US spokesmen have made three different kinds of statements regarding the proposed sale of lethal weapons to Pakistan. Since these are mutually contradictory, they have further widened the credibility gap.
American officials from the Secretary of State, Mr. William Rogers, to the Ambassador in New Delhi, Mr. Kenneth Keating, have repeatedly claimed that this is a one-time exception to the embargo on the sale of lethal weapons to India and Pakistan. At the same time they have said that the arms in questions are replacements for those which have been worn out. This is factually incorrect. Three hundred armed troop carriers cannot be said to be a replacement. But even if this was so, the two US positions would be mutually contradictory. Once Washington accepts the principle that it is obliged to replace worn out equipment in the possession of Pakistan, it will have to do so again and again.
Similarly if the United States is serious, as it claims to be, about weaning Pakistan away from China or Russia or both, it will have to resume its old role as Islamabad’s main source of arms supply. It cannot be so naive as to believe that President Yahya Khan or his successor will ever agree to dilute his country’s friendship with Peking or Moscow in return for limited supplies by America. American officials and diplomats should therefore be not surprised if most people in India tend to reject their assurance that the proposed sale to Pakistan is a one-shot affair. They must not delude themselves into believing that Mrs Gandhi’s Government is primarily responsible for the popular scepticism.
Solemn Pledges
They must know that the popular reaction has largely been conditioned by Washington’s failure to live up to its solemn pledges in 1965. No satisfactory explanation for this failure has so far been forthcoming from the United States.
It would have been a different matter if Pakistan had sprung a surprise on America. In point of fact Islamabad staged a rehearsal in the Rann of Kutch in April and May that year to test India’s determination as well as the US response to the deliberate misuse of weapons supplied by it. Pakistan sent infiltrators into Kashmir only when it was convinced that it had nothing to fear by way of retaliation by either New Delhi or Washington.
The Johnson Administration was fully aware that President Ayub Khan was moving towards a military confrontation with India. An American colonel who was then serving in Pakistan, for instance, made a public statement that he and his colleagues knew that tanks were being painted battle grey. The Indian Embassy also drew Washington’s attention to war preparations in Pakistan. Yet Washington did not think it necessary even to lodge a strong protest with Islamabad.
It is not known sufficiently widely in India that a war ‘game’ was played by the Institute of Defence Analysis in Washington sometime between December 30, 1964 and March 1965, that is just before Islamabad precipitated the crisis in the Rann of Kutch. The first date can be fixed because the ‘scenario’ takes note of the arrest of 800 left communists and the second because the book “The Crisis Game” which includes a description of the ‘game’ was then sent for publication by the author, Mr. Sidney F. Giffin.
The scenario bore a striking resemblance to Pakistani plans in August-September 1965. It is a different matter if these plans miscarried partly because the Chinese did not attack India and partly because Pakistani Pattons got bogged down in the Khem Karan sector. Two excerpts may be quoted. It should however be noted that the scenario provided for a conflict in 1966 and not in 1965.
Mutual Support
It said: “Peking in the winter of 1966 informed Pakistan of its intention ‘to eject interlopers from the south of China’, commencing with favourable summer weather, and suggested that the consequent probable diversion of Indian military forces should offer a favourable opportunity for Pakistan to assume its ‘rightful control’ over Kashmir. Pakistan responded by expressing concern over the position of East Pakistan, vulnerable as it was to a surrounding India and to internal Hindu subversions, should Pakistan make any offensive move to the Kashmir area. Peking, with unconcealed contempt for Indian military capabilities, assured Lahore that Chinese forces would be so poised as to counter Indian threats to East Pakistan. Agreement on mutual support for military operations to achieve Pakistani occupation of Kashmir and Chinese occupation of all Himalayan border claims was thereafter reached, the target date being September 1, 1966.”
It should be noted that Marshal Chen Yi visited Pakistan at the time of the crisis in September 1965 and that Mr. Bhutto led President Ayub Khan to believe that the Chinese will come to the assistance of Pakistan. He apparently had private lines of communication with Peking. After the war was over, he claimed that India had been deterred from attacking East Pakistan because of the fear of retaliation by China.
The scenario then goes on to add: “Pakistan commenced a series of complaints respecting ‘aggressive Indian incursions’ across the ceasefire line in Kashmir. UN truce teams in the area were unable to confirm such Indian incursions. On August 30 all communications from truce teams on the Pakistani side of the cease-fire line broke off (the teams having been taken into protective custody by the Pakistani Army). Early on August 31, Pakistani forces, which had been moving up nocturnally for the purpose, crossed the cease-fire line in Kashmir. Indian troops were driven back, truce teams on their side of the cease-fire line moving with them and reporting back to the United Nations firm evidence of a Pakistani violation of the truce.”
Pertinent Points
This is not to insinuate in any way that the Johnson Administration connived at Pakistan’s aggression in 1965. War ‘games’ have been organised in the West for decades and are played at various campuses in America. But certain points are pertinent. First, those who are involved in these games are often consultants to the State Department and the Pentagon. Their efforts are financed by some official agency and the results are available to them. Secondly, if the consultants could anticipate the developments in question, the US Administration can have no excuse for pleading that it was taken by surprise. Why then did it not act? It did not either warn Pakistan or step up military assistance to India in spite of the possibility of a joint Sino-Pakistani attack. It in fact dragged its feet on the question of the supply of sophisticated equipment and finally turned down India’s requests. It was only then that New Delhi turned to the Soviet Union for arms assistance.
All this is recalled at this stage to show that there are good reasons why the Government and people of India have reacted sharply to the supply of US arms to Pakistan.
The sale of tanks by the Soviet Union to Islamabad – the number is generally placed at 250 – may well constitute a greater threat to India’s security than the present US supply. But if that did not produce an equally fierce emotional reaction in this country the reason simply is that Russian weapons have not been used by Pakistan to attack it and that Moscow has so far not failed to live up to its pledges.
If the Americans are prepared to examine the issue dispassionately, they will not need to make the absurd charge that India is guilty of double standards. This country, like any other, is bound to be guided largely by its experience which is that while the Soviet Union has been helpful on issues bearing on its security, the United States has not been forthcoming for whatever reasons. While New Delhi has repeatedly been rebuffed by Washington, it has seldom faced disappointment in its dealings with Moscow.
The Soviet Union stood by this country on the Kashmir issue in the late ‘fifties and early ‘sixties when the United States and Britain brought to bear the maximum pressure on New Delhi to compel it virtually to surrender the valley to Pakistan. Apparently Washington and London did not care if this undermined the country’s political fabric.
The US failure to appreciate India’s position on Kashmir has not been an accident. It has been the result of a massive divergence in the world views of the two countries. These did not meet even after the Chinese aggression against this country in 1962 because while New Delhi looked upon the problem of security strictly from the limited national point of view, Washington wanted to utilise the opportunity to push India into a regional defence arrangement and thereby destroy its credentials as a non aligned country.
India may face similar pressures from Moscow in years to come as the Soviet Union establishes a strong naval presence in the Indian Ocean. The danger will be specially acute if it succeeds in consolidating its position in West Asia. Though it is the task of Indian leaders to anticipate this possibility and take measures to counter it, they cannot possibly ignore the fact that so far the area of agreement between Moscow and New Delhi has been wider than the area of disagreement.
It is self-evident that the Soviet Union has been guided by its appreciation of its national interest. But its opposition to US hegemony in Asia has suited India and other countries which have been led by men inspired by anti-imperialism and a desire for genuine independence. Since Russia has not been in a position either to dominate New Delhi or subvert the democratic regime, the latter has had no cause either for complaint or for falling in line with the US view of the communist threat.
All in all, US officials and diplomats should take a fresh look at the history of Indo-American relations on the one hand and of Indo-Soviet ties on the other before they rush to the conclusion that New Delhi is applying double standards because it leans to the left and depends on the CPI for support. The issues are extremely complicated and it does not help to simplify them.
The Times of India 18 November 1970