It never made much sense for Iran to hold American diplomats as hostages. The results speak for themselves. Teheran has failed to secure the return of the Shah (now dead) and his fortunes and to extract an apology from Washington for alleged misdeeds in Iran. On the contrary, by disrupting its relations with the United States so violently, it has invited on itself the Iraqi Attack. For it is highly unlikely that President Saddam Hussein would have invaded Iran if he was not assured that it was isolated and helpless. But before the outbreak of the war, the Iranian action could be said to make some sense at least from the psychological point of view. It does not do so any more. The Islamic revolution is intensely anti-U.S. not only because America restored the Shah to the throne in 1953 and kept him in power for 25 years, but also because it symbolises what the Iranian revolutionaries regard as decadent Western culture. This basic issue has not and cannot become irrelevant just because another country has attacked Iran. But the war must alter Teheran’s priorities. A revolution must survive before it can succeed in implementing its ideology and programme. This means that on calm consideration and calculation, Iran cannot allow its grievances against the United States to complicate its task of resisting the Iraqi attack. As such it is possible that it may release the hostages. Mr. Rajai’s statements in New York hint at such a possibility. But the release cannot be part of a deal with Washington, certainly not one involving spare parts for the U.S.-made military equipment. The Carter administration cannot afford to enter into such arrangement in the context of the Iraq-Iran war. It just cannot afford to alienate President Saddam Hussein and his Arab supporters.
It is only natural that the U.S. government should wish to avoid a clear-cut choice between Iraq and Iran. It must hope to be able to do business with both once the hostilities are over. That is necessary for it if it is to prevent a substantial increase in Soviet influence in the region. President Carter’s cautiously worded censure of Iraq for its attack on Iran fits into this perspective of US policy. But two other points appear obvious. First, America’s top priority must be to give a sense of security to the rulers of Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Oman, the United Arab Emirates and so on. It cannot, therefore, accept Mr. Rajai’s demand that it withdraw its four radar planes from Saudi Arabia and its powerful fleet from the Gulf. That is out of the question whatever the Iranian reaction and response. Secondly, Washington will be loathe to see President Saddam Hussein overthrown as a result of serious reverses in the war. As things stand, such an eventuality appears rather remote. But if it threatens to materialize, it will not be surprising if King Hussein of Jordan steps in with his troops, perhaps the best trained in the Arab world, and Washington turns the Nelson eye on this development, The U.S. administration’s perception of its interests does not leave it much choice.