It is banal to say that the rise of an independent Bangladesh marks the end of the two-nation theory which led to partition in 1947. Since in place of two there are now three fully sovereign countries in the subcontinent, the disposal of the doctrine of a nationalism based on religion has not meant the triumph of the concept of one nation as expounded, among others, by Mahatma Gandhi and Jawaharlal Nehru. What then has taken or is likely to take the place of the two-nation theory?
This is an important question because on the answer to it hinges the future of the subcontinent. The situation is somewhat nebulous just now, and it will be some time before a clear picture emerges. But there is already one clue to the future. It is that Hindu communal forces will be further weakened as a result of recent developments in the subcontinent. This is bound to have a profound effect on the relations between India, Bangladesh and Pakistan, however much interested external powers try to arrest or reverse the march of history.
In a historical sense, Hindu communalism was always a lost cause. It became so particularly after 1947 when, by virtue of their overwhelming majority the Hindus acquired, for the first time in their history, a State whose writ ran from the Himalayas to Cape Comorin. But since the factors which gave birth to Hindu communalism in its present form some 50 years ago have not become altogether irrelevant, it has managed to survive.
Broadly speaking, Hindu communalism has had three facets: the community’s deep feeling of inferiority vis-a-vis the Muslims as a result of centuries of subjugation, its sense of insecurity in the context of growing westernisation, and its search for identity. The first aspect has so far been the most important though the second and third may acquire a new relevance in the years to come.
RECOVERY
Though the process of recovery of self-confidence among the Hindus began with the establishment of the British rule and the reform movements which modern education promoted in the 19th century, it was not completed by the time the country achieved independence in 1947. Partition did not reverse it or even halt it. But it made further advance difficult.
Mr. Nehru was able to prevent the resurgence of Hindu communalism partly by leading a campaign against it and partly by adopting a firm stand vis-a-vis Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. It was, however, not before the war with Pakistan in 1965 that the bogey of appeasement of Pakistan was finally laid. There has been no outcry against appeasement since then, even on the Jana Sangh’s platform. In the ‘fifties this was the party’s main plank.
But since for all practical purposes the hostilities in 1965 ended in a stalemate – General Harbaksh Singh’s claim notwithstanding – it could not help the Hindu community overcome completely its long-standing sense of inferiority. The war last December should do so because this time Indian victory has been complete and so has been Pakistan’s rout.
The inference is that the Hindu community can now be more generous in dealing with the minorities, particularly the Muslims. This is just a question of job opportunities for the steadily growing Muslim intelligentsia or even of giving it a proper share in political power. These are undoubtedly important problems, and no Indian can claim in all honesty that they have been satisfactorily solved. But the crux of the matter is that the Hindu community, which is now assured of its position and future, should be able to recognise and respect the right of the Muslims to preserve not only their religious, but also cultural and linguistic identity.
ISSUES
Relevant issues have been confused or distorted over the years for a variety of reasons. But in the perspective of history it should not be impossible for students of the subcontinent’s affairs to appreciate that just as it was unavoidable that nationalism in India should have acquired Hindu religious-cultural overtones – it was, indeed, a political expression of the Hindu resurgence brought about by modern education and social reform movements – it was more or less inevitable that the Muslims should have by and large stood away from it because psychologically they were just not prepared to concede that the majority community had the right to play a leading role in shaping the country’s future. It is a futile exercise for anyone to try to apportion blame in such a complex situation.
Whatever some people might say for the sake of scoring a point, a vast majority of the Muslims would not have participated in the freedom struggle even if it had been led not by so-called religious figures like Lokmanya Tilak and Mahatma Gandhi but by rationalists of the 19th century and radicals of the 20th century variety. The truth is that the issue involved a major readjustment of relations in terms of power, and that it could not be resolved so long as the majority community had not demonstrated its capacity to cope with the problem of modernising itself and of running a modern State, and so long as the Muslim minority did not feel compelled to overcome its nostalgia for the past when it could claim to have ruled over the country and to reconcile itself to the fact that the majority community has the right to set the tone of national life so long as it does not try to suppress the language and culture of other smaller groups.
Independence settled these issues to some extent. But in psychological terms the Muslim search for parity and equality continued, this time on a State-to-State basis, because many Muslims even in India took pride in Pakistan’s achievements.
To avoid unnecessary misunderstanding, it should be said that this observation is not made with the intention to malign anyone but with a desire to understand and explain a historical process. In fact it is quite ridiculous for anyone to suggest that a community with an intense awareness of its all-India (in the pre-1947 sense) character could have easily accepted its division along the new boundaries.
The Hindus, on their part, should have recognised after independence that the process of nation-building need not involve violence to the culture and language of any minority, specially of a community so conscious of history as the Muslims. But many of them could not do so, partly because they have been acquainted only with the relatively monolithic Anglo-US model of nationalism but mainly because they did not feel quite secure vis-a-vis Pakistan. This has been true even of those who subscribe, not wholly insincerely, to the concept of secularism.
The problem has another facet in that many genuine secularists among the Hindus have also not grasped the nature of the historical forces at play. As opposed to Mr Madhok’s theory of “Indianisation” they have taken the equally simplistic view that in a multi-religious country nationalism can and must be culturally neutral. But while it is easy to appreciate their desire to cater to the sentiments of the biggest minority, it is shocking that they should believe that a culturally neutral polity is both possible and desirable and that it alone can respect the rights and personalities of smaller groups.
In the new context this interpretation needs to be resisted as much as the monolithic view of nationalism. The advocates of a culturally neutral nationalism can make it appear that the acceptance of the standpoint can facilitate the task of strengthening good relations with Bangladesh and seeking reconciliation with what remains of Pakistan. In fact an acceptance of their prescription can only debilitate the nation and deprive it of what sustains it and distinguishes it from others.
PERTINENT
The more pertinent point immediately, however, is that as India strengthens its secular and democratic polity and increasingly demonstrates its capacity to respect the cultural and linguistic heritage of the Muslim minority, it will be laying the foundation for a new relationship not only with Bangladesh but also with Pakistan. Over the long haul the latter, too, will not be able to resist the pull of a secular, strong and friendly India.
The process of readjustment will not be easy and quick for Islamabad partly because it will find it extremely difficult to define its identity in new terms and partly because external powers will try to freeze it into its old posture of hostility towards India and cast it into the role of a central Asian power. But it cannot shirk the task for long except at the cost of its unity because only in cooperation with India can it eliminate the risk of the trans-Indus areas moving away from the subcontinent.
The Times of India, 26 January 1972