The Chinese embassy in New Delhi has confirmed that Mr. Huang Hua will not be visiting India next October, as earlier indicated, or any time later this year. The embassy’s version is that the Foreign Minister is too busy to accept India’s invitation. But it is difficult to accept this Statement at its face value. If Mr. Hua was indeed busy, Beijing would have conveyed the information to New Delhi through normal diplomatic channels. Instead, officials in the Ministry of External Affairs have read the news in a New Delhi daily. This has led to the speculation that the report itself may be based on a deliberate leak by the Chinese embassy. The promptness with which it has confirmed the report certainly strengthens this possibility. There is also a recent precedent.
On the eve of a senior External Affairs Ministry official’s visit to Beijing last June, Mr. Deng Xiaoping caught hold of an Indian journalist who happened to be there to spell out to him the terms on which the Chinese would wish to settle the border dispute with this country. Thus, if Mr. Deng can think it profitable to use the press to convey to the people of India his terms for a border settlement, it is plausible that his ambassador in New Delhi may have resorted to a similar expedient, that is, he may have utilized a newspaper to convey a rebuff to the government of India. And if in the first instance the calculation was that the people would welcome the terms and press the government to accept them, the calculation now can be that the people would appreciate China’s annoyance over the government’s recognition of the Heng Samrin regime in Kampuchea. In both cases the assumption is naive. Since Mr. Deng’s interview, pressure has started building up on the government not to give up its claims to Aksaichin and postponement of Mr. Huang’s visit can only strengthen the position of those Indians who argue that China cannot be India’s friend. Apparently the Chinese leaders and their official advisers do not understand the working of Indian democracy.
The Chinese had expressed their displeasure with India at the time of its recognition of the regime in Phnem Penh. Apparently they have now followed it up by postponing indefinitely the Foreign Minister’s visit to New Delhi. This conforms to their rather simplistic approach to international relations. Unlike us, they tend to divide nations into friends (those who agree with their current line) and foes (those who do not accept their current line). Unlike us, they also do not believe in isolating one issue from others and judging each on its merit. Witness their perseverance on the issue of the inclusion of the anti-hegemony clause in the peace treaty
with Japan. They would have known as well as anyone else that Tokyo would not join an anti-Soviet crusade if it accepted the clause and that it would not abandon its reservations about Moscow if it did not concede their demand. But while on the basis of past experience we know that this is the general Chinese approach, we must not rush to the conclusion that they have once again put us firmly in the enemy (read Soviet) camp. The very fact that they may have used an Indian newspaper instead of the normal diplomatic channels to convey their rebuff to New Delhi may be an indication that they have not yet made up their mind. As a rule they do not change their policy in a hurry. A perusal of their dealings with the Soviet Union and the United States would be illuminating in this regard. Even so it may be wrong for us to ignore the signal.
The Chinese attach considerable importance to Kampuchea. They are determined to wage war on the Hanoi-backed Heng Samrin regime there through the Khmer Rouge guerillas. They have the backing of the United States in this enterprise. They may also find it useful to exploit India’s recognition of the set-up in Phnom Penh to weaken its position in south-east Asia where New Delhi’s decision has not been welcomed. And they may have convinced themselves that Mrs. Gandhi has acted under Soviet pressure and thus proved herself incapable of taking independent decisions. But New Delhi should not be unduly surprised if it turns out that the Chinese are concerned above all with the Soviet intervention in Afghanistan, that they are angry over the Prime Minister’s recent statements on this issue, and that putting off Mr. Huang Hua’s visit may be their way of registering their protest.
It may be a sheer coincidence that the postponement has come in the wake of Mr. Agha Shahi’s visit to New Delhi. But the coincidence may not be wholly fortuitous. It is possible that the Pakistani foreign minister was speaking to a brief prepared in consultation with the Chinese. The signals are far from clear. Indeed, they are confusing. But our policy-makers cannot afford to ignore them. A bitter struggle is shaping up in our neighbourhood between the Soviet Union on the one hand and China and the United States on the other. We cannot define our position in relation to it without a proper understanding of its dimension and possible repercussion on the region and our country.