We are not quite back to the pre-Operation Bluestar situation in the Golden Temple complex in Amritsar yet. For one thing, the complex has not been fortified in the way it had been in 1984. For another, there is no Bhindranwale presiding over the build-up. But it cannot be denied that the situation has taken a dramatic turn for the worse in recent months. Clearly, many more terrorists are operating from the complex now and are evidently better armed than at any time since Operation Bluestar. Thanks to Pakistan, they are now equipped with the Chinese assault rifle, AK47s and other deadly weapons. And there can be little doubt that they are planning to fortify the place in the 1984 style. Indeed, the shoot-out on Monday was the result of an attempt on the part of the security forces to prevent the terrorists from constructing fortifications on land behind the Akal Takht.
The attack on the security forces by the militants from within the temple complex clearly marks a watershed in the struggle of the terrorists for Khalistan and of the Indian state to meet this challenge. The extremists have once again put the Indian state on notice that they are ready to take on its security forces from within the temple complex if the latter try to interfere with their plans. The state has no choice but to pick up the gauntlet. It cannot allow the impression to spread that it lacks the will to act even in the face of so grave a provocation as an attack on its security forces from within the complex. And, equally important, it cannot allow the complex to be fortified and once again turned into a fortress.
The shoot-out on Monday was the result of developments such as the concentration of terrorists in the temple complex and acquisition of masses of deadly weapons by them, which have been common knowledge for some months. As such it is legitimate to think that the security forces have drawn up contingency plans and that their political bosses, including the Prime Minister, Mr. Rajiv Gandhi, have had time to discuss these plans. We do not know whether the security forces favour an early, if not an immediate, storming of the temple complex and whether such a proposal has been endorsed by the Union government. Also, we have only a general idea of the gravity of the situation; for we do not have access to intelligence reports. As such we are in no position to say whether the situation in the temple complex is already so grave as to make it obligatory for the authorities to act without further loss of time. So what follows is based on an assessment which, in turn, is based on published reports, that is, an assessment which may or may not be reasonably accurate.
As of today, our assessment is that while the situation in the temple complex is serious, it is still not desperate. We are not back to April-May 1984 when the government was left with no choice but to send the army into the Golden Temple, whatever the political consequences. In plain terms, our view, for whatever it is worth, is that it is possible to delay an entry into the temple complex, provided measures are taken to prevent fortification of the place. We recommend a delay also in order that the government can take care of the consequences in advance. Mr. Rajiv Gandhi should, in our opinion, hold two meetings – one of opposition leaders and one of prominent Sikhs from all over the country. He should take them fully into confidence, tell them of the terrorist build-up in the complex and their future plans as assessed by his intelligence agencies, and ask them to suggest measures to cope with the growing menace. He will have achieved a great deal for the future of the Indian state if he manages to secure a consensus on an armed entry into the complex. Even if he is unable to achieve such a consensus, especially among prominent Sikhs, he shall have demonstrated his bona fides.
Though it remains fashionable to talk of the hurt Sikh psyche in certain quarters, we feel that the terrorists have taken care of that problem for the government. For the first time perhaps in a long, long time, the ordinary Sikh finds himself on the defensive, not so much because some Hindu leaders such as Mr. Bal Thackeray have adopted an aggressive attitude towards him as because the extremists have taken away from him his pride which rested above all on his self-perception of his contribution to the well-being of the whole of India. He could sustain a strong sense of grievance precisely because he felt that his contribution to the country’s struggle for freedom and its consolidation, especially in respect of national defence, was such as to entitle him to whatever he could possibly ask for from the Indian state and the Indian people. And he was not far wrong. In this larger-than-life view of himself, he saw himself not as part of the mainstream but as the mainstream. The terrorists have taken that self-image away from him. We say all this to underline the proposition that in the event of an entry into the Golden Temple the authorities may not face the kind of Sikh backlash they had to contend with in 1984. While it would be wrong to be dogmatic on such an issue, we do feel that way. But we also say all this to underline the opposite point, that every effort must be made to convince the ordinary Sikh that those in power are more than sensitive to his susceptibilities. He feels more vulnerable than a member of any other community, which is one reason why it is unrealistic of the others to expect him to raise his voice against the terrorists. The Indian state must try to ensure that it does not aggravate his sense of vulnerability. The two institutions on which the Sikh in Punjab could lean – the Shiromani Gurdwara Prabandhak Committee and the Akali Dal – have let him down badly and he will not easily turn to other parties. There is a vacuum in his life which is going to be difficult to fill. Neither the SGPC nor the Akali Dal can come alive so long as the state does not take care of the terrorists who have undermined these pillars of the Sikh community. The SGPC and the Akali leaders, with some honourable exceptions, such as Mr. Surjeet Singh Barnala, former chief minister, are themselves largely responsible for much of the mischief in Punjab. But that is history which offers no clue to a solution to the present problem. Indeed, even they should be asked to suggest a way out. The entry into the temple complex, should it become necessary, will be a bloody affair. It has to be carefully prepared for, in terms of both the deployment of the necessary force and the mobilization of public opinion, especially among the Sikhs.