Two top officials of the US State Department, Mr. Kenneth Rush and Mr. Joseph Sisco, will be in New Delhi on April 20 and 21 to begin what one hopes will develop into a meaningful dialogue. If this is not to prove an exercise in futility, both sides will have to recognise that developments in the Persian Gulf will profoundly affect the course of Indo-US relations in the ‘seventies and that it will be irrelevant to think in terms of co-operation between the two countries unless they discover and promote a community of interests in this vital area. Gone are the days when Indo-US relations could have been stabilised with the termination of American military supplies to Pakistan and direct involvement in Indochina.
This is not to suggest that these two preconditions for improved Indo-US relations have been met but that they have become inadequate. In fact the growing US involvement in the Persian Gulf will impinge much more directly on Indian interests than American involvement in Indochina during the last two decades.
Moonshine
On the face of it, the talk of common American-Indian interests in the Persian Gulf is pure moonshine. Indeed, it appears that the two countries are heading towards an open conflict as Washington implements its programme of arming Iran with highly sophisticated weapons – the present deal itself amounts to the fantastic figure of two billion dollars – to make it by far the best armed power in the Gulf and encourages it and Pakistan to establish still closer ties. This unfortunate development can be avoided only if Washington and New Delhi do not respond to the radically different situations and problems of today in the style of the ‘fifties and realise that these call for a fresh approach on the part of each of them.
The crux of the matter is that while the United States should recognise that it cannot ensure peace in the Gulf solely on the strength of an Iran-Pakistan axis and similar other military moves, India should realise that it, too, has a stake in the stability of the area.
A US-backed Pakistan-Iran axis as distinct from common membership of the largely ineffectual CENTO will cause justified anxiety in this country and oblige it to step up its defence expenditure and take such other measures as it regards necessary to meet the threat. This will make nonsense of any hope of reconciliation and peace in the sub-continent and instead stimulate a dangerous arms race.
From America’s own point of view, its policy of promoting and supporting a Pakistan-Iranian axis is likely to prove self-defeating. For, an arrangement that alienates India and aggravates the Indo-Pakistan conflict will increase rather than decrease Iran’s sense of isolation and insecurity. It will be logical in the circumstances for the Nixon Administration to do all it can to persuade the Shah to adopt a more friendly and cooperative attitude towards this country than he has done in the recent past and assure it that he will not pass on surplus military equipment to Pakistan.
It is open to question whether Iraq would have gone in for a treaty with the Soviet Union if the Shah had not forcibly seized the three islands of Abu Musa and the two Tunbs at the entrance of the Hormuz Straits on the eve of the British departure from the Gulf in 1971. In view of the historic feud between Teheran and Baghdad over the control of the Shatt al-Arab estuary and the conflict over their respective shares of the continental shelf, it is possible that the latter would have invoked Soviet power to offset Iran’s claims to hegemony in the area. Even so, the Shah could have handled the whole affair with greater discretion and thereby avoided further complications for himself and his country.
Be that as it may, there cannot be much doubt that he will be throwing the entire region into turmoil if he intervenes in the affairs of the sub-continent by supplying military hardware to Islamabad. India will take a much more grim view of such an action by him than it did in the past because his capacity to tilt the balance against it so far has been rather limited. Now that he is spending billions of dollars on military purchases he needs to act with greater discretion.
President Nixon and the Shah will also do well to take note of the possibility that an intensification of the conflict with India is likely to upset the internal power balance in Pakistan to the advantage of young radicals, specially in the armed forces, who are already said to be disillusioned with President Bhutto because he has abandoned his earlier plank of drastic changes in the economy and modified his call for a thousand years of crusade against India. The recent arrest of 20 middle-level army officers on charges of conspiracy is relevant in this context.
Result
As a result of the East-West ideological cold war which has dominated the world scene for over a quarter of a century, the word radicalism has come to have a Marxist connotation. But the rise of Col. Gaddafy and the relative eclipse of Nasserism in Egypt should persuade policy-makers in leading capitals to recognise that the concept can acquire a religious character not only in West Asia but also Pakistan.
The personality of Col. Gaddafy was undoubtedly a decisive factor in the overthrow of King Idris in September 1969 and more than any other single factor it is responsible for the Libyan government’s emphasis on the need for a return to the pure faith of early Islam. More than any other leading Muslim figure of our era he has also come to represent all the major movements that have swept the Muslim world with varying degrees of intensity in the last one hundred years – revivalism, anti-Westernism, anti-communism and radicalism.
President Nasser, too, was influenced by these ideas and, to put it more accurately, passions. But in opting for the concept of pan-Arabism in place of pan-Islamism, he introduced an element of secularism in his political philosophy and programme. This came to be emphasised more and more in the course of his struggle against pro-West conservative monarchs and sheikhs precisely because in self-defence they raised the banner of pan-Islamism and tried to create the impression that he had opened the gates to the imported ideology of atheistic communism.
Neither Col. Gaddafy nor President Sadat has repudiated President Nasser’s concept of pan-Arabism or what has come to be known as Arab nationalism. In fact both swear by it and by and large limit their activities to West Asia, though Col. Gaddafy is known to have extended some financial assistance to the Muslim guerilla movement in the Philippines. But under the stress of events even the much more moderate Egyptian leader has come to rely on religion to buttress his position in the struggle against Israel and domestic critics, liberals as well as leftists, and this despite the fact that Egypt has a fairly large Copt minority which is Christian.
Subversion
The point about all this is that the rise of a Gaddafy cannot be ruled out not only in a country like Saudi Arabia where the situation is not very dissimilar from the one that obtained under King Idris in Libya but also in Pakistan where conditions are different in view of the presence of a large middle class and well organised and strong administration.
When the Shah says that Saudi Arabia lies open to subversion, he is apparently thinking in terms of a coup inspired and organised from abroad. This is understandable in view of Iran’s obsession with the Soviet Union because of its troubles with its northern neighbour in the past and the assistance that the rebels in Oman receive from external sources. But the Shah must not be oblivious to the fact that the free officers in Libya in 1969 acted completely independently. It is equally important that he realises that religious fanaticism can be as disruptive of a moderate regime in Pakistan as the Marxist-inspired concept of revolution.
On its part India also cannot be indifferent to developments in the Persian Gulf because the success of so-called radicalism there can inspire a similar movement in Pakistan and create new difficulties for it even at home. It will do well to note that the policy of leaning towards the radical Arab nationalists which served it well during the better part of the Nassar era has lost much of its utility and effectiveness in the changed circumstances. There is not much it can do to prevent sudden and unhelpful changes in the gulf area. But it should be willing to seize any opportunity that comes it way to establish and maintain a frank dialogue with both Washington and Teheran.
The Times of India 18 April 1973