By its blanket criticism of India’s foreign policy at its annual session in Bombay the Jana Sangh leadership has done no good to itself. It has only fostered the impression that it is interested more in striking certain postures than in making a constructive contribution to the current national debate on issues of foreign relations.
The Jana Sangh’s foreign policy resolution is full of contradictions. On the one hand it advises New Delhi to solicit Moscow’s support on the question of Tibet’s future status on the plea that the Kremlin has a better appreciation now of China’s expansionist designs and crimes against the Tibetan people. On the other, it asks it to “stop moving into the Russian orbit”, meaning thereby that it should not have such close relations with the Soviet Union as it has had for some years. How can the two Governments cooperate on so ticklish and complex an issue as the future of Tibet except on the basis of the closest possible relations?
TIBETAN CAUSE
Most people in this country share the Jana Sangh’s detestation of the Chinese actions and its desire that Tibet should regain its autonomy. But they also realise that beyond giving asylum to the Tibetan refugees and helping them to preserve their way of life there is precious little that India can do and that no other nation is prepared to raise a little finger in support of the cause of Tibetan independence.
The Sangh’s attitude towards the Arabs is equally contradictory. It wants close economic and cultural ties with Iran mainly because Teheran is at odds with the Arabs and yet wants the Government to try to play a mediatory role in the Arab-Israeli dispute. It ignores the obvious proposition that however remiss New Delhi may have been in not establishing normal diplomatic relations with Israel at the time of the latter’s admission to the United Nations, it cannot undo the past mistake at this stage without risking the open hostility of all the Arab States.
It may have been permissible for this country to risk the hostility of the Arabs in the name of some abstract principle if it were not involved in a fierce competition with Pakistan and if Israel could possibly replace them as a trading partner. But this is not so. India’s trade with the Arab countries today exceeds Rs. 100 crores a year and can be expected to grow fairly rapidly in the years to come.
The Jana Sangh makes much of the fact that religious considerations influence the thinking and policies of Arab countries towards the Kashmir dispute. But for India the more important points are that these considerations have not proved decisive, that several Arab regimes are doing all they can to secularise their people’s thinking and that this country has a vital stake in the success of this enterprise. New Delhi can strengthen the position of secular elements in Arab societies by pursuing a policy of friendship towards them. It is no small gain for this country that the majority of Arab Governments do not automatically rush to the support of Islamabad. It should be content with the neutrality of the Arabs in its disputes with Pakistan.
The Jana Sangh accused the Government of following a “partisan policy with communal motivations and overtones” in West Asia. This is a throwback to the past when the Sangh leadership charged the Congress with being pro-Muslim and anti-Hindu. This is a pity because it prevents the party from outgrowing its communalist origin.
Even otherwise the Jana Sangh shows only a dim awareness of the realities of international life. It continues to think and talk in terms of “finding reliable allies and friends” against Pakistan’s “aggressive designs”, not realising that such a search will be utterly futile.
In the past the Soviet Union and other members of the East European bloc endorsed India’s stand on Kashmir and extended to New Delhi a measure of diplomatic support as part of their competition with the United States. They are no longer prepared to do so for reasons which are well known.
Pakistan has steadily moved away from the Western alliance systems since 1961 and the Russians think that they can not only develop friendly relations with it but also wean it away from American and Chinese influence. New Delhi’s repeated protests to Moscow against the decision to provide military assistance to Pakistan have been of no avail. If the Jana Sangh has a solution to this dilemma or if it has some potential allies in view, it has kept that a closely guarded secret.
RELIABLE ALLIES
The Sangh leadership has also not woken up to the fact that there are no “reliable allies and friends” to be won against China. The Soviet Union is interested in securing India’s support in its confrontation with China and may perhaps be prepared to meet India’s needs for sophisticated weapons on a quid pro quo basis. But it is debatable whether India should make common cause with Russia against China.
Some people believe that this is a dangerous proposition because it will unnecessarily provoke Peking and subordinate India’s interests to those of the Soviet Union. Others disagree and argue that India’s close ties with Russia will discourage Chinese adventurism and make Peking more amenable to an honourable settlement. But an informal alliance with Russia is not what the Jana Sangh leaders have in view when they talk of the need for allies to deal with the Chinese menace. They are thinking principally of the old Western proposal that India, Japan and Australia should provide the nucleus for an Asian alliance.
This was not a practical proposition even when it was first mooted some years ago. Whatever interested commentators might have said, India’s commitment to the policy of non-alignment was not the only obstacle in their way. Is there anything to show that Japan was seriously interested in any form of alliance with India at any stage? Or that Australia’s principal concern has been China and not Indonesia? In any case who would have been the principal partner in such an alliance and whose interests would it have served? Those of economically and militarily weak India? Or those of Japan which has emerged as the third greatest economic power in the world, next only to the United States and the Soviet Union?
In the new context the proposal has become positively dangerous. The United States has almost decided to wind up the war in Viet Nam. This will mean the end of an era in American policy which began with Washington’s support to the French in their effort to reimpose their rule over Indo-China. In the new phase which is about to open now the United States can be expected to pursue a policy of accommodation with China. Other countries in the region will draw the necessary lesson and suitably readjust their policies. Thailand is already said to have established secret contacts with Peking.
MISGIVINGS
Should India take the lead in organising an anti-China alliance or even think of joining one in this context? It is difficult to believe that any Indian party can answer the question in the affirmative without the deepest misgivings unless, of course, it has no awareness of the sea-change that is taking place in the international situation.
Since 1962 it has become fashionable to talk of the outdated assumptions of Indian foreign policy. But what precisely are those postulates on the basis of which Mr. Nehru is supposed to have formulated the country’s foreign policy and which are said to have become irrelevant in the ‘sixties? In fact almost all of the late Prime Minister’s major assumptions have been vindicated by events.
Mr. Nehru was convinced that the East-West confrontation would not last indefinitely. A Russo- American detente is a fact of life now. He believed that the ideological facet of the struggle would lose its importance in course of time. It already has to a large extent. In fact the Soviet Union regards China as its principal enemy. Mr. Nehru said literally hundreds of times that nationalism would prove to be the decisive force in our times. Can anyone question this proposition after China’s defection from the Soviet bloc?
Mr. Nehru did not regard the communist bloc to be monolithic in which there was no place for the expression of the national personality and interests of each member. Were Mr. Dulles alive today even he would accept the correctness of this judgment. Mr. Nehru seldom criticised either NATO or the Warsaw Pact because these were broadly confined to Europe and did not impinge on the freedom of Asia or Africa. He was only opposed to the extension of these alliance systems to the non-Western world because he rightly believed that they would compromise its newly gained independence.
It is not appreciated sufficiently that soon after independence Mr. Nehru came to the conclusion that Washington was trying to establish Pax Americana and that he decided to oppose its extension to India and the area where he believed India could exercise a measure of influence. He fought Pax Americana with superb skill and success understandably to the chagrin of America and the West. He won Russia’s support in this without in any way subordinating Indian policy to that of Moscow. His policy towards China was a facet of this larger purpose and was not the result of weak-mindedness, ideological sympathy and similar other reasons which are advanced by the late Prime Minister’s critics.
Mr. Nehru undoubtedly made certain miscalculations in dealing with China and he himself said so. But others with far greater resources at their disposal have made worse miscalculations. Mr Khrushchev and Mr. Dulles were among them. If adulation of the late Prime Minister is a barrier to clear thinking so is his denigration without any understanding of the factors which inspired his outlook.
The Times of India, 30 April 1969
Author’s handwritten note, found attached to personal copy of article: This article was written almost a year earlier on the occasion of the Jana Sangh’s annual session in Bombay. This, together with the previous article represents the author’s views regarding the Jana Sangh’s approach to domestic and foreign policy problems.
The context in which the author made the note is unknown – Ed.