It is a matter of satisfaction to India that despite their preoccupation with the internal power struggle the Chinese have responded to its initiative for exchanging ambassadors. For, it is an assurance, however vague and indirect, that they are not particularly anxious at present either to fish in the troubled waters of Bangladesh to this country’s disadvantage or to encourage Islamabad to persist in its intransigence towards New Delhi. But it is by no means clear why they have chosen to make a favourable and, for them, remarkably quick response to the Indian initiative.
Some explanations can be and are in fact being offered. The New York Times has, for instance, speculated that the Chinese decision may have something to do with the Indian nuclear explosion nearly two years ago, or that Peking may be wanting to mend its fences with Moscow and may be using the approach to India as an initial probe or that it may have finally convinced itself that Mrs. Gandhi is truly independent of the Soviet Union and runs her country’s foreign policy solely in its own interest.
Struggle
In addition, it can be argued that it is precisely because the Chinese are preoccupied with the internal power struggle which is likely to become acute as Chairman Mao Tse-tung is increasingly unable to impose his will on his country – on all accounts he has become extremely frail and incapable of articulating his views – that they wish to reduce the intensity of the conflict with their biggest neighbour in the south.
Clearly none of these explanations is wholly convincing. For instance, it appears unlikely that any group of Chinese leaders would wish to try to mend fences with the Soviet Union at this stage for the good and obvious reason that relations with that country are one of the major issues in the internal power struggle and anyone who shows the slightest desire to normalise these, is certain to incur the displeasure of the still powerful chairman. And since Mr. Hua Kuo-feng has become Prime Minister with the acquiescence, if not with the active support, of the radicals who are bitterly hostile to Moscow, it inconceivable that he would have made the approach to India as an “initial probe” to the Kremlin.
Similarly, if the Chinese have been looking for evidence of Mrs. Gandhi’s independence of the Soviet Union, they need not have waited all these years. Her lukewarm attitude towards Mr. Brezhnev’s proposal for Asian collective security since 1969, her refusal to endorse it despite the bilateral Indo-Soviet treaty of friendship concluded in 1971, the absence of any special facilities for the Soviet fleet in any Indian port and finally, the nuclear explosion in May 1974, should have left them in no doubt that Mrs. Gandhi does not subordinate her country’s foreign policy to the Kremlin or, for that matter, to anyone else. Indeed, the question should never have arisen in their mind in view of the fact that India has all along continued to receive most of its aid from Western countries and to carry on most of its trade with them. For the Chinese these are normally important indices for assessing a country’s alignments.
As for the impact of the current turmoil in China on its leadership’s view of its relations with India, the experience in the past has been that in such periods it seeks to retreat into its shell and to reduce to the bare minimum its ties with the outside world. The so-called cultural revolution illustrates the point. In that period Peking kept only two ambassadors abroad and recalled hundreds of even junior diplomats. It was only after this turmoil was over that it gradually emerged from its self-imposed isolation and resumed normal dealings with other countries.
The mystery regarding the Chinese response deepens even if their most favourable earlier statements – which naturally exclude those wherein they have accused India of harbouring expansionist designs – are taken at their face value. For, these indicated that they placed the onus of continued Indo-Pakistan estrangement on this country and that they expected it to normalise its relations with Islamabad as a precondition for any improvement in its ties with them. New Delhi, of course, did not and does not accept the Chinese view of its difficulties with Islamabad, and it has not allowed and will not allow a third country to interfere in matters relating to its ties with its neighbours. But these are different propositions.
Belief
Similarly, it is difficult to explain the Chinese action in the context of the widespread and not unjustified belief in this country that Peking never reconciled itself to Bangladesh’s friendship with India and that it would spare no effort to take advantage of the present Dacca regime’s adverse attitude towards New Delhi in order not only to prevent a rapprochement between the two countries, but also to promote troubles across the border in the north-eastern India.
An inquiry into Peking’s calculations and motivations would doubtless have been redundant if India’s world view converged with its as it did in the ’fifties in the wake of the US decision to cross the 38th Parallel in Korea, recognise the breakaway Kuomintang regime in Formosa and take other steps in pursuit of the self-proclaimed objectives of containing China and dominating the whole of Asia. But there is no such convergence of views now. Even in the ‘fifties there was no identity of views in that Mr. Nehru never accepted Chairman Mao Tse-tung’s formulation that the world was divided into the socialist camp headed by the Soviet Union and the capitalist-imperialist West led by the United States, that one had no option but to choose between the two and that the third road did not exist. But these differences were manageable because in practice the Chinese were prepared to accept the validity and relevance of the concept and policy of non-alignment. The differences are much sharper now.
This is so not only because India has good relations with the Soviet Union or because New Delhi does not accept the Chinese view that Moscow is launched on an expansionist course. Even otherwise New Delhi’s perception would of necessity be different from Peking’s. For, India cannot possibly ignore the twin facts that in the neighbouring countries and the adjoining Persian Gulf area of direct and immediate interest to it, the Soviet Union’s influence is clearly limited and that the United States is pouring into the region vast quantities of highly sophisticated arms which, in its view, are likely to promote instability and conflict there.
India, unlike China, is not trying to tilt the balance of power between the West and the Soviet group of countries in any particular direction and partly its policy must be determined primarily by developments in its neighbourhood.
Reason
Be that as it may, this country has every reason to welcome the Chinese response to its initiative. The presence of an Indian ambassador in Peking and of a Chinese one in New Delhi will reopen channels of communications which have been clogged for fifteen years and hopefully persuade China to observe greater restraint in its overall South Asia policy. It would be unrealistic to expect an early resolution of the border dispute. It has for all practical purposes been frozen since the armed conflict in 1962 and can easily be kept frozen till conditions are truly propitious for settling it once and for all.
There is considerable speculation regarding the possible course of Chinese foreign policy in the post-Mao period and Washington and Moscow are trying to influence it. Interestingly enough, both appear to have a stake in the victory of the moderates, the former because it expects them to follow a realistic economic policy which will facilitate China’s modernisation and growth and the latter because it expects them to improve their relations with it. India, too, would be watching the transition with great interest. But for it the critical issue is not so much the general direction of Chinese policy as the role Peking chooses to play in and around the sub-continent.
This is not to exaggerate China’s capacity to influence the course of events in this part of the world. This has proved to be fairly limited all these years. After all, while despite China’s efforts to the contrary India has coped fairly successfully with the Naga and Mizo rebels and the Naxalites. Peking was neither able to persuade the military junta in Islamabad to adopt a realistic policy towards the aspirations of the people of what was then East Bengal nor prevent the break-up of Pakistan in 1971. But there can be no doubt that India’s task in building co-operation with its neighbours will be facilitated if Peking adopts a helpful attitude. This will not detract from China’s influence in Pakistan and Bangladesh. On the contrary, it will be placed on a more secure footing by virtue of being constructive and acceptable to India.
The Times of India 21 April 1976