The authorities appear to have finally decided to grapple with the main source of the continuing crisis in Punjab – the murder gangs who stalk the land as if it belongs to them. The Prime Minister’s telephonic conversation with the state chief minister on Monday was the first clear indication that Mr. Rajiv Gandhi would no longer allow the search for a formula whereby Chandigarh could be transferred to Punjab to detract him from attending to what should always have been his first priority in the state – law and order. Mr. Gandhi followed his blunt talk with Mr. Barnala with a detailed discussion of security problems in Punjab with his experts on Tuesday. And on Thursday came the statements by Mr. Kamlapati Tripathi and Mr. Arjun Singh, which together left little room for doubt that the atmosphere had changed in Delhi in favour of greater realism.
Mr. Tripathi still remains the working president of the Congress party. But he does not speak for the ruling group. In this case, he has spoken for the nation. He has given expression to the desperation of the Indian people; their patience with Mr. Barnala is exhausted and their confidence in him badly shaken. Mr. Tripathi has given him two choices: if he cannot end terrorism in one month, he should either step down and make way for President’s rule or call in the army. This is a reasonable proposition, though it should not be interpreted rigidly. While it may not be possible for Mr. Barnala to end terrorism altogether in one month or even six months, it should be possible for him to show worthwhile progress in that period. If he cannot, the conclusion would be obvious: the task is beyond him.
Mr. Barnala is said to be a good and sincere man who is as genuinely interested in preserving the country’s unity as he is in ensuring Akali power in Punjab. We have no need to dispute this view of his intentions. But we feel obliged to point out two facts. First, that as chief minister he has been responsible for much of the mischief in Punjab; he released thousands of people suspected of being terrorists, extremists, smugglers and their supporters and put many of them into an already communalized and demoralized police force. The argument that he was under pressure from fellow Akalis and fellow Sikhs cannot answer the charge; those who might feel that we are exaggerating should read the carefully worded statements of one of the country’s most respected policemen, Mr. Ribeiro, currently director-general of the Punjab police. Secondly and even more pertinently, Mr. Barnala has among his cabinet colleagues and Akali legislator-supporters men who continue to maintain their old links with terrorists, extremists and smugglers and to interfere in the working of the police on behalf of their patron-clients. Again, we are not arguing that Mr. Barnala should be packed off. But we regard it necessary to reaffirm our position that we must not pin too much hope on him. He is constrained by his colleagues and the instrument at his disposal has long been largely blunted. The advocates of the so-called political solution owe it to themselves (and the nation) to answer these specific questions and not try to terrorise us into silence by inventing nightmarish pictures of what might have happened if the so-called political process had not been resumed in Punjab and if Mr. Barnala had not been thrown up by that “bountiful” process as a potential saviour.
We are not so naive as not to know the limitations of the army in dealing with the kind of situation that prevails in Punjab. The army is trained and equipped to fight external enemies; it has to operate in formations of a certain minimum size; and it must feel free to use the deadliest weapon at its command. When it is called in to assist civilian authority to enforce law and order, it cannot function in the manner it is expected to in fulfillment of its normal duties. We are also fully aware that an army is an elite institution and, in order to keep it effective, we must not expose it to too prolonged a contact with the turbulence and corruption of our civil society. But there are occasions when the awesome power and majesty of the mighty Indian state must be put on display so that the enemy of the state knows what he is up against in the final analysis. Such demonstration should be rare just as major military exercises on the border are rare. Indeed, ideally they should not be necessary; the police should be able to represent the power of the Indian state; and then we have the paramilitary forces. But unfortunately we have allowed our police forces to run down and in certain situations the paramilitary forces are not able to instil in the enemy the necessary amount of fear. In situations like the one that obtains in the border districts of Punjab, a concentrated use force is also often the most economic in terms of costs – human lives. Weak governments end up killing more people than strong ones. Sardar Patel pacified Punjab – then, too, disturbed by the Akalis – with words alone. The opponent knew he meant business and that he spoke for the Indian state with all its coercive power.