While one can only hazard a guess whether the shift in China’s policy towards the United States is the result largely of more pragmatic men coming on top in Peking or of a new flexibility on the part of Chairman Mao Tse-tung, it is clear that the Chinese want something more than a limited detente.
It will not be altogether surprising, however, if the progress of the Sino-US dialogue is as slow as that of the Russo-American talks. The problem of Formosa can prove to be as intractable in this case as that of Berlin was till recently in the other. But it will be wrong to push this parallel too far. For, while the Soviet Union has been America’s rival for worldwide influence since 1945, Peking is not and cannot hope to compete with Washington on a global scale in the foreseeable future.
China is economically weak and technologically backward. Mr. Chou En-lai himself admitted that much in a recent interview to Mr. James Reston of The New York Times. China cannot become the third super-power for a long time despite the growth of its nuclear armoury. It will remain a regional power. As such America and China can seek and achieve accommodation with each other more easily.
This will be still easier if it is true, as some leading Sinologists believe that the Chinese continue to think of their country as the middle kingdom, that they do not regard the thought of Mao Tse-tung as an exportable commodity, that their obsessive emphasis on ideology has been defensive in character in that it has been intended to insulate their country against the Soviet Union’s claim to supremacy in the communist world and that modernisation and consolidation of their nation remain their principal, if not their only, concern.
Dynamic
A pragmatic regime in Peking capable of working through the overseas Chinese, the most dynamic community all over South-East Asia, may find it easier to achieve its ambitions in the region. But that is not likely to stand in the way of Sino-US understanding.
Since everyone knows by now that the Sino-US dialogue would not have made any progress at all if US policy in Asia had not suffered a serious reverse and if the two countries were not equally disturbed by Russia’s rapidly growing military power, it is no longer necessary to emphasise these points. But the place of Japan in their respective schemes of things deserves more attention than it has received so far.
China’s position in this regard is fairly obvious. Having had personal experience of Japanese aggression, Chairman Mao and his colleagues are deeply concerned at the increase in that country’s military capability. They are also extremely sensitive to Japan’s economic penetration of South-East Asia because they see in it the fulfilment of the old imperial concept of co-prosperity sphere in a different guise. Above all, they know that if Tokyo goes in for nuclear weapons, it will outclass them in a few years on the strength of its far superior industrial and technological base. They are determined to prevent this at all costs even if they have to reconcile themselves to continued US nuclear presence in the area. Mr. Chou En-lai has hinted as much in his remarkably candid interview with Mr. James Reston.
The American perception of Japan’s role and status is by no means as clear. But it will not be altogether surprising if Washington co-operates with Peking in ensuring that Tokyo does not go nuclear. For one thing, the Americans themselves have a lively appreciation of Japan’s military potential, which in our era means nuclear strength, in view of their bitter memories of Pearl Harbour. For another, they have mesmerised themselves into believing that if Japan goes nuclear, India, and possibly Israel too, will follow suit and that an increase in the number of nuclear powers will nullify all their efforts to establish a stable world order.
Intimate
This is not to suggest that the Sino-US dialogue marks the beginning of a reversal of alliances in the Far East. In fact, while America and China may not even be able to establish normal diplomatic relations for years in view of Washington’s defence treaty with Formosa, US-Japanese ties, especially in the economic field, will remain strong and intimate. At the same time it will not be too much of an exaggeration to say that the days when American policy in the region centred primarily on Japan are gone.
Japan’s importance in the American scheme of things has clearly been the result of its perception of China as an expansionist and irresponsible power. It is likely to be reduced as Washington deals with the Chinese leaders and becomes convinced that they are not wild men bent on provoking a nuclear catastrophe in the pursuit of extraordinary ambitions. Its emphasis will, therefore, inevitably tend to shift from containment to a proper regional balance which does not deny China its legitimate place in the region.
If this is a credible projection, it raises three questions. First, will Japan be content with the status of a non-nuclear power for ever or will Japanese nationalism assert itself once again to make nonsense of the plans the Americans and the Chinese may draw up? Secondly, will the Soviet Union try to encourage Tokyo’s ambitions and seek an arrangement with it in order to frustrate Sino-US co-operation? Finally, will Japan respond to Moscow’s overtures with their obvious anti-US and anti-Chinese overtone?
It is impossible to answer these questions with certainty. One can only speculate on future developments whose outlines are barely discernible today. But as of now it appears that if there was ever an opportunity for the Japanese to acquire nuclear weapons and thus become the third super-power, they have missed it. In theory, they have the right to defy the United States and China but in practice they will find it extremely difficult to do so. Japan, in short, is likely to find itself in the same position as West Germany.
In fact the Japanese may soon discover that the concept of a Pacific community, comprising, apart from their own country, Australia, New Zealand, the Philippines, the US and Canada, on the lines of the European Economic Community, has also ceased to be a practical proposition, partly because it cannot square with Washington’s desire to find a modus vivendi with Peking and partly because the Americans have come to regard them as their toughest competitors in the economic field.
It is only to be expected that the Japanese will find it galling to accept the consequences of a Sino-US rapprochement and their own non-nuclear status. But what other option do they have? Even if a revival of xenophobic nationalism and militarism were not out of question which it is, it would only complicate the problem for them in so far as it would alienate the United States and draw it much closer to China.
The Soviet Union will naturally want to take advantage of Japan’s dilemma. It will try to see to it that instead of going in for large-scale investment in the development of mineral resources in Manchuria as desired by the Chinese (the Americans, too, may endorse such plans) the Japanese opt for joint projects in Siberia. But Moscow is as allergic to the acquisition of nuclear weapons by Tokyo as Washington and Peking.
Main Threat
As for the Japanese, they have all along believed, rightly or wrongly, that the main threat to their security comes from the Soviet Union and not from China. Their programme of naval expansion is also intended to ensure that the Soviet fleet in the Indian Ocean does not interfere with their trade routes in the Persian Gulf and the Malacca Straits. They are highly sensitive on this issue because ninety cent of their oil supplies come from the Persian Gulf via the Malacca Straits. That is incidentally one reason why they have been so critical of the Indo-Soviet treaty.
All in all, it appears on present reckoning that in the wake of the American withdrawal from Indochina and the reduction in its overall military presence in the region, a new power balance will slowly emerge there as a result of the competition and co-operation among the three great powers – the United States, China and the Soviet Union – and that Japan will suitably adjust itself to the new reality.
New Delhi has to take note of the emerging power balance in the region. It should have no great difficulty in recognising that it will need reasonably good relations with all the four major actors – America, Russia, China and Japan – if it is not to find the dice heavily loaded against it.
The Times of India 15 September 1971