It is extraordinary that some people, who are unhappy with certain facets of foreign policy, should limit their criticism to Mr. Swaran Singh and spare Mrs Gandhi altogether. After all, they know full well that major policy decisions are taken by her, that she does not depend exclusively on the briefs she receives from the minister or the ministry of external affairs, and that quite often Mr. Singh only implements decisions that are handed down to him.
Unlike some other members of the cabinet who privately voice disagreement with the Prime Minister, Mr. Singh invariably owns responsibility even for policies which he has not helped shape. The Indo-Soviet treaty is a case in point. Though he was not actively involved in the negotiations, he has never expressed reservations about the pact. On the contrary, he has strongly defended it in Parliament and outside.
Trait
This trait in his personality may or may not make him an ideal foreign minister. But it should endear him to those who swear by Mrs. Gandhi. At least it should convince them that he is not the kind of person who would go to South Korea, or take upon himself the task of removing misunderstandings with Iran, or make hopeful statements regarding relations with China, without Mrs. Gandhi’s tacit, if not explicit, support. Why then are some of the leftists so angry with him? Or is it a war of nerves against the Prime Minister whom, right now, they do not consider it discreet to criticise? Be that as it may, it is clear that Mr. Singh’s critics would not have been furious over his visit to Seoul if they were not convinced that it is part of the larger policy of improving relations with the United States. For, they cannot in all conscience claim that some of the regimes with which India maintains close ties with their approval, are any more solicitous of the rights of dissenters than President Park.
Indeed, they hardly make any secret of their deep concern that, despite all the attacks on the CIA, the government may finally be moving towards an understanding with Washington. On the contrary, they go so far as to suggest that some bureaucrats and ministers have deliberately wrecked the procurement drive in order to create an acute shortage of food so that they are free to reach a new understanding with the United States. This is, of course, utter nonsense. But it provides an excellent index of their anxiety.
It is notable that the detractors of the policy of friendship with America have for quite some time not cared to recall the concept of non-alignment. This cannot be, and is not, a case of oversight. It is deliberate. Behind it lies the view that the treaty with the Soviet Union marked a qualitative change in India’s foreign policy and any attempt on New Delhi’s part to restore the old balance by improving relations with the other super-power is a retrograde step which must be fought tooth and nail.
Obviously these over-enthusiastic supporters of the Soviet Union do not wish to pay much attention either to the extraordinary circumstances in which Mrs. Gandhi agreed to sign the treaty or to the specific clause in it which says that Moscow would continue to respect this country’s right to pursue the policy of non-alignment. But unless they are living in a world of make-believe even they cannot be indifferent to the perils inherent in the approach they favour.
Since the end of the war with Pakistan and the establishment of Bangladesh in December 1971, the central foreign policy issue for not only Mrs. Gandhi but also Mr. Brezhnev in South Asia has been whether they should work for its pacification or polarisation. They have doubtless opted for the first course as is evident from the series of agreements the Prime Minister has reached with Mr. Bhutto and the backing the Soviet leader has given to her in this regard. But Mr. Brezhnev must be as well aware as Mrs. Gandhi that in the final analysis no amount of concessions by India can produce durable peace in South Asia unless the Shah of Iran and the US administration are helpful, and that they will not adopt such an attitude unless they are assured of New Delhi’s bona fides towards Islamabad on the one hand and its independence of Moscow on the other.
This, on a superficial view, can be said to place the Soviet leadership in a dilemma in that it cannot hope to achieve its objective of a peaceful South Asia and Persian Gulf unless it is willing to content itself with a measure of influence in India, which is not very different from the one it enjoyed before the treaty of 1971, or would have enjoyed in the absence of a formal pact. But in view of Mr. Brezhnev’s commitment to detente with the United States, the dilemma is more apparent than real. The speed with which the Soviet government has reached an agreement with Iran, tripling the price of gas in one year, underscores the same point.
Logic
But even if some individuals in Moscow do not wish to face up to the compulsions of the situation and the logic of their own policy of detente with America, it does not follow that any sensible Indian should ignore the requirements of his country. Leaving aside for the moment its desperate need for economic assistance, it cannot abandon the policy of non-alignment except at the cost of its cherished objective of a South Asia where the countries concerned can settle their disputes through bilateral negotiations without interference by external powers.
Friendship is obviously not a one-way affair. In plain terms, India’s desire to cultivate America would have been futile and even humiliating if the latter was not responsive. But Washington is far from unresponsive. If it were, it would not have written off the enormous rupee debt under PL 480, withheld military supplies to Pakistan and looked kindly on the entente cordiale which has developed between New Delhi and Teheran in the past one year.
Washington is doubtless guided in its moves towards this country by a hard-headed appreciation of its own interests and not by any abstract concept of goodwill. It recognises that polarisation of countries of South Asia and the Persian Gulf along cold war lines could lead to instability and even place a strain on the Soviet-US detente. But this only proves that there now exists mutuality of interests between America and India and New Delhi has a better chance of establishing friendly relations with Washington on a more satisfactory basis than in the past.
This assessment does not, of course, dispose of the residue of the old distrust and the suspicions aroused in this country as a result of the latest disclosures regarding the CIA’s role in Chile. Both these inevitably influence Indian public opinion which the policy-makers cannot disregard. But it will be unfortunate if they become prisoners either of the past which is dead, or of suspicion which, however justified, cannot be allowed to overshadow all other considerations.
In purely rational terms it is pointless to hark back to the ‘fifties when the United States decided to arm Pakistan because that decision flowed from an obsession and an arrogance of power which the American people themselves have repudiated after the anguish and humiliation of failure in Viet Nam. We can legitimately take pride in the fact that in Mr. Nehru we had a leader who refused either to share the American obsession with a non-existent communist monolith or to be cowed down by its overwhelming power. But constant references to that phase in Indo-US relations are as much a sign of lack of maturity on our part as American reminders of assistance on theirs. Witness the ease with which the Chinese set aside past disputes.
Role
The CIA is a different proposition. So long as it is not conclusively established that it has at long last been forced by the American people to give up its activist role, India will need to remain vigilant. But this applies to all foreign intelligence agencies – one would be naive to believe that the KGB does not operate in India – and friendship with the United States does not by any means involve acquiescence in interference in our internal affairs by the CIA. Firmness is not antithetical to understanding. Instead it provides the only genuine basis for long-term amity.
Not much is known about the CIA’s activities in India. The government has been singularly reluctant to provide details through the normal procedure of well arranged leaks. Even Mrs. Gandhi has contented herself with vague charges. But judging by the book, “The Cult of Intelligence” by Victor Marchetti, a former assistant to the deputy director of the CIA, and Mr. John D. Mark, who worked for the director of intelligence in the State Department and articles in foreign journals, it would appear that the government of India itself has in the past acquiesced, to put it no higher, in some of its activities. By hindsight it is open to doubt whether this was necessary or useful. But in view of Chinese activities along the Himalayan frontier can anyone say that there was no provocation for it? This doubtless cannot be the end of the matter, but government has to take such things in its stride.
The Times of India, 25 September 1974