The three service chiefs are said to be elated. During his recent visit to New Delhi, so the story goes, the Soviet Prime Minister, Mr Kosygin, spoke of the new military equipment this country might need to cope with the Chinese threat as he sees it and indicated his government’s willingness to meet its requirements. And they are almost embarrassed by the Finance Minister, Mr Charan Singh’s generosity. He is more than ready to concede whatever they ask for. Indeed, he has been suggesting that they might be well advised to think in bolder terms.
The story may not be accurate in all details. But it is being given credence among politicians and bureaucrats who should be reasonably well informed on these matters. Some of them have in fact been involved in the discussions between the Soviet and Indian delegations during Mr Kosygin’s visit and in the talks the military leaders have had with Mr Charan Singh.
Security
Assuming the story is reasonably correct, it would be absurd to suggest that Mr Kosygin and his colleagues in the Kremlin wish to egg on India to embark on a massive military build-up and that Mr Charan Singh’s willingness to cough up whatever amounts of money the service chiefs may be asking for is indicative of the general atmosphere in the capital. On the contrary, it would be more reasonable to say that the Soviet leaders are too experienced to believe that India can divert large resources to defence without endangering its economic growth and in the process its security.
If they are, indeed, more forthcoming on the issue of the supply of military hardware than they might have been in the recent past, the reasons are not far to seek. They have reasons to accept the Janata government’s commitment to friendship with the Soviet Union; they may be less inclined to worry about Pakistan’s susceptibilities in the wake of the pro-Soviet communist coup in Afghanistan; they have begun to take the Chinese threat much more seriously after Peking’s attack on Vietnam; and in all probability they sincerely believe that India’s security environment has deteriorated seriously in recent months. They have never sought to impose their views in such matters on Indian policy makers in the past and they are unlikely to do so now.
Similarly, there is not the slightest evidence of hysteria or even undue concern in New Delhi. The discussion on the changes in the country’s security environment resulting from recent developments – the collapse of the Shah’s regime and the continuing turmoil in Iran, the introduction of a powerful fleet in the gulf by the United States, the war between the two Yemens, Washington’s decision at Saudi Arabia’s instance to commit its prestige to the victory of North Yemen and the Chinese attack on Vietnam – are limited to a small circle of ministers and military and civilian officials.
But it has become necessary to raise these issues for public debate. For one thing, they are too serious to be left to a small group of politicians, bureaucrats and generals. For another, old responses are too much in evidence for comfort. For, the situation is too different from what it has ever been in the past to yield to old solutions, though the overall concept of non- alignment remains refreshingly valid. The country has also never been better placed to be able to pursue an independent course. Its foreign exchange and food reserves and the disarray in Pakistan which cannot but reduce its attraction and pull for other countries, including its staunch supporters, give it a new capacity for independent action which is quite different from what is called room for manoeuvre.
To begin with, the developments in and around the gulf need to be separated from those in South-East Asia. India cannot be indifferent to the first. The countries in question are close to us and we have acquired a great stake in their stability. For, we buy our oil supplies there; our trade with them has expanded and will continue to expand if they are not overtaken by a major convulsion as Iran has seen; we are executing projects worth some billions of dollars there; thousands of our young men and women are gainfully employed there; and they remit back home through the regular channels around $ 2 billion a year which enable us to import whatever we need in order to keep prices stable. But there is little we can do either to influence the course of events in West Asia and the gulf or to protect ourselves from the consequences of developments in the region.
Many of these countries are trying to move from primitive economy to sophisticated technology and they cannot escape the confusion, uncertainty and instability that such a rapid transition, accompanied as it is in several cases by the infusion of unheard of wealth, must produce. And on top of it all, the region has become the centre of acute Russo-American rivalry which in turn must add to instability because it must reinforce local rivalries and hostilities.
Lost Cause
New Delhi can continue to press for resumption of Soviet-US talks on making the Indian Ocean a zone of peace and to advocate this cause in forums like the UN General Assembly. But in reality it is fighting for a lost cause. This has always been so. It has been especially so since the beginning of the energy crisis in 1971 when it became evident that Western Europe, Japan and the United States itself had become critically dependent on oil supplies from the gulf countries, that they would do all in their power to keep friendly rulers in power and the Soviet Union would not reconcile itself to the status quo even if it does not directly intervene in any conflict. The United States tried to achieve its objective through a surrogate so long as one was available in the form of the Shah of Iran with his wild ambitions. But now that such a proxy is no longer available, Washington has decided, as was only to be expected, to establish a naval presence of its own in the area. The Soviet Union is bound to respond. The competition will continue to intensify till such time as the top super-powers begin to think that it is in their own interest to regulate it.
The Soviet Union may think that it can derive some propaganda advantage out of this issue. That is apparently why during his trip to India Mr Kosygin thought it useful to reiterate the Soviet government’s willingness to help convert the Indian Ocean into a zone of peace. But India has nothing much to gain by pressing this demand. It can only annoy the United States which it cannot be in its interest to do at least at this stage when American policy is in flux. It must also know that the issue has become extremely complicated and that it is no use pretending it has not.
Insensitivity
China impinges much more directly on us by virtue of its occupation of Tibet, the elaborate network of roads it has built there right up to and along our frontier and the other military facilities it has established there. Surprisingly though it may appear on a surface view, we had less reasons to be concerned so long as Chairman Mao Tse-tung was alive because he kept China in ferment and away from modern technology in most fields. Even a partially modernised China will almost certainly be much more difficult to live with. It will be that much more powerful and in that much stronger position to project its might, both economic and military, outside its borders.
It is truly extraordinary that the present Chinese leadership should have shown such insensitivity to world opinion as it has not so much by attacking Vietnam as by not trying to justify it in defensive terms, which is what the government of any other country would in all probability have done in similar circumstances. By talking of meting out “punishment” to Vietnam, it has displayed an arrogance which is truly frightening. For, it shows that China’s responses are different from those of the rest of us because it alone talks of the right to “punish” those who cross its path, not just defend its territory against encroachments by others. The middle kingdom complex? But whatever the source of this arrogance, it must serve as a grim reminder to those in charge of this country’s affairs that they have to cope with a very difficult neighbour and that they cannot hope to lower their guard.
The purely military aspect of the problem is, however, clearly not all that complex and difficult to cope with in view of the nature of the Himalayan terrain. The challenge is almost certainly going to be much tougher in the political and economic fields if the leadership is able to stabilise its position and implement the modernisation programme even partially. The first calls for much greater independent initiative by us while we maintain the closest ties with the Soviet Union, and the second for production, import and use of the latest technology by us on a fairly big scale. We just cannot afford to be left behind China in respect of science and technology, however much some of our leaders may value the virtues of a simple agricultural society.
The Times of India, 21 March 1979