It is not particularly difficult to understand the moves of some of the Sikh members of the establishment who are now keen to dissociate themselves from it. Judging by their statements, they are apparently shocked that the government should have had the audacity to ask the army to flush out the terrorists from the Golden Temple complex. They have a view of their faith and their community’s place in the country’s life which leads them to believe that the laws of the land cannot and do not apply to it. Even if some of them think differently, they are under enormous social pressure to behave as if they share the anger of the Panth. But they strain credulity when they expect the rest of us to take them at their word.
It is too late in the day for any sensible person to argue whether in the given situation as it obtained on June 2 it was possible for the Prime Minister to avoid ordering troops into the Golden Temple complex. The size and quality of the arsenal that has been seized there and the heavy casualties and the time the army has taken to dispose of the terrorists should clinch the issue. Mrs. Gandhi would have betrayed her charge of the country’s affairs if she had postponed action any longer.
The BSF and the CRPF could, of course, have done the job as far as the Golden Temple complex is concerned. These paramilitary forces could have dealt with the terrorists there. But they could not have policed effectively enough the rest of the state. The persistent attacks on the security forces by the extremists in Punjab and the number of people who have been killed in the past one week there should settle this issue as well. It was just not possible to avoid calling in the army. In any case, would leading Sikhs, who have objected to the army’s entry into the temple complex, have been less angry if, instead, the BSF and the CRPF had been used?
Two Issues
Two different issues are involved – the government’s obligation to enter the temple complex in order to flush out the terrorists and the use of the army for this purpose – and the two should not be confused. Thus, while it is still possible to argue that even if it had become necessary to call in the army to the aid of the civil authority in Punjab, it need not have been used at the temple complex, it is just not tenable to suggest that action could have been avoided. Action had to be taken and it is action – not action by the army – that a number of leading Sikhs are in reality objecting to. Their position would not have been different even if the Punjab police had been sent into the complex.
The government’s intelligence set-up has come in for a great deal of criticism, and rightly so. The Punjab state intelligence machinery has been criminally negligent in performance of its duty. Indeed, it cannot be ruled out that some of its officers and men might have cooperated with the terrorists as the latter took into the complex fairly heavy and large weapons which are not easy to hide. But in the light of post-June 2 developments, it is clear that the government was reasonably well posted with the nature of the challenge that it faced. It knew that the extremists had spread all over the state in sizeable numbers, that they would continue to operate after their headquarters in the Golden Temple and sub-headquarters in other gurdwaras elsewhere had been seized, and that their activities called for a level of response which the army alone could provide.
The authorities have naturally been reluctant to spell out the magnitude of the threat. They have perhaps not wanted to spread panic. Mrs. Gandhi was careful even in her broadcast to the nation on June 2 when she had already deployed the army extensively in Punjab and decided to order it to enter the Golden Temple complex. So people outside the state who have not felt the assassin’s shadow behind their back have not known that the government called in the army only when it had good reason to be convinced that it was confronted not just with terrorism but insurgency.
Beyond Doubt
We do not wish to pretend that we were cognisant of the magnitude of the danger. We were not. That was why, as late as May 18, we editorially opposed the induction of the army into Punjab for the purpose of dealing with the extremists and argued that the BSF and the CRPF could do the job as well. But while we said so in ignorance, a number of leading Sikhs are objecting to the army’s entry into the Golden Temple complex now when the facts have been established beyond reasonable doubt.
Since the last weekend, some companies in the army have mutinied. It would be comforting to believe that this is a spontaneous reaction to the army’s entry into the Golden Temple complex. But this may perhaps be an exercise in escapism. The chances appear to be that the extremists had established contacts in these units and spread disaffection among the jawans long before the government deployed the army to assist the civil authorities in Punjab.
It is not possible to say whether or not the authorities had accurate information regarding the disaffected units. On the face of it, they did not. Otherwise, they would have disarmed the jawans in question and detained them, though it is not wholly inconceivable that they held their hand in the hope that the worst would not happen and in the calculation that it was better to risk trouble in a few units than provoke resentment among a large section of the armed forces. Be that as it may, it does appear that Mrs. Gandhi finally decided to act only when she was persuaded that Bhindranwale and his gang were planning to unleash a regular insurgency.
Let us face it. All of us in the media have been functioning in the dark. Last Saturday (June 9), that is before the mutiny had broken out in some units in Rajasthan, we said editorially: “We know too little about the surviving terrorists – their numbers, organisational structure, chain of command, possible sources of support, their external connections and so on – to be able to make a firm assessment. Right now, we are not even sure whether we are dealing with loosely organised bands of criminals, or with a properly organised, even if a relatively small, guerrilla force; whether Bhindranwale was its sole leader, or whether he was being manipulated by some other unknown individuals and agencies; and whether or not a successor to him is ready to take over the leadership of his supporters”.
It is still not possible to answer these questions properly with the necessary evidence. But if it is true, as it appears to be, that the extremists had established contacts with certain units in the army, it would be in order to draw certain tentative inferences. These tentative inferences would be:
That the country has, without knowing it, been facing a well-planned attempt at armed insurgency, not just bands of terrorists, extremists and criminals; that it is unlikely that the illiterate Bhindranwale straight out of the middle ages (he sincerely believed that since he was a man, he could not go to New Delhi to meet the Prime Minister because she after all was a mere woman)was its true leader; that someone, certainly from outside the temple complex if not outside the country itself, was masterminding the operation; that the individual or group in question continues to function; that a chain of command established without much reference to Bhindranwale remains intact; and that the number of insurgents is far bigger and their contacts far more extensive than most of us have suspected.
Waited Too Long
This is a terrible indictment of those in office. It is shameful that a threat of this dimension to the country’s integrity should have been allowed to rise. This is the true charge against Mrs. Gandhi which she will find extremely difficult to answer. But by the same token, she cannot be guilty of the charge the leading Sikhs are hurling at her – the charge of acting harshly against them and the holiest of their holies. She has been much too patient; she has waited too long; perhaps if she had known that so many educated and well-placed Sikhs would react the way they have to the army’s entry into the Golden Temple complex even after the insurgents had taken so many innocent lives and converted the temple complex into a well-defended and large arsenal, she would have called in the army earlier.
We can now debate forever whether or not Mrs. Gandhi could have clinched a deal with the Akali Dal in 1982, and whether or not the Akali leaders were subsequently too frightened of Bhindranwale and his men to engage in meaningful negotiations with the government. This will not be a futile exercise. The first priority must now be to restore order and respect for order and in this enterprise it would be idle to expect much help from the Akali leaders, however well-motivated some of them might be. In fact, it will be worse, much worse, than idle to do so. A show of weakness – which is how an attempt to open talks just now will be seen by a lot of people – in a situation like the one we are now facing could be an invitation to disaster.
The Times of India, 12 June 1984