Finally an agreement of sorts has been hammered out in Geneva on Afghanistan. When signed in a few days, it will provide the Soviet Union a face-saver. Under it, Moscow will be able to withdraw its troops without having to acknowledge the plain fact that it has failed to pacify Afghanistan in the face of resistance by US-backed Mujahideen. But, on the face of it, the agreement will be pretty meaningless otherwise. For, it will stipulate that the Americans and the Russians will continue to be entitled to provide arms to their respective clients. And while Pakistan will formally agree not to interfere in Afghanistan’s internal affairs, it will in reality continue to do so, inasmuch as it will still serve as a conduit for US arms supplies to the Mujahideen. Indeed, the American decision to maintain arms supplies to the rebels can make sense only in the context of Pakistan’s willingness to continue to serve at a conduit. But precisely because the draft agreement, as it stands, is so absurd that it is legitimate to suspect that there may be a secret understanding between the two superpowers.
The central American purpose has been accomplished with the Soviet decision to withdraw its troops from Afghanistan. Rightly or wrongly, Washington took the view that the military intervention in Afghanistan was an expansionist act on the part of Moscow and that it had to
be beaten back. Beaten back it has been. America has also paid Islamabad generously for the services the latter has rendered by way of massive military assistance. But Pakistan is a valuable ally and Washington cannot suddenly disown responsibility for the three million Afghan refugees in Pakistan. That is why the decision to continue the arms supplies to the Mujahideen. There is, however, a catch in all this. Which is that it is difficult to think of any possible development in Afghanistan, including the collapse of the Soviet-backed Najib government in Kabul, which can help restore peace in that strife-ravaged land and thus facilitate the return of the refugees.
Afghanistan presents Pakistan a very different problem than Bangladesh presented to India in 1971. Bangladesh had a towering leader in Sheikh Mujibur Rahman who could inspire confidence among the refugees; Afghanistan has no such leader. Bangladesh possessed a long tradition of centralized civilian rule, even if the capital was located in far-away Pakistan; Afghanistan is essentially a tribal society where the gun remains the final arbiter. Bangladesh could boast of a reasonably competent civil service which could quickly restore order once the Pakistani forces were out; there is no such agency in Afghanistan. A de facto division of the country could offer a way out for the interested parties, if the Mujahideen could be persuaded to form a coalition and not seek power in Kabul. But that does not appear to be on the cards. President Zia-ul-Haq must be a very worried man, even if he is convinced that the ammunition depot blow-up near Islamabad is not the result of sabotage by Kabul’s agents.