Generally so little is known about communist theories and practices in India that it is natural that the CPM-CPI decision virtually to run an independent anti-Rajiv campaign of their own must come as a surprise to most of even those who discuss the current political scene in the country day in and day out. But in terms of their approaches to politics, there is not much cause for surprise.
All politics is, in the final analysis, about power. This is particularly true about the communists. For they are convinced that history is on their side: progress towards socialism, according to them, is unavoidable in an industrial society whatever the twists and turns. And they are equally convinced that they can give history a push in its inevitable march.
Broadly speaking, there are, according to them, two routes to the goal – “revolution from above”, whereby they either enter into an alliance with a dominant “bourgeois” party or infiltrate it, and the “revolution from below”, whereby they mobilise the people for a direct assault on the government. The communists in India have been divided on the choice of the route since their very arrival on the scene in the twenties.
Tougher Line
In independent India, the division, centering on Mr Nehru, predated the open split in the CPI in 1964. By and large, those who then left the CPI to form the CPM favoured a tougher line towards the government, even in respect of its foreign policy. They took the stand that if Mr Nehru was, in fact, pursuing a progressive foreign policy, the clash leading to the border war in 1962 with China would not have taken place. Thus while the dissidents, who later set up the CPM, favoured the strategy of “revolution from below”, the rival majority faction favoured that of “revolution from above.”
The hour for the post-split CPI struck in 1969, when the split in the Congress reduced the ruling party to a minority in the Lok Sabha and when Mrs Indira Gandhi deliberately adopted a left-of-centre stance and promoted former communists in the government and the party. This led to a virtual alliance between the Congress and the CPI at the time of the poll to the Lok Sabha in 1971. The CPI leadership had good reasons to believe that the strategy of revolution from above was succeeding. But by 1972, Mrs Gandhi was busy trying to cut the leftists in her party down to size.
The CPI leadership obviously could not, or did not wish to, read the writing on the wall, so much so that in June 1975, it was by and large willing to support the emergency in the fond, though mistaken, belief that it would be able to manipulate Mrs Gandhi to its advantage. The effort failed, thanks partly to Mr Sanjay Gandhi. In my opinion, if would have failed even if he had not come to enjoy the kind of authority he did come to enjoy. Mrs Gandhi was not the kind of person who would have allowed herself to become anyone’s prisoner for long. Two more points may be made in this bird’s eye view of complicated developments.
First, the communists were in no position to make a Benes (Czech leader who was successfully divested of power by the communists there in 1948) of Mrs Gandhi. Second, in view of the basically conservative and, in the communist jargon, rightwing character of the Indian state machinery, the emergency regime, if pushed to its logical conclusion, would have borne closer resemblance to Fascism than to Communism. What prevented that development was the strength of the liberal sentiment and not the leftists.
I have recalled all this to make the point that regardless of whether the communists follow the strategy of “revolution from above” or of “revolution from below,” Mr V.P. Singh cannot fit into their scheme, for reasons I shall explain in a moment. They cannot admit this fact. That may indeed be one reason why they have decided to make such a big issue of the Bharatiya Janata Party. That certainly helps them to cover up the reality of the untenability of a long-term arrangement between them and Mr Singh.
I am aware that the communists are making a determined bid for the Muslim vote which they think has moved away from the Congress. But that cannot, in my opinion, be a good enough reason for them to reject the possibility of a loose alliance system in which the BJP can be accommodated indirectly, via Mr Singh and the Lok Dal (B), of which the BJP is a junior partner in Haryana. The wholly uncompromising anti-BJP line could have made sense if the BJP possessed, even with the support of the RSS, the potentiality of becoming the centre of a Rightist alliance system under Mr V.P. Singh’s umbrella. But the BJP is in no position to serve that role.
Context Today
It is not for me to say whether or not Mr Singh realises the implication of his statement that the leftists, a euphemism for the communists in the context of today’s India, are his “natural allies”. But in effect, even if unconsciously, he is placing himself above the two communist organisations and inviting them to become his followers in his campaign. Surely the communists cannot accept such a subordinate position to him; also they can have no long-term interest in helping him to consolidate his popular appeal, which he can, if necessary for his purpose, use against them at his will.
If nothing else, their experience of dealing with Mr Nehru and Mrs Gandhi would warn them of the pitfalls of such an arrangement. Thus, he is not, and cannot, be their “natural ally” even if he thinks they are his. As it happens, his past cannot give him leftist credentials. And his acceptance of the “Raj Rishi” title by some Banaras Brahmins must raise the pulse-beat of any Marxist, however pseudo.
Mr Singh can be useful for the communists if he manages to split the Congress in a manner that gives him a good operating base, but does not place power within his reach in the near future. Both conditions need to be fulfilled: the first because in the absence of a split Mr Singh can remain a potential successor to Mr Rajiv Gandhi, as leader of the party, should events overwhelm the Prime Minister; and the second, because the expectation of office in the near future will tilt the power balance decisively in Mr Singh’s favour and against all his potential allies. Surely such a prospect, if it ever was realistic, which it never was in my view, has disappeared.
Implicit in this assessment are two propositions which it is necessary to spell out. First, I remain convinced that no disclosure in relation to the alleged payoffs by Bofors is going to be so embarrassing to Mr Gandhi personally as to leave him no option but to step down. Second, short of such a development, I do not expect a serious challenge to emerge to him in the Congress party. There is talk of Congress MPs panicking on the eve of the next poll. But that event is too far away – more than two years – to interest me.
In the absence of a major split in the Congress, an arrangement with Mr Singh can be acceptable to the communists essentially on their terms. That is, he is welcome to head a broad movement of “like-minded” parties and individuals which can enable them to expand their own base, especially in the Hindi-region, where his appeal is the greatest. But what are those “like-minded parties”?
Battle of Dals
Things change in politics, as in life. So one should not be too dogmatic in one’s statements. But on the present reckoning, it looks highly unlikely that the Janata Party chief, Mr Chandrashekhar, or the Lok Dal (B) president, Mr H.N. Bahuguna, will ever accept Mr Singh as the new messiah. In any event, another battle has been on in UP which would be occupying Mr Bahuguna’s mind. This is the factional struggle between the Lok Dals, one headed by Chaudhury Charan Singh’s son, Mr Ajit Singh, and the other by him. Behind this fight, it may be mentioned, is the emerging rivalry between the Jats, who constitute the dominant landowning community in Western UP, and the Yadavs who have come up in Eastern UP.
Apart from the militant Bombay trade union leader, Dr Datta Samant, and the peasant leaders – Mr Sharad Joshi in Maharashtra and Mr Mahendra Singh Tikait in UP – this leaves the BJP as Mr Singh’s most important potential ally. But this is not an alliance Mr Singh can be comfortable with. For he is anxious to retain his political respectability among the intelligentsia which his association with the BJP and RSS could damage. That is partly why he is keen on an arrangement with the communists, who currently enjoy a certain level of acceptability.
The BJP and the RSS, on their part, are looking for respectability, which they think Mr Singh can provide. They are sadly mistaken; even Mr Jayaprakash Narayan could not do it for them except for a short period and that too in the context of the emergency. All in all, the Indian political scene looks chaotic once we shift the focus from Mr Rajiv Gandhi, his weaknesses and vulnerabilities.
The Times of India, 9 September 1987