials and others would do their duty reasonably honestly and efficiently.
In theory, this hope could turn out to be wholly ill-founded. But the chances are that this will not be so provided the government is careful in picking the key officials such as the chief secretary, inspector-general of police and district magistrates and is willing to make an example of those who have colluded with the extremists. Most officials in India, as elsewhere, trim their sails to the prevailing wind. In Punjab they could well have felt that the Akalis and Bhindranwale represented the wave of the future. The government’s own inaction could have promoted and reinforced this feeling. In the changed circumstances of today they could behave very differently if they could be convinced that not only their duty but also their interests lie elsewhere.
No Elections Now
In plain terms, if a reasonably competent and impartial administration has to be restored in Punjab, three preconditions must be fulfilled. The army’s role must be reduced; such purges as the Union government regards absolutely necessary on the strength of competent intelligence reports must be completed soon, the emphasis being more on transfers than on dismissals; and measures should be taken to see to it that the Akalis are not seen by the people in the state as tomorrow’s rulers.
It is hazardous to try and assess right now the standing of the Akali Dal among the Sikhs. The situation is too fluid to admit of a definitive assessment. No one in authority should be in a hurry to reach a firm conclusion in this regard. But some points can be made at this stage.
First, it should be made clear that conditions in Punjab are such that there can be no question of a poll there even in connection with the forthcoming election to the Lok Sabha. Secondly, the Union government should not, directly or indirectly, engage in negotiations with the Akalis so long as they do not repudiate the Anandpur Sahib resolution with its separatist overtones or otherwise demonstrate their commitment to the nation’s unity and integrity. It has shown signs of being impatient to resume talks with the Akalis so much so that serving generals established contacts with the five head priests who are no more than a front for the Akalis. This is a sure prescription for disaster.
There can be genuine differences of opinion on whether Bhindranwale forced the Akalis to be intransigent or whether the Akali intransigence prepared the ground for the rise of Bhindranwale. But there can be no disagreement on the desirability of seeing to it that we are not caught in a similar pincer again. This might call for a reversal or approach by the government.
As I see things, the extremists are in disarray following the death of Bhindranwale and they are not likely to be able to regroup under a new leader in the near future. This assessment can lead to two conclusions. First, we should take advantage of the disarray in their ranks and liquidate them. Second, we should offer them an opportunity to return to normal life. Our choice inevitably depends on our assessment of these men. If we take the view, as some well-informed nationalist Sikhs do, that they were mostly misguided youths who somehow fell under the evil spell of Bhindranwale, we cannot but take the second option. This is a point Mrs. Gandhi and her principal aides would do well to ponder.
Co-ordination
As in the past, Mrs. Gandhi has demonstrated remarkable firmness in dealing with the Akalis and the extremists since June 2 when she appealed to them in a nation-wide broadcast to return to the path of reason. But evidently her courage and toughness cannot suffice. We need a proper machinery which can oversee the activities of various agencies and eliminate some of the confusion which now prevails. There must be a co-ordinating centre in New Delhi headed by the new Union home minister who must be given the necessary authority, to be exercised, of course, under the overall supervision of the Prime Minister; no one else should speak in her name; and nationalist Sikhs of experience such as Sardar Darbara Singh, Mr. Gurdial Singh Dhillon and Mr. Buta Singh should be associated with it. Only such a centre can end the ad hocism which continues to characterise the government’s handling of Punjab. And the bureaucratic approach is as out of place in the situation as ad hocism. We need a mature political approach which only experienced politicians can provide.
This brings us to Giani Zail Singh. Conventional wisdom would have us argue that as President of the republic he can have no role in Punjab. His alleged association with Bhindranwale and the anti-Darbara Singh faction in the Punjab Congress would strengthen this argument. But this viewpoint does not square up with the reality which is that emotionally the Giani is too deeply involved in the affairs of Punjab to agree to step aside and that he has too much knowledge and influence to be ignored. His acceptance or rejection of a move can determine whether it will succeed or fail. Whether we like it or not, he cannot just be brushed aside. The Giani on his part should reconcile himself to Sardar Darbara Singh.
Finally, while it is now idle to argue whether or not it was advisable for the authorities to encourage Baba Santa Singh to undertake ‘kar seva’ in the Golden Temple complex, care should be taken to ensure that it not only remains but is also seen by the Sikh community to be his show. The Congress as a party would be well advised to keep out of it, though individual Congressmen are as entitled to undertake “kar seva” as anyone else. In a crisis like the one in Punjab there is no place for stunts. The problem is much too serious to admit of the kind of antics Congressmen in Punjab are used to. The Buddha Nihang Dal chief has won the support of five other sants and more are likely to endorse his move. He has shown enough strength of character to defy the five head priests and he is not likely to waver in the face of adverse criticism. But the Congress should not complicate his task by trying to gain propaganda advantage out of his movement.
The Times of India, 31 July 1984