In spite of the thin attendance at the Chinese national day celebrations in New Delhi last week there is little room for doubt that there now exists in India a fairly widespread desire for a dialogue with Peking. This radical change in the popular Indian attitude does not represent a left-wing swing in public opinion and left parties, including the CPI(M), cannot claim any credit for it.
The desire for a rapprochement with China can directly be traced to the growing feeling that as a result of the quarrel with its northern neighbour India has lost all room for manoeuvre in its relations with the two superpowers, that they have tended to take New Delhi for granted, that neither has shown much respect for its susceptibilities on the sensitive issue of Kashmir, and that of late the Soviet Union has become as anxious to cultivate Pakistan as the United States has been since the early ‘fifties. Implicit in all this is an acknowledgement that Rawalpindi’s foreign policy has been more successful than New Delhi’s.
Soviet Aid
Most Indians found the situation at least tolerable so long as they felt assured of the Soviet Union’s whole-hearted support over Kashmir. But since Moscow decided earlier this year to give arms to Rawalpindi as well and to treat it more or less at par with New Delhi, the feeling has grown that the country’s present foreign policy cannot safeguard its essential national interests in the new international situation. It is notable in this context that it was only after the Soviet decision regarding arms assistance to Pakistan became known that the urge for a dialogue with China found a full-throated expression.
The Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia has inevitably strengthened this trend in Indian thinking. Generally a less harsh view is beginning to be taken of Chinese extremism and even expansionism after the brazen use of military power by Russia against a small and friendly neighbour. As it happens, the Soviet action in Czechoslovakia has come in the wake of the decision to provide arms to Pakistan. New Delhi’s policy of maintaining the friendliest possible relations with Moscow and of siding with it in all disputes with Peking has therefore been robbed of some of its appeal. The extremely harsh tone which the Soviet delegation adopted at the recent Indo-Soviet talks in New Delhi has underscored the point that excessive dependence on a superpower is a risky and at times even a dangerous proposition.
There also persists the view that the country needs to cut down its defence expenditure and that it can begin to do so once it becomes possible to take steps towards normalisation of relations with China. The continuing lack of dynamism in the economy, the shortage of funds for investment, the inability or unwillingness of governments both at the Centre and in States to raise resources through additional taxation and increasing difficulties in securing foreign aid make a detente with China attractive for a fairly significant section of the community.
On a more sophisticated level the argument is that India cannot afford to have two powerful enemies on its borders, that it must do all it can to break the unholy alliance between China and Pakistan, that in spite of Peking’s present intransigence it is likely to prove more reasonable than Rawalpindi in the long run because the Sino-Indian dispute is not as deeply rooted in history and bitter memories as the Indo-Pakistan conflict, that the international situation has changed so much in recent years that it is absurd to insist on the Colombo powers’ proposals being the only basis for border talks with Peking and, finally, that the country’s military build-up has proceeded to the point where there is no risk of the Government negotiating from a position of weakness.
It was apparently on this kind of reasoning that as Minister for External Affairs, Mr. MC Chagla, indicated last year that the Government of India was no longer wholly averse to the idea of unconditional negotiations with China. Though he had to explain away his statement in view of public criticism, it was common knowledge that the proposition enjoyed the support of a sizeable group in the External Affairs Ministry. In any case the doveish approach has since won much wider acceptance in view of the disillusionment with the Soviet Union and the reassertion of the desire for some room for manoeuvre in the international field.
Many Hurdles
All these arguments possess some merit. It is in India’s national interest to normalise relations with China if and when that is possible. New Delhi must be on the lookout and seize the first possible opportunity to begin a dialogue with Peking. The arguments are also useful for creating in the country a climate of opinion in which it would be possible for the Government to display a certain amount of flexibility in future dealings with China. But on the whole the doveish approach suffers from several grave weaknesses.
First, there is no evidence at all that the Chinese would respond to a gesture by India. In fact it appears to be a safe assumption that an Indian offer of unconditional negotiations at this stage would be regarded as a sign of weakness in Peking and would be dismissed with contempt.
This argument is open to the objection that this leaves the initiative with Peking. Unfortunately there is no other choice. An initiative for improvement in Sino-Indian relations, to be meaningful, has to come from Peking. The history of Sino-Indian relations even before the Chinese aggression in October 1962 should leave little room for argument on this score.
Secondly, in psychological terms the doveish approach represents, in spite of all the gloss, the same old desire for a soft, cheap and easy option which is just not available. The same psychology which led New Delhi in the past to believe that it could ward off undue pressure from one superpower by leaning towards the other and in the bargain receive economic aid, is at work.
It need hardly be pointed out that a search for soft options cannot be the basis of satisfactory, durable and equal relations with China. Whatever their other differences the men in Peking are playing for high stakes and they are not lively to relax pressure on India just because New Delhi is beginning to find too much dependence on superpowers rather irksome and frustrating.
Prerequisites
This is not to deny that Peking’s displeasure with India has partly been the result of the so-called convergence of American and Soviet interests and of its feeling that New Delhi has been co-operating with Washington and Moscow in their common objective of encircling China. It follows that the Chinese would review their India policy if they come to believe that this country is no longer an area of agreement between the two superpowers and that it is not interested in collaborating with them. But it is neither desirable nor feasible that New Delhi should start defying the superpowers for the sake of convincing Peking that it is truly independent of them. Moreover much more is involved in China’s hostility towards India than its alleged collusion with the United States and the Soviet Union.
Not to speak of the possibility of an actual improvement in its relations with Peking, New Delhi will have to wait for the fulfilment of certain conditions before it finds it possible even to raise the diplomatic representation to the ambassadorial level and to open talks.
First, normalisation of relations with India requires that relatively moderate men should be on top in Peking and that they should feel strong enough to be able to pursue a sane policy. This does not appear feasible in the near future in suite of the failure of the so-called great proletarian cultural revolution. For one thing, the struggle for succession to Mao Tse-tung continues. For another even the institutional picture in China is so confused just now on account of the relative eclipse of the Communist Party and the ascendancy of military commanders that it is unrealistic to expect a stable political situation to emerge there.
Secondly, the stabilisation of the political and power situation in south-east Asia is vital for better relations between India and China. It is immaterial whether or not New Delhi has thought of itself and still thinks of itself as Peking’s rival for the leadership of south-east Asia because so long as the Chinese feel that they have a reasonable chance of establishing their hegemony in the region, they would remain interested in immobilising India by supporting tribal insurrections in the north-eastern part of the country, encouraging Pakistan to maintain its hostile posture towards this country and by maintaining a certain amount of military pressure on the Himalayan border.
As a rule Indian policy makers have steadfastly refused to recognise that the withdrawal of imperialist powers from south-east Asia has created a power vacuum which other countries are trying to fill. But facts do not disappear because of our refusal to face them. The contest is between the United States and China and Peking calculates that as an outside power America cannot stay in the region indefinitely. America’s failure even to stabilise its military position in South Viet Nam and the steadily growing domestic pressure in favour of withdrawal cannot but encourage the men in Peking in the belief that history is on their side.
There is little India can do to change the situation in south-east Asia. Its resources are already spread too thinly. But it would be idle for it to expect a helpful move out of Peking so long as the situation in south-east Asia remains disturbed and therefore promising for the fulfilment of Chinese ambitions.
Thirdly, the Chinese leadership must work out a viable overall foreign policy before meaningful discussions with it can become possible for India or any other country. Since its break with the Soviet Union, Peking has clearly been marking time in the field of foreign policy. The ill-tempered propaganda that has been pouring out of China all these years, the occasional beating up of diplomats in Peking and gun-running cannot pass for one.
When things do settle down in Peking it would no doubt begin defining its priorities and overall approach. It is an open question whether it would opt for moderating its conflict with the United States or the Soviet Union.
Finally, India’s willingness to accept indefinitely the burden that defence against hostile neighbours involves, is the precondition for a reasonable attitude on the part of the Chinese. A dialogue with Peking cannot be a substitute for military preparedness; the two must supplement each other. For Indians to look for soft options is to delay the process of rapprochement with China.
The Times of India 9 October 1968