The interest that the British press displayed in the Security Council’s debate on Kashmir this time was in sharp contrast with the indifference it showed when the issue was discussed in 1962. In 1962 leading papers carried only the briefest reports from New York. This time reports from New York were suitably preceded or accompanied by articles and editorials, needless to say wholly critical of the Indian stand. The agitation in the State following the theft of the Prophet’s hair provided a convenient peg to hang the a priori conclusion that the people were in revolt not only against the State Government but also New Delhi. Inconvenient facts like the non-communal nature of the agitation and the demand for direct rule by the Union Government were conveniently ignored.
The press mirrored a change of attitude in Whitehall. In 1962 officials were willing to admit privately that the dispute could be settled only on the basis of the partition of the State as offered by Mr Nehru. Consequently the British delegate to the Security Council urged direct talks between India and Pakistan. This time the officials talked about the offended susceptibilities of Pakistan and in the Council the British delegate reaffirmed support for Pakistan’s demand for plebiscite. No one even seemed to remember that Pakistan ruled out all possibility of a negotiated settlement during the ministerial discussions initiated at the insistence of America and Britain after the Chinese aggression against India by demanding virtually the whole State including Jammu and Ladakh except for a sub-district.
Ignorant
The reporting of communal riots suffered from a similar bias. Not a single report appeared here about the communal riots in East Pakistan before the riots broke out in Calcutta. On the first day of the riots in Calcutta the BBC linked them directly with the theft of the holy relic in Srinagar. It was either blissfully ignorant about the riots in East Pakistan and the flight of thousands of refugees from there or it did not see any connection between them and the trouble in or around Calcutta. Even when reports of the riots in East Pakistan were at last published no one blamed the Pakistan Government for its cynical exploitation of a religious issue. Last week-end when the story of 50,000 Christians being forced out of East Pakistan appeared, The Observer found it necessary to balance it with a story, written in London on the basis of material supplied by Phizo, about the Indian army’s alleged atrocities against the Nagas.
Equally notable is the easy confidence with which Mr Chou En-lai’s visit to Pakistan has been treated both in Whitehall and the press. It provides a study in contrast against the fevered anxiety that was displayed here at the start of the Chinese Prime Minister’s tour of Africa. The fact of his mere presence in Africa was enough for some of the more excitable commentators to conclude that China was behind the coup in Zanzibar and army mutinies in Tanganyika, Uganda and Kenya. The Prime Minister, Sir Alec, himself repeatedly quoted Mr Chou En-lai’s statement that Africa was ripe for revolution to the same effect. If Mr Chou En-lai announced his decision to intervene in the Indo-Pakistan dispute over Kashmir the instinctive response was that India’s intransigence was responsible for the West’s loyal ally’s flirtation with China.
Instances
Even confirmed Anglophiles would find it difficult to argue that Britain’s support to Pakistan over Kashmir is really based on an unshakable adherence to the principle of self-determination. Only last December the British Government handed over the Somali-inhabited northern district to independent Kenya in the face of a strong agitation there for a merger with Somalia. The length to which Britain went to frustrate the will of the Greek Cypriots, first for union with Greece and then for true independence, is well known. More of such instances can easily be cited.
The simplest explanation could be the new Prime Minister. As Foreign Secretary, Lord Home was generally regarded as a foil for the more progressive policies of Mr Macmillan. Under Mr Macmillan the British Government faced both ways on most issues but finally moved, particularly in Africa, in the direction of change. The direction has not perceptibly changed under Sir Alec, not yet. But his natural instincts incline him in a direction different from that of Mr Macmillan.
In respect of India he would have the wholehearted backing of the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr Duncan Sandys. His influence cannot be exaggerated. On Cyprus, for instance, he has pushed the Foreign Secretary, Mr RA Butler, into the background. Known for his elephantine memory, he is not likely to have forgotten the rebuff he received during his visit to New Delhi last summer when Mr Nehru agreed to see him only in the company of Lord Mountbatten.
It is only too likely that, even Sir Alec and Mr Sandys would have been more discreet over Kashmir if India’s standing in the world had not suffered as a result of the military debacle in NEFA in October-November 1962. It emphasised our increased dependence on America and Britain. Further, Mr Nehru’s illness has revived not only the question mark against India’s political stability but also her influence in the world. There could be two possible reactions to our difficulties: either the desire to help us tide them over or the attempt to push us around. No clear choice has been made because neither a confident India nor a weak India wholly suits the former imperial rulers. Only the innocent divide the world between friends and enemies.
The British desire to woo Pakistan at our expense is nothing new. Only for some years past it was not considered possible. The Chinese aggression was seen here as a godsend to compel New Delhi to surrender at least the Kashmir Valley to Pakistan. That New Delhi allowed itself to be coerced into talks with Rawalpindi strengthened this belief. When this strategy miscarried, Pakistan’s outcry against even the limited military aid was used in Whitehall as a convenient excuse for not making any commitment beyond the Nassau agreement.
Meanwhile, fortunately for Pakistan, the developments in the Middle East have helped to emphasise the continuing value of CENTO. The revolt in Yemen has posed a major long-term threat to British dominance in Southern Arabia and Aden. The importance of the region to Britain cannot be overstated. Oil is Britain’s one stake. The need to befriend Pakistan and Turkey is thus only too obvious.
Three Fronts
There is yet another facet of the British policy which deserves some attention. At the time of the Chinese aggression and for some months afterwards, it was said at nauseam that India was fighting on three fronts – China, Pakistan and economic backwardness – and she had to give in on one of them. Virtual surrender to Pakistan was recommended in the erroneous belief that India was sufficiently frightened of China and had become sufficiently pro-West. This arbitrary choice did not survive long. India did not surrender to Pakistan. Equally important, the British line on China was revised as the split between Moscow and Peking became public and bitterly acrimonious. The whole press became converted to the concept of strengthening China to enable her to withstand Soviet pressure. That there are profits to be made in the bargain is a welcome bonus. That American policy in south-east Asia has run into difficulties has further underlined the need to deal with China. The policies towards Pakistan and China neatly fit together. In this context Indian irritation and annoyance become a risk worth taking.
Pakistan’s case against India over Kashmir is regarded here as sell-proven. The Chinese case over Aksaichin needed proving and the attempt to do that has now been made by Mr Alastair Lamb in his book “The China-India Border” published on behalf of the Royal Institute of International Affairs. That it is an adequate work in so far as it only casts some doubt on India’s claim without in any way substantiating the Chinese claim is not the fault of the author or his sponsors. On the side he produces an alibi for Pakistan’s border concessions to China. It is idle to debate whether the author had the official support and blessing because it is undeniable that he has represented the official viewpoint.
The Times of India, 29 February 1964