It is rather simplistic to discuss the likely consequences of the eventual American withdrawal from Viet Nam in terms of a power vacuum or the ability or inability of the countries in the region to look after their security. The issues involved are extremely complex.
To begin with, America’s massive intervention in Viet Nam was intended to serve several purposes – to establish a military counterweight against China’s growing nuclear and conventional power and thus to reassure the countries of the region that they need not accept Peking’s hegemony out of fear; to demonstrate that wars of “national liberation” of the Maoist type can be defeated and that the United States has the resources and the will to do the job; and to defend the territorial as well as the socio-economic status quo in South-East Asia.
Not For Nothing
The last point seldom attracts much attention though this is of crucial importance. It is not for nothing that Presidents Truman, Eisenhower and Johnson repeatedly said that change in Asia should be gradual and peaceful and that, as far as it lay within their power, they would not permit violent, drastic and sudden upheavals.
It is hardly necessary to make the point that the American withdrawal from Viet Nam will involve a drastic revision, if not an abandonment, of all these objectives of US policy. Since the United States has not been able to establish a military counterweight against China it is hardly in a position to advise South-East Asian countries on the policy they should adopt towards Peking.
Washington has also failed to demonstrate that Maoist wars of “national liberation” can be defeated and that it has the will to take up the challenge. On the contrary, President Nixon is at pains to emphasise that America will never again involve itself in a Viet Nam type struggle.
Finally, it is only too obvious that the territorial and socio-economic status quo in South-East Asia will come under heavy pressure after America’s withdrawal from Viet Nam and Britain’s from Malaysia and Singapore.
This does not mean that China is only waiting for the Anglo-US pull-out either to descend on South-East Asia or to unleash a series of insurrections, or that another Viet Nam can be staged by Peking at will, or that local regimes will collapse one after another. In fact China is almost wholly preoccupied with the problem of its own security vis-a-vis the Soviet Union and the success of the Viet Cong in South Viet Nam is the result of circumstances which are not easy to repeat elsewhere.
All the same there can be no doubt that China’s standing in the region will improve as a result of the American withdrawal, that Governments in South-East Asian countries will be anxious to be in Peking’s good books, irrespective of their ideological predilections and present alignments, that dissident elements will be encouraged to intensify their diverse struggles and that almost all the regimes will come under attack from ethnic minorities and aggrieved sections of the community.
The point is not whether the US intervention was justified or unjustified, whether the projected change in the attitude of South-East Asian countries towards Peking is desirable or undesirable and whether the status quo deserves to be preserved or not. There can be genuine differences of opinion on these questions. The pertinent point in the present context is that the American withdrawal from Viet Nam will set in motion a chain of developments which cannot profitably be discussed in terms of the theory of power vacuum. The American pull-out will mark the end of an era not only in America’s Asia policy but also in the life of the region.
Pertinent Query
It is pertinent to take note of the fact that the threat to the status quo or to peace and stability in South-East Asia does not come from China alone. It comes from three other sources – North Viet Nam as in the case of Laos, Cambodia and Thailand, overseas Chinese as in that of Malaysia, and dissident tribesmen as in Burma and Thailand. Indonesia is quiescent just now. But how long will the Indonesians keep under control their ambition of becoming one of Asia’s great Powers?
Annam, now known as North Viet Nam, was engaged in territorial expansionism when the French arrived on the scene in the 18th century. The old search for national unity and imperial influence was resumed after the end of the last world war. The world’s greatest Power has failed to stop this march The presence of some 25,000 North Vietnamese among the Pathet Lao forces, their participation in the struggle against the legally constituted Government, the establishment of a series of bases in Cambodian jungles and the assistance by Hanoi to insurgents in northern and northeastern Thailand can all be explained in terms of the present war. But they are also pointers to the future. North Viet Nam will seek special influence in these countries. It is immaterial whether this leads to a revision of the present borders or not. North Viet Nam will not rest content till its supremacy is recognised in these countries.
As for the overseas Chinese, two recent developments are of primary importance. First, they have rejected the subordinate political position in Malaysia which they earlier appeared to have accepted in return for the freedom to pursue their business activities in peace. The racial clashes and revival of communist activities on the Malaysian-Thai border are manifestations of one and the same phenomenon – the determination of the overseas Chinese to command a degree of political power and influence which is commensurate with their numbers, dynamism, professional skills and wealth. The phase when they were willing to compromise their Chinese character in the interest of better accommodation with the local peoples seems to be over. There appears to be a new surge of ethnic and cultural consciousness among overseas Chinese all ever South-East Asia.
Over the years the impression was created that the British administration in Malaysia in the ‘fifties succeeded not only in defeating the communist guerillas but also in winning the “hearts and minds” of the still uncommitted Chinese population. This view is now open to serious doubt. In fact it is a legitimate inference that “whatever military success was achieved in suppressing the communist challenge to an orderly transition of power in Malaya, the political affiliation of the mass of Malaya’s Chinese to the alliance solution was not gained” and that “the political formula which the British and Malaysians devised to solve the dilemmas of a plural society has proved to be a temporary rather than a long-term solution”.
Grim Reality
The Australians recognise this grim reality. That is why they are no longer as willing as in the past to get involved in the problems of Malaysian security against external aggression and internal subversion. They have specially disavowed any commitment for the defence of Sabah.
The problem that rebel tribesmen have posed to the Governments in Burma, Laos and Thailand are sufficiently well known to need a detailed reference here. On the whole it is difficult to disagree with the view of the Singapore Foreign Minister, Mr. S. Rajaratnam, that while the 1950s were an “age of confidence”, the 1960s have become an “age of disillusionment” for South-East Asia. The 1970s may well turn out to be a decade of deep turmoil and crisis throughout the region.
It is easier to state the problem than to suggest a viable solution. But it is legitimate to say that the talk of economic co-operation and development has little relevance to the critical problem of nation-building, political stability and peace in the region.
Regional economic co-operation is desirable by itself. It can help reduce the dependence of the countries concerned on outside assistance and to promote trade among them. It may even make some difference to their rate of growth. But it cannot produce political stability because it cannot reconcile diverse races and tribes to each other and it cannot check the expansionist drives of China, North Viet Nam and so on. Contrary to popular belief, the process of modernisation and economic growth aggravates communal consciousness. Our own experience should serve as a warning against easy optimism on the consequences of modernisation. That instability is a necessary price to pay for modernity is a different matter which does not concern us here.
There is no escape from this painful process for any traditional and plural society wanting to enter the modern age. After having poured in billions of dollars into the region the United States has failed to ensure that change in South-East Asia will be peaceful and gradual.
The new policy which is now being shaped and implemented may help Washington to cut its losses and reduce its future commitments. But in plain terms it amounts to an acknowledgement that it is in no position to determine the course of events. President Nixon’s talk of honouring existing commitments, of a willingness to provide training and arms for anti-guerilla struggles and of the United States not being indifferent to overt Chinese aggression, cannot cover up this unpleasant fact.
The Times of India, 6 August 1969