It is not surprising that Peking has taken note of a recent statement by 150 MPs calling for the recognition of Taiwan by New Delhi. But it will be unfortunate if the Chinese leaders fail to understand that in spite of all that they have done to hurt India’s national interests in the last one decade, the dominant sentiment in this country favours normal relations with theirs, and that the statement in question is a hang-over from a past which is rapidly passing into oblivion.
It is difficult to list the factors which have brought about this sea-change in the Indian public attitude. But outside the lunatic fringe, only those who completely identify themselves with the Soviet world view are opposed to the normalisation of relations with Peking. It is not too much to hope that the Chinese will not be wholly insensitive to the new mood in India.
Expediency
This is not to suggest that in their desire to embarrass Mrs. Gandhi’s Government some of the Opposition parties like the old Congress and the Jana Sangh will not raise a hullabaloo whenever it takes even the preliminary step of exchanging Ambassadors with Peking. But they will do so out of expediency and not conviction. They themselves privately recognise that India cannot secure the necessary room for manoeuvre in its relations with the outside world without some kind of a rapprochement with Peking. All in all there is not much hostility in this country towards China and it appears unlikely that a worthwhile anti-Peking campaign can be built up here.
This change in the popular mood in India is, however, likely to remain infructuous if Peking does not, in its own interest, find it necessary to revise its attitude and policy towards this country. As it happens, the Chinese Government has since last May given a number of indications which encourage the hope that it too may be interested in a thaw in its relations with India.
It all began with Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s handshake with the Indian Charge d’Affaires at the May Day celebrations in Peking. This was followed by a perceptible toning down of propaganda blasts against this country. The Chinese, for instance, did not say one word in criticism of India at the time of the Japanese Foreign Minister’s visit to New Delhi. Soon afterwards the Chinese Chamber of Commerce and the Bank of China in Hong Kong invited Indians to their functions for the first time since 1962. Then came the Chinese Ambassador’s “courtesy call” on the Indian envoy in Cairo last month.
The reasons for this thaw on the part of China are obvious. In sum, India no longer figures among its principal enemies because Peking is of necessity preoccupied with the Soviet military threat and the growing economic and military prowess of Japan. In the Chinese demonology even the United States now takes a back seat because Chairman Mao Tse-tung and his colleagues know that Washington has no choice but to reduce its military commitments on the periphery of China and that it is only a matter of time before Tokyo asserts its independence of America and steps up its efforts to realise its own nationalistic ambitions. Peking knows that it is now operating in a world which is strikingly different from the one in the ‘fifties and the ‘sixties and that it has got to adjust its policies accordingly.
India inevitably figured prominently in China’s calculations in the second half of the ‘fifties and in the early ‘sixties when Peking was trying desperately to influence and even dominate Soviet foreign policy. The Chinese intensely disliked Mr. Khrushchev’s policy of seeking a detente with the United States; they figured out that they could deflect him from this course only by a wide-ranging attack on his ideological position. This obliged them not only to call into question his view that a war with US “imperialism” was not inevitable and that a transition to socialism was possible in certain countries through democratic means but also to criticise the Soviet Union’s assistance to India.
It was a travesty of truth for the Chinese to claim, as they did in 1963, that the Tass statement of September 1959 marked the beginning of the Sino-Soviet dispute. Every student of international relations knows that the trouble between the two communist giants began with Mr. Khrushchev’s denunciation of Stalin and his other ideological formulations at the 20th Congress of the Soviet Communist Party in February 1956. But it cannot be disputed that the Chinese calculated, and rightly so, that their success in compelling the Soviet Union to abandon its policy of friendship with India could serve as the proverbial thin end of the wedge. The Russians knew it and therefore refused to budge.
Mistake
It is safe after this to conclude that once Peking gave up the hope of influencing Soviet foreign policy some time in 1965, that is, when Mr. Brezhnev and Mr. Kosygin continued to follow Mr. Khrushchev’s overall approach after his overthrow, its hostility towards India lost much of its raison d’etre. At the same time the Chinese wrecked the Afro-Asian forum where India could be their rival. No one has taken the initiative for holding a second Bandung-type summit after the fiasco in Algiers in 1965.
Logically a thaw in the Chinese attitude towards this country should therefore have taken place five years ago. But the cultural revolution made that impossible. What is more, Peking did not become sufficiently aware of the reality of Japanese power and its consequences until recently. The Chinese leaders apparently made the mistake of thinking that Japan would always be a satellite of the USA. They may be thinking so to some extent even today. But on the whole they are displaying a greater awareness of the realities than in the past.
If this overall view of the Chinese thinking is correct, there is not much reason for New Delhi to be alarmed over the recent Radio Peking broadcast which has taken exception to the celebration of an India-Taiwan friendship week in New Delhi and the holding of a Tibetan Youth conference in Dharamsala last month.
It is possible that the Chinese leaders still do not quite understand the working of the Indian political system and that they tend to believe that the Government colludes with opposition groups which favour an independent Tibet and recognition for Formosa. If this is so, it can become an obstacle in the path of the normalisation of relations which both Peking and New Delhi desire. But the danger does not appear to be unmanageable and need not be exaggerated.
Objections
Another interpretation is equally feasible. It is that in the process of laying down conditions for Sino-Indian co-existence and even friendship at some later date, the Chinese have resurrected the principle of non-interference in each other’s internal affairs and thereby suggested by implication that they too are prepared to end their support to the Naga and Mizo rebels and to the Naxalites on a quid pro quo basis.
This interpretation is open to three possible objections. First, it can be argued that since in theory Peking has never repudiated the principle of non-interference it does not need to resurrect it. Secondly it has conveniently drawn a distinction between “illegitimate” interference and “legitimate” support to so-called wars of national liberation and that it can continue to do so. Finally, if the Chinese are realistic they will know that New Delhi can only complicate the task of normalising and improving relations with them if it restricts still further the activities of the Dalai Lama and his entourage at this stage and takes undue notice of the pro-Formosa “lobby” in the country. The implication is that Peking must first call off its aid to rebel groups in India if it is interested in a quid pro quo.
These are substantial points. But it is pertinent to remember that though it is true that the Chinese proclaim their faith both in the principle of non-interference and in support for so-called wars of national liberation, they have not allowed their enthusiasm for revolutionary causes to interfere with their relations with countries which they regard as friendly. Burma is perhaps the only exception to this rule of Chinese diplomacy and even in that case Chinese interference has fluctuated with the state of Peking’s official relations with Rangoon. Secondly, the very fact that the Chinese attach so much importance to the activities of the Dalai Lama and the pro-Formosa lobby suggests that they may be prepared to pay a price for any new curbs on them. In any case, it will be worthwhile for New Delhi to explore whether or not the Chinese are interested in a quid pro quo. The possibility of an informal deal should not be rejected in view of the rapid changes in the world scene.
It is still open to question whether the Chinese are prepared to move so far and so fast. But it is notable that they acted precisely in that fashion in the early ‘fifties once they were convinced of Mr. Nehru’s independence of the West. If the Chinese wanted to be difficult and to throw a damper on reports regarding a possible Sino-Indian rapprochement they would in all probability have reaffirmed their border claims and reiterated their charge that New Delhi was acting in collusion with the United States, the Soviet Union and Japan to encircle their country. They have not done so.
The Times of India, 11 November 1970