It was not really necessary for the Prime Minister to make the specific statement that he would not cede territory to China during his forthcoming visit to Beijing. His intention is, of course, obvious, which is to make it known that he does not intend to negotiate a deal on the border which could involve some territorial adjustments. But then he could have phrased his statement differently. He could have said that he was going to China in search of a larger political understanding and not a border settlement. The phrasing of the statement apart, however, that is the crux of the matter.
Broadly, the issue of Sino-Indian relations has been formulated in two ways. While some people have held that a border settlement is a prerequisite for a wider understanding between the two countries, others have contended that only a larger political understanding can pave the way for a deal on the border. Obviously, there is merit in both propositions. But equally obviously, New Delhi has to opt for one of the two approaches. Mrs Indira Gandhi opted for the second during her tenure of office up to 1977; the Janata government for the first, and therefore sent its minister for external affairs, Mr Atal Bihari Vajpayee, to Beijing; during Mrs Gandhi’s next term, between 1980 and 1984, she more or less marked time, perhaps because China was internally in a state of flux and there was no movement in Sino-Soviet relations. Mr Rajiv Gandhi is apparently back to the Janata approach; perhaps he sees in the progress in Sino-Soviet relations in the past year or so, a hopeful sign.
It is difficult to be sure whether or not the Prime Minister and his aides are justified in taking such a view. One difficulty is that it is virtually impossible to define China’s strategic doctrine, indeed even to say whether it currently possesses a strategic doctrine. It follows that we are in no position to even try and find out Beijing’s view of India’s place in its scheme of things. As we all know, the Chinese strategic doctrine up to the sixties was that the United States was the chief villain of the piece in the world; then it was modified to include the Soviet Union as a threat to world peace; in the seventies the top place in the Chinese demonology was assigned to the Soviet Union; this was followed by the theory of equidistance from the two superpowers, though with a tilt towards the US. In the seventies, Beijing favoured the rearming of Japan; recently it has expressed concern over the possibility of Japan emerging as a major military power, in addition to its already being a formidable economic power. Finally, the Chinese assessment of the future of the third world and its place in it, is not at all clear.
Two wholly contradictory inferences can be drawn from this confusion regarding China’s strategic doctrine. It would be as legitimate to infer that this is a good time to open a dialogue with Beijing (because we can hope to influence it) as to conclude that it would have been more advisable for Mr Rajiv Gandhi to wait for a clear definition of their overall policy by the Chinese. The Prime Minister has apparently accepted the first proposition and it is as irrelevant to commend it as to condemn it. We have to wait for events to unfold themselves, before we can say whether or not he has been well advised.
Narrowing the argument, two factors have been and remain of paramount importance in the shaping of Sino-Indian relations – developments in Tibet and the Chinese attitude towards Pakistan. The two factors are inter-related, inasmuch as the difficulties China has encountered in consolidating its hold in Tibet has inclined it to distrust India, befriend Pakistan and encourage Islamabad in its general policy of maintaining a varying level of hostility towards New Delhi. The developments in Tibet have in turn been greatly influenced by Beijing’s refusal to show genuine and sufficient respect for Tibet’s distinct culture and autonomy. The record was uniformly bad, till some years ago. Since then, the approach has fluctuated between limited accommodation for the Tibetan people’s aspirations and repression. But there is a desire for accommodation. The invitation to the Dalai Lama for talks is the latest indication of that desire. It is not for us to advise the Dalai Lama. We can only say that progress on the question of genuine autonomy for Tibet could help improve Sino-Indian ties.