It is unfortunate that Mr. Kissinger’s visit to New Delhi should have been preceded by a controversy here over the need to seek food imports from the United States on concessional terms. For, this has obscured the central and significant point about the trip, which is that developments over the years have created favourable conditions for co-operation between the two countries on mutually acceptable terms.
It is worth recalling-that during the entire Nehru era, Indo-US relations were vitiated not so much by American military assistance to Pakistan as by Washington’s conviction that it alone could protect newly independent countries against the threat of a communist takeover and Sino-Soviet domination. Indeed, though US arms aid to Pakistan inevitably dominated the popular Indian reaction, it was only an offshoot of the larger US view of the Asian scene. As such, there could be no long-term and genuine friendship between New Delhi and Washington so long as the latter continued to seek some form of hegemony in Asia as part of its worldwide anti-communist crusade.
Obstacle
This obstacle began to disappear in 1968 when a large and influential section of the American public was finally convinced that military victory was impossible in Indo-China and compelled President Johnson not only to put a stop to bombing raids on North Viet Nam but also to withdraw from the electoral battle. President Nixon’s Guam Doctrine, whereby the United States modified its self-imposed role of the world’s gendarmerie, flowed logically from the growing disenchantment and protest at home.
The Indian people were then too indignant over American actions in Indo-China and too preoccupied with domestic developments to pay sufficient attention to the American retreat and appreciate its significance for our bilateral relations with Washington. But it is clear in retrospect that the Guam Doctrine marked the beginning of the end of the phase in the USA’s Asia policy and the inauguration of another in which it would seek accommodation with China and allow other countries in the region to sort out their problems without undue interference.
The second question which bedevilled Indo-US relations in the Nehru era related to this country’s place in South Asia. No one can say how this issue would have been sorted out if it had not come to the fore as a result of the Bangladesh crisis in 1971, precisely at a time when President Nixon and Mr. Kissinger were engaged in the task of normalising relations with China and in the process ending the American search for hegemony in Asia. But as things developed, India’s easy military victory in the East, China’s reluctance as well as inability to come to the rescue of Islamabad and the break-up of Pakistan settled the question so convincingly as to leave the US administration in no doubt regarding this country’s natural pre-eminence in South Asia.
Since the influx of millions of destitute refugees from East Bengal as a result of the reign of terror there threatened the social, economic and political fabric of the whole of north-eastern India, this country felt that it was entitled to the support of the world community, including the United States. It was therefore deeply aggrieved when the Nixon administration not only failed to condemn Pakistan for the atrocities committed by the army in East Bengal but resumed a limited supply of weapons which Islamabad had purchased before the crackdown on March 25, 1971, and subsequently decided to “tilt” towards it to the extent of sending a powerful naval task force headed by the aircraft Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal. But in historic terms, 1971 saw the resolution of two outstanding differences between New Delhi and Washington – India’s place in South Asia and America’s policy towards China and the rest of Asia.
A less imaginative leadership in the United States than that provided by Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger could well have responded negatively to the outcome of the Indo-Pakistan conflict in 1971. It could have decided to resume military aid to Islamabad in an attempt to deprive New Delhi of the political advantages of its military victory, and justified it on the plea that by signing the treaty of friendship and co-operation with the Soviet Union, India had abandoned its policy of non-alignment and virtually moved into the Russian camp. But, Mr. Nixon and Mr. Kissinger did nothing of the kind. Instead, they quickly recognised Bangladesh and supported its application for admission to the United Nations, thereby indicating clearly that they recognised and accepted the new realities in the sub-continent.
Evidence
In the absence of any evidence at all either way, it is impossible to say whether or not simultaneously with the move to accept the new balance in South Asia, the Nixon-Kissinger leadership also decided to do all it could to promote Indo-Iranian understanding and friendship. Two points are, however, reasonably clear. First, India could not hope to consolidate its gains in South Asia in the absence of accommodation with Iran because it could have found itself in an extremely difficult position if the Shah, flush with enormous oil revenues and extremely sophisticated military hardware, had decided to reactivate the alliance with Pakistan and transfer some of his even relatively older weaponry to it. Secondly, even if he had independently come to the conclusion that it was in his country’s best long-term interest to cultivate India, Washington could, if it so desired, have impeded the progress of Indo-Iranian detente by feeding the Shah’s fears. It is no secret that until the middle of 1973 he had grave misgivings regarding India’s intentions in view of its treaty relations with the Soviet Union.
Be that as it may, the Indo-Iranian detente has developed into entente cordiale and the way has been cleared for Indo-US cooperation. Thus in a sense it is only logical that Mr. Kissinger should have followed and not preceded the Shah of Iran to New Delhi.
There are doubtless some people here who are critical of these developments in the country’s foreign policy. Their thinking is so completely dominated by the legacy of the past that they are unable either to recognise remarkable changes that have taken place in the American view of Asia as a result of the painful realisation of the limitations of US power and in Iran’s policy or to come to terms with the emergence of their own country as the pre-eminent power in South Asia. The general secretary of the CPI, Mr. Rajeshwar Rao, spoke for this section of the Indian intelligentsia the other day when he made the alarmist statement that “one IBM or General Motors will suffice to upturn the Indira Gandhi government.” Surely, one cannot look for a more depressing expression of utter lack of self-confidence.
Contradiction
Mr. Rao and other like-minded political leaders and intellectuals are, of course, concerned lest Indo-Soviet relations suffer as a consequence of a significant improvement in this country’s ties with the United States. But implicit in their approach is the Chinese view that the contradiction between the two super powers is irreconcilable and “their contention is all-embracing, permanent and absolute.” They cannot otherwise regard Indo-US friendship as contradictory of Indo-Soviet cooperation.
The CPI leaders may not be aware that there is a contradiction between their welcome to the Russo-American detente and their opposition to Indo-US reconciliation. But they cannot explain it away.
It goes without saying that those who expect the United States to meet our food deficit year after year and to pull our economy out of its present stagnation with large doses of aid and investment are as mistaken as the opponents of the Indo-US reconciliation and friendship. This has become possible precisely because the United States has lost the will and capacity to dominate Asia and the world. And whether we like it or not, government-to-government aid on a large scale was as much an expression of a search for Pax Americana as military alliances round the globe and the active involvement in the civil war in Viet Nam. The recent actions of the US Congress can leave no room for illusion on this score. It has reduced not only military aid for countries like South Viet Nam and Cambodia but also economic assistance for India.
It does not follow that the government should be unduly inhibited in asking for help in a year of widespread drought like this one. But it should realise that the cold war and large and undisposable food surpluses made the American administration more forthcoming in the past than it is likely to be in the future.
The Times of India 28 October 1975