The long feared exodus of Hindus from Punjab has finally begun. It can assume unmanageable proportions and lead to a national disaster if it is not checked while it may still not be too late. It is 11 p.m. in the life not only of the Sikh community but also of the nation as a whole. In just another hour it will be midnight.
A similar note of warning was sounded more than two years ago in these columns. The warning then was addressed to the Sikh leadership. It was not heeded. The disastrous results were not long in coming. They were there for us all to see in just about seven months. This time the addressees are those in authority in Delhi, for nothing like a government exists in Chandigarh. The prospects of being heard are no better this time than last time. But one must hope against hope.
On a surface view, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi faced a cruel dilemma in 1985, and on a surface view, he faces a similar dilemma now. The question, as it was formulated then, was whether or not he should go in for an agreement with the Akalis despite their shocking behaviour in the previous four years. The issue, as it is formulated now, is whether or not he should continue to back the Akali chief minister, Mr. Surjit Singh Barnala, despite his failure to offer the slightest hope for restoration of law and order.
In 1985 there was no evidence to support the view that the Akalis could hold together in office and bind the wounds they had wilfully inflicted on the people in the state. But Mr Rajiv Gandhi was not alone in believing that they would perform this double miracle if only he conceded most of their demands and let them seize power – of course, with the help of the ballot box. Almost the entire intelligentsia was equally escapist in its approach. In just about six months, these illusions lie shattered around us.
Similarly, there is now no evidence to suggest that Mr. Barnala has the capacity to restore law and order in the state. By humiliating himself on the order by five head priests who owe their livelihood to his self-proclaimed opponents, he has lost whatever little moral and political authority he might have possessed earlier even in his own predominantly Jat Sikh community; as a rule the Jat, whether Sikh or Hindu or Muslim, admires the warrior, the successful and the defiant. But once again Mr. Rajiv Gandhi is not alone in convincing himself that he must keep Mr. Barnala in office. Almost the entire intelligentsia is in agreement with him.
Wrongly framed
The issue was wrongly framed in 1985 and it is being wrongly framed now. The question in 1985 was not whether Mr Rajiv Gandhi should reach an accord with the Akali leaders on whatever terms it was possible but whether he should resume negotiations with them if they were willing to do so, that is, if they had also come round to the view that it was as much in their interest to end a virtual military rule in Punjab as it was in that of the Union government.
If the issue had been so framed and an appropriate policy adopted and pursued, the Akalis could have taken time agree to talks. They would have had to engage in a debate among themselves which would have been bitter and prolonged. It would by no means have been certain that the “moderates” headed by Sant Longowal would have won. But they could have. The dreaded Bhindranwale was dead; his murder squads had been dispersed and rendered incapable of coherent action; the Sikh peasantry, however embittered, was yearning for a return to normalcy; so the hardliners could have found it difficult to resist the pressure for appearing to be reasonable. In any case, the country would have known where the Akalis stood as a body in the post-Indira period, that is when the alleged architect of the policy of confrontation had disappeared from the political scene and it could have dealt with them accordingly.
In the event, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi settled not only for a policy of reaching an accord but also of doing so through secret negotiations with one section of Akalis who were willing to go along with Sant Longowal. He ignored powerful Akalis such as Mr. Tohra, SGPC chief for well over a decade, and the former Punjab chief minister, Mr. Badal. As if this was not a sure enough recipe for failure, in the ensuing poll he fielded weak candidates on behalf of his own party and put limited resources into the election campaign as if to make sure that the Akalis won a landslide victory. If he acted on Mr. Arjun Singh’s advice, as appears to have been the case, Mr. Singh owes the country an explanation and indeed an expiation.
Now too the issue is not whether the Congress and the Centre should back Mr. Barnala but whether or not he should be allowed to hang on if he can manage to do so on his own, that is, if he can continue to command the nominal support of a majority of Akali MLAs. The answer is obvious. He should be allowed, provided he does not obstruct such effort as the Centre can mount to restore law and order in the state.
Hindu Minority
The Hindu minority overwhelmingly and a significant number of Sikhs voted for the Congress in the last elections. They had no faith in the Akalis as a group and they can have no faith left in Mr. Barnala’s capacity to ensure peace in the state after his “atonement”; they must feel badly let down by the Congress leadership when it promises support to him. Mr. Gandhi owes something to these people. Also Mr. Barnala “atonement” cannot but further demoralise the administrative machinery such as it is in Punjab just as it must inevitably encourage those in the police who are at once thoroughly communal and corrupt and who look the other way when murderers kill innocent people and easily escape. (In Tarn Taran the criminals do not need even to escape if we are to believe those who have fled that place; the criminals set out from the residences of police officers and, return to these “sanctuaries” after they have done the deed).
It is difficult to believe that Sant Longowal could have delivered his side of the bargain if he had lived. But that is an academic issue. Once he had been killed and the Akalis allowed to win an overwhelming majority in the elections that followed last September, the subsequent developments were a foregone conclusion. In our ignorance of the history and psyche of the Jat Sikhs who constitute the vast majority in the Sikh community and dominate Akali politics, reinforced by a desperate anxiety to avoid facing the reality, we spin tales. One of these is that the Akalis would not have split if Mr. Barnala had accommodated Mr. Badal as the second man in his cabinet. We do not even wait to ask ourselves the question as to what Mr. Tohra would have done in such an eventuality? Or Capt. Amrinder Singh? Or Mr Sukhjinder Singh who had openly championed the Khalistan cause? And how long would Mr. Badal have been content with the status of a deputy chief minister?
History’s verdict is loud and clear. The Akalis could not have held together in office. Not to speak of Mr. Badal and Mr. Tohra who were not members of Mr. Barnala’s government, some of those in it too began to work for his downfall within months, if not weeks, of its formation. By early this year the potential dissidents were holding secret meetings and waiting for an opportunity to strike at Mr. Barnala.
Lure of Office
It is ridiculous for us to invent grievances for the Akali dissidents inside and outside the government. They did not need any, though they would have discovered one for propaganda purposes; factionalism is an end in itself for the Akalis as is the lure of office. The dissidents would have split the party even if Mr Barnala had not ordered the police into the Golden Temple on April 30. How else can one explain the fact of Mr. Amrinder Singh, the former Maharaja of Patiala, and Mr. Tohra, an old-time foe of his, coming together? Or Mr. Tohra crossing over from Mr. Barnala’s side to Mr. Badal’s?
The present split cannot be and is not final. Some of Mr. Barnala’s present ministerial colleagues have belonged to the Tohra, Badal and Amrinder Singh factions in the past and can go over to them when the time is opportune. To the question as to what would constitute the “opportune time”, the answer is fairly obvious. Either the dissidents must be able to hold out the hope of office or Sikh public opinion must be strongly alienated from Mr. Barnala. That would explain the dual strategy the dissidents are trying to implement. On the one hand, Mr. Amrinder Singh is seeking to create the impression that his old ties with Mr. Rajiv Gandhi and his aides are still intact and, on the other, he and other dissidents are trying to stir up the Sikhs on the question of police entry into the Golden Temple complex.
It looks as if the Sikh community had by and large felt relieved when the police had finally managed to push anti-social elements out of the Golden Temple. Even if that was not so, there was no sign of strong resentment in it over the action. The dissidents picked up the issue not because the Sikhs in Punjab were exercised over it but they (dissidents) needed a pretext for spitting the Dal legislature party and thereby toppling Mr Barnala. Perhaps they too did not calculate that the Chief Minister would undermine his own position in the manner he has. It is doubtful that he had consulted his powerful backers in New Delhi, above all the Prime Minister, before he decided to answer the summons from the five head priests and accept their order to “atone” for doing his duty both as chief minister and as a Sikh, the latter because he had acted in obedience to a directive by the Sarbat Khalsa (held at Anandpur Sahib on February 16) which is the highest decision-making body of the panth.
(To Be Concluded)
The Times of India, 28 May 1986