There has been endless talk, especially in the last four troubled years in Punjab, of unity of religion and politics in Sikhism. This talk has been part of a deliberate and mischievous plan, to establish that Sikhism is closer to Islam than to Sanatana Dharma. That is, of course, so much nonsense. But what is more pertinent, it would not clinch the issue of the relationship between religion and politics in Sikhism even if the Panth was closer to Islam than to Hinduism. For, the relationship between religion and politics in Islam itself is not so simple. How many theocratic states have we had in the Muslim world in the last 14 centuries? Hardly any before the rise of Ayatollah Khomeini in Iran.
There is, of course, a close connection between religion and politics in the Sikh community today. But that is not the result of the Sikh faith as such; it is the product of the Gurdwara Act, which the British government in India had enacted. As is well known, under this Act, a single body known as the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee (SGPC) controls gurdwaras in Punjab, and therefore their funds and the employees; and through them, it controls the Akali Dal. Thus after every split in the Akali Dal, whatever faction happens to be in control of the SGPC comes to be regarded as the true Akali Dal.
A careful look at developments in Punjab would have shown that Bhindranwale outflanked this nexus. He had not gained control over the SGPC and the gurdwara funds and employees, when he came to dominate Sikh politics. This fact has seldom been noted in the discussions on Bhindranwale, and his brand of Sikh politics, though he was the first to achieve this feat. Indeed, therein lay his genius. He tapped a deep purificatory vein in the Sikh psyche. But that issue deserves to be discussed separately.
As many writers have attributed qualities of charismatic leadership to Bhindranwale as have blamed Giani Zail Singh and the late Mr. Sanjay Gandhi for creating that Frankenstein in their desire to undermine the Akali Dal. Even those who have tried to discover objective factors which accounted for his success, have mostly given credence to either imaginary grievances which the Akali leaders have invented, from time to time, or to the theory of an identity crisis among the Sikhs. Hardly anyone has ever, in the past four-five years, examined the connection between the rise of crime in Punjab and the new brand of Akali politics which Bhindranwale symbolised most effectively.
Congress Pioneers
As in much else, Congress leaders were pioneers in this field. Congress leaders in Punjab faced the charge of being in league with smugglers and other anti-social elements as early as the Fifties when Mr. Nehru was still around. But that does not concern us in the present context. What does concern us is whether there is a connection between crime and Akali politics and whether this is a major factor in the crisis we have been facing in the State.
The connection is a fact which cannot be denied. Any official investigating agency worth the name should be able to establish its extensive ramifications. The story goes back at least to 1975, when thousands of Akalis were imprisoned and found themselves in the company of criminals in various jails. The contacts proved useful at the time of the elections in 1977, and have continued since. Other parties too have had such ties with criminals.
There can also be no question that Bhindranwale became a kind of patron saint of criminals of various types and that they became his sword arm. They gave him both men and money for his nefarious activities and he gave them “respectability.” Killers became warriors in a holy cause thanks to him and the thoughtlessness of the rest of us.
The second development – the rise of Bhindranwale – is, however, not an inevitable and direct consequence of the first – the link-up between crime and Akali politics. The general, mutually beneficial link between say smugglers and some Akali politicians could have prospered without producing the Bhindranwale monster, if some other developments had not taken place.
This is a subject for careful and detailed investigation by scholars. But it may be appropriate to mention some facts. The much-publicised Green Revolution in the State has been accompanied by a rise in the number of landless on the one land and the spread of the use of drinks and drugs in the countryside in the other. The State’s increasing prosperity has been more than matched by the growth of smuggling from across the border, especially of heroin, so much so that India has become perhaps the biggest transit point for its being smuggled into Western Europe and the United States. And the stakes of those involved in the business of smuggling should now be counted in billions and not in lakhs of rupees as was the case in the Fifties. Not to speak of the Punjab police, even the BSF and the Army personnel have not been able to resist the glitter of the gold that has literally poured from across the border.
Imaginary Grievances
Young Jat Sikh boys, armed with degrees but with little education, have moved in their thousands from rural areas into Hindu-dominated towns and found themselves unemployed. Either there have been no jobs for them or they have been offered jobs which have not been in keeping with their temperament and self-image based on their perception of their status in the rural areas. This generally produces a psyche which feeds on imaginary grievances and inclines one to violence. Finally, as genuine piety has declined, fanaticism has grown. All in all, it would be seen that the stage was set for a distorted personality like Bhindranwale by the Seventies.
The Akali agitations against the British were a highly disciplined and a largely non-violent affair. They won even Gandhiji’s admiration on that account. In independent India up to 1980, Akali demonstrations often led to violence, but they were intended to be non-violent and disciplined in the old Akali tradition. Sant Fateh Singh, it should be noted, threatened to immolate himself in order to press his demand for a Punjabi Suba; he did not threaten to set Punjab ablaze. Bhindranwale represented a radical departure from all this. He came to command attention in a big way, first when he joined in an armed attack on the Nirankari Bhavan in Amritsar in 1978. His courage failed him and he did not participate in the actual assault. But he overcame the shame of it by arranging the assassination of the Nirankari Baba later. Violence was his creed, unlike that of any other leading Akali until then, and he had only to raise his banner, in order to attract a horde of criminals.
The ensuing problem would not have assumed crisis proportions, if the Akali leadership had not offered him a ‘piggy-ride’ and if the police administration in the state had not been so incompetent, corrupt and communal. But the Akalis gave him a ‘piggy-ride’ and the Punjab police acted more as his accomplices, than as guardians of law and order. In its irrational hatred of Mrs. Indira Gandhi, the intelligentsia blamed her and in the process it encouraged the forces of disorder in Punjab, headed by Bhindranwale.
Still another nexus arose as a result of the rise of Bhindranwale to prominence. This was a nexus between the Sikh advocates of Khalistan abroad, and their mentors on the one hand, and the criminals in Punjab on the other. Crime came to wear a political garb in the State. This turn of events suited the enemies of India and the Indian State, as it suited the criminals. It would have been a miracle if Pakistan had not given it a helping hand. It did.
Law And Order
Despite its international dimension, basically the problem was one of law and order before “Operation Bluestar” and it is one of law and order now. It was confused then, as a political problem, and it is being similarly confused now. The Akalis had played a key role in confusing it then, and the Akali dissidents are doing the same now. Mr. Tohra had installed Bhindranwale into the Akal Takht then and the same Mr. Tohra has manipulated the split in the Akali legislature party and the humiliation of Mr. Barnala now. Unlike Mr. Badal and his likes, who hankered after power then and are hankering after power now, Mr. Tohra appears to have set his sights much higher.
It is not possible to break completely the nexus between crime and politics in Punjab. For one thing, we just do not have an agency which can accomplish this task effectively; for the police force in the State below the level of deputy superintendents is often unreliable; it is also crippled for want of informers and its men are demoralised; their families, too, live in dread of ‘killer-bands’. For another, the criminals are too resourceful, and their activities enjoy support beyond India’s frontiers. It is reasonably certain that Pakistan is running 20 training camps inside its jails, to avoid detection, and the so-called Khalistanis are openly active in Canada, America and Britain. Even so we can weaken the alliance between crime and “politics”, if we can somehow catch hold of smugglers and other well-known criminals, especially in the border districts. The police know their identity; even Congressmen know them.
Since the death of Bhindranwale, the Crime Syndicate has no headquarters and no central leader. Different ‘killer bands’ appear to be operating on their own initiative. While it cannot be ruled out that some unseen agency or group, abroad, is manipulating them, the necessary command structure and communication links do not seem to be in place. Thus within the country the law and order aspect of the problem deserves far greater attention than the political one.
It has been argued that politically dedicated young men have replaced Bhindranwale’s gangs of criminals and that it is such men who are now being trained and indoctrinated by Pakistan. Such evidence, as is available, does not support this proposition. On the contrary, it is being said that the killing is being done by hired men. We cannot say whether this is in fact the case. But if it is, who are the paymasters? Again, we do not know the answer. But we can say that those engaged in heroin smuggling have a lot to gain by paralysing the administration in the border areas and diverting its attention away from their own activities.
(Concluded)
The Times of India, 29 May 1986