In spite of the pressure of public opinion at home and abroad Washington is still non-committal on Hanoi’s firm offer to “hold talks on relevant questions” if it stops bombing and all acts of war against North Viet Nam. If Mr. Dean Rusk is to be taken at his word his Government is not sure whether the North Vietnamese Foreign Minister’s statement is a peace feeler or a propaganda stunt. Mr. William Bundy has taken up an even more sceptical position. It is not possible to say therefore whether negotiations will in fact begin and under what auspices. The prospect is not particularly bright.
While there can be no question that Hanoi’s present position is at least on the face of it more conciliatory than its earlier stand, the reasons for the change are obscure. It may not be wholly idle, however, to pose the question whether there is taking place a further shift in the balance of power in South-East Asia in favour of the United States and against China because even if the change in North Viet Nam’s posture is not directly related to it, Washington’s and Hanoi’s policies cannot but be deeply influenced by the broad trend in the region.
An Admission
The most obvious indication of the shift is provided by the change in Prince Sihanouk’s attitude. It is absurd to suggest as Mr. Joseph Alsop has done that the Cambodian leader has gone “three-quarters of the way to changing sides in the Vietnamese war”. He has done nothing of the sort. In fact he is as anxious and determined as ever before to preserve his country’s neutrality and territorial integrity. But the importance of an indirect admission by him that the North Vietnamese and Viet Cong may have established sanctuaries, bases and supply lines on Cambodian territory cannot be over-emphasised.
In the face of his steadfast denial of the existence of Viet Cong bases in his country, his pre-occupation with the danger from Thailand and South Viet Nam, Cambodia’s traditional enemies, Phnom Penh’s generally bad relations with Washington particularly since the severance of diplomatic relations in 1964 when Prince Sihanouk packed off the new American Ambassador without even receiving his credentials, his repeated threats to call in help from China and other Communist countries to deal with encroachments by American and allied troops, the present admission itself would have been rightly regarded as a development of great significance. In fact Cambodia has offered to negotiate with the United States on the question of Viet Cong and North Vietnamese bases. Mr. Chester Bowles is already in Phnom Penh. Prince Sihanouk has strongly repudiated the suggestion that he is prepared to allow American forces the right of hot pursuit in outlying uninhabited jungles which his small army of 30,000 men cannot possibly control. But he has for the first time equated the Viet Cong with the American forces in that he has said that he would treat the two as equally guilty if they crossed into Cambodia.
Mrs. Jacqueline Kennedy’s visit to Phnom Penh last November is said to have been the turning point in Prince Sihanouk’s attitude towards the United States. The view is feasible inasmuch as he allowed American journalists to visit one of the Viet Cong sanctuaries soon afterwards and thus to collect incontrovertible photographic evidence about its existence. But it was two months earlier in September last that the Cambodian Head of State accused China publicly of trying to subvert his regime, dismissed two Left-wing ministers, banned the French language bulletin of the New China News Agency, revoked its agreement with the official Cambodian news agency and announced his decision to recall his Ambassador and staff from Peking. The last decision was stayed following a conciliatory message from Mr. Chou En-lai. But even then Prince Sihanouk did not fail to draw the inference that he had made China realise that “the Cambodian fruit is not yet ripe.”
The September 4 message from the Sino-Cambodian Friendship Association in Peking to its banned counter-part in Phnom Penh was without doubt provocative. It described Prince Sihanouk’s Government as reactionary and subservient to US imperialism and Soviet revisionism. But it is open to question whether the Cambodian leader would have reacted equally sharply to a similar provocation by the Chinese a year or so earlier when he still believed that they represented the wave of the future. Having convinced himself that Peking was bound to emerge as the dominant power in South-East Asia he was adjusting his policy accordingly. It is sanctimonious humbug for anyone to quarrel with his realistic approach. A small country like Cambodia could otherwise face disaster. But the relevant point now is that Prince Sihanouk no longer feels obliged to ignore Chinese provocations.
Irrelevant
His new stance towards the United States must reflect both his assessment of the new power balance and his disillusionment with China. The vulgar talk of Prince Sihanouk being an opportunist is irrelevant. Statecraft for the leader of a small country placed in an extremely difficult position is not an exercise in abstract morality.
The disillusionment with China and the desire to improve ties with the United States is by no means confined to Cambodia among the neutral countries in South-East Asia. Burma has also been reacting to developments in a more or less similar fashion. Gen. Ne Win’s style of leadership is different from that of Prince Sihanouk. The Burmese leader is reticent and seldom allows himself the freedom to discuss serious foreign policy issues in public speeches. But in his case as well there can be no question about the shift of emphasis in the policy towards China and the United States.
Discerning observers have traced back the change to Senator Mike Mansfield’s visit to Rangoon in late 1965. It certainly led to Gen. Ne Win’s trip to Washington last September. The subsequent improvement in Burma’s relations with America has angered Peking which in turn has asked the White Flag Communists to adopt a tough line and called for a violent overthrow of Gen. Ne Win’s Government. The Sino-Burmese relations have steadily deteriorated since last summer leading finally to the withdrawal of 500 Chinese technicians who were implementing Peking’s largest ever aid programme to a non-communist country.
Defiance
It is clearly absurd for the Chinese to claim a veto on Burma’s relations with other countries. To what length they can go is illustrated by the fact that they have taken exception even to the Indo-Burmese border agreement and accused Rangoon of not only endorsing India’s border claims to what the Chinese call their territory, but also of having violated their frontiers. The manner in which the Chinese Embassy officials defied the Burmese authorities in distributing Mao badges in Rangoon last June speaks for itself. Certain other points are notable. The aid programme was implemented by Peking with an eye on military considerations. The first project to be completed, for example, was the Kunlong bridge which connected China with Thai border through an all-weather road. The Chinese technicians were on strike since last June and Rangoon had no option but to disown the responsibility for maintaining them after a fixed date. No Asian leader has been more anxious than Gen. Ne Win to avoid offence to the powerful northern neighbour. All the same a new note of defiance can be discerned in his attitude towards Peking for almost a year.
Thailand is America’s ally and depends on it for security. No general conclusions can therefore be drawn from the fact that it has sent troops into Viet Nam and allowed the US Air Force to use bases there for bombing raids into North Viet Nam. Similarly there is nothing unexpected or surprising about the Singapore Prime Minister’s plea to the United States that it must not withdraw from South Viet Nam. But even Prince Souvanna Phouma, Prime Minister of Laos, who was overthrown by rightist Generals with open American support in 1959 (it has been described as a CIA operation), turns a blind eye towards US bombing raids along the Ho Chi-minh trail and accuses North Viet Nam of sending troops into his country. Indonesia under Gen. Suharto is as militantly anti-communist as Thailand or the Philippines.
The hawks in Washington claim that these developments have been made possible by the American decision to take a stand in Viet Nam, irrespective of the terrible cost in men (100,000 casualties) and money ($30 billion a year). This is an arguable point. In the historical perspective the United States has been fighting against nationalism and not communism in Viet Nam. The turning point in South-East Asia has been the failure of the pro-communist coup and the success of the army-led counter-coup in Indonesia in October 1965. The American role in that could at best be marginal. Indonesians in fact resent speculation about the US contribution to the success of the counter-coup and the elimination of the PK1 as a serious factor in the country’s political life.
As it happened the so-called proletarian cultural revolution was initiated by Mr. Mao Tse-tung in China soon afterwards. The consequent turmoil, uncertainty and the ascendancy of the extremists have increased China’s isolation from neighbouring countries. The deterioration in Sino-Burmese and Sino-Cambodian relations is largely due to the irresponsible fanaticism engendered by the cultural revolution.
No Evidence
There is no hard evidence to show that Hanoi’s new posture is in any way the result either of the general trend in South-East Asia or of the continuing confusion in China, though it cannot but affect adversely its capacity to assist North Viet Nam. Western correspondents who have visited Hanoi in recent months have also testified that there is no evidence of war weariness there. If the Russians have been trying to persuade Dr. Ho Chi-minh to begin negotiations, the effort has been well concealed. If anything Mr. Brezhnev’s recent statements are open to the interpretation that Moscow’s over-all policy towards the United States has become tougher. Thus it is difficult to fit the North Vietnamese move for talks with the United States into the broader regional framework. But it appears unlikely that the shift in the power balance can be reversed in the immediate future.
China is largely to blame for the present trend. By its reckless denunciation of non-communist nationalist and neutralist regimes and attempts to terrorise and subvert them, Peking has facilitated Washington’s task in presenting itself as their principal and reliable protector. Hanoi has also to reassure neighbouring Laos, Cambodia and Thailand that it is prepared to respect their territorial integrity and right to shape their economic and political institutions if their dependence on America is to be reduced.
The Times of India, 10 January 1968