Most people here will agree with Mr Chavan that the Soviet Union has been a steadfast and reliable friend and share his hope that this relationship will endure in the future. But the Minister for External Affairs himself will be willing to recognise that this country’s ties with the outside world need to be somewhat better balanced than they have been for some time.
New Delhi has, of course, been more than willing to put the dispute with the United States over the Bangladesh issue behind it and improve its relations with that country. Indeed, considerable progress in that direction would almost certainly have followed Mr Kissinger’s visit last October if Washington had not subsequently decided to lift the embargo on the supply of arms to Pakistan and thus revived old fears and suspicions regarding its South Asia policy in this country. But it cannot also be denied that the political atmosphere in India at the time was not quite propitious for the pursuit of a pragmatic approach by the government.
It is not necessary to recall that at the best of times American policy makers have not shown the same kind of concern and respect for this country’s susceptibilities and interests as their Soviet counterparts. That has been self-evident, though America’s partisanship towards Pakistan since the death of Mr John Foster Dulles in 1958 has from time to time been exaggerated in this country. In fact anyone who has studied the Pakistani Press and official moves in the late ‘fifties and the early ‘sixties can easily testify that Rawalpindi was then quite unsure of the USA’s continuing support and that this was one reason why President Ayub Khan began to make overtures to the Soviet Union and China.
Concern
All this is, however, less pertinent than the fact that a very large part of the total outside assistance to this country has come from the United States and its allies, that this aid was of critical importance in helping it stabilise prices from the mid- ‘fifties to the mid-’sixties and achieve a modest rate of growth and that American co-operation was vital in the development of power and agricultural research and its application. And, needless to say, without the US shipment of around 10 million tonnes of foodgrains each year in 1966 and 1967, India would have been in great difficulty.
The West is doubtless not monolithic and in recent years West Germany, Britain, France and other West European nations have needed American prodding to extend sizable aid to this country. But without Washington’s initiative in the early ‘sixties, the Aid-India consortium might not have been formed and the US- dominated World Bank and its soft-lending affiliate, the International Development Association, have been fairly generous even after 1971 when Washington cut off direct aid. Last year, for instance, India was the largest recipient of IDA assistance – $840 million.
It would have been proper to make these points even if the objective of zero net aid by the end of the ‘seventies appeared to be realistic and Indian agricultural advance promised to be rapid enough to meet this country’s requirements. But, as it happens, neither proposition may be valid. Surely on the present reckoning it cannot be said that the World Bank is exaggerating when it says that India will need substantial aid to achieve an overall three per cent rate of growth in the ‘seventies – the figure up to 1974 has been as low as 1.4 per cent a year against a 2.5 per cent annual increase in population. And it may be some years before Indian agriculture can produce in good years the kind of surpluses which may help the country tide over bad years. Indeed, it may also be advisable to take note of the possibility that as land reforms are successfully implemented and big farms eliminated, partly as a result of the enforcement of ceilings and partly as that of the inevitable process of fragmentation, the marketable and marketed surplus may decrease in proportion to the overall output.
Assistance
It is somewhat ironical that agriculture and not industry should provide the United States its biggest leverage in dealing with developing countries, most of whom need to import food, as well as the Soviet Union. That country is said to have suffered a major setback once again and will perhaps need to import 20 million tonnes, at least one half of it from the United States. The scale of Soviet purchases leaves little room for doubt that the drop in production has been pretty heavy and that despite massive investments in the last two decades, agriculture remains the Soviet Union’s Achilles’ heel.
Fortunately for this country, Mrs Gandhi was quick to grasp the hand of friendship proffered by the Shah in the summer of 1973, that is, before the Arab-Israeli war and the dramatic fourfold rise in oil prices soon afterwards. That relationship has developed steadily ever since and India has been spared the nightmarish feeling of being surrounded by powerful and hostile states. But the Prime Minister’s action in responding to the Shah’s call for co-operation attracted considerable criticism from some of those who did not have a proper appreciation of the new realities in West Asia and continued to divide that part of the world into “progressives” and “reactionaries.”
They juxtaposed friendship with Iran at that time against co-operation with Iraq, as if one was incompatible with the other and as if the disputes between Teheran and Baghdad were incapable of resolution in the near future. Subsequent events have proved that it was not necessary for India to choose between Iran and Iraq precisely because in the new environment in West Asia governments in that region have acquired a new capacity to settle disputes either directly or through the good offices of a third country. Clearly several factors are responsible for this happy development. But it may not be much of an exaggeration to say that America’s come-back to the region and the shift in the local power balance between the “radicals” and the “conservatives” in favour of the latter are two of the most important among them.
Surplus
Friendship with the Shah has been paying dividends and not just in terms of credits for the purchase of oil, the development of the Kudremukh iron ore mines and so on, but also in terms of relations with Pakistan. For, it is difficult to believe that Mr Bhutto and the Pakistani media would have been as reticent in the wake of the declaration of national emergency in this country if the Shah had not been as well disposed towards it as he is. Thus, Mrs Gandhi is in a position to concentrate on domestic issues and not be distracted too much by the problem of external security.
But if the circle is to be completed, a meaningful dialogue with China will also be necessary. This is perhaps not a practical proposition right now in view of the unhelpful stance Peking has adopted on a number of issues. It has been arming Pakistan. It has been opposed to the incorporation of Sikkim in the Indian Union despite the demand for it by the duly-elected representatives of the people. It is providing training and arms, even if on a limited scale, to Naga and Mizo hostiles. It is said to have worked overtime to whip up anti-India sentiment in Nepal and it has been highly critical of the Prime Minister’s decision to proclaim a state of national emergency. But while it may be necessary for New Delhi to bide its time, it would be well advised not to regard the issue as being closed indefinitely.
Since the Chinese approach is so different from ours, it is extremely difficult for many people here to understand Peking’s behaviour. The fact that it subscribes to the Western ideology of Marxism-Leninism cannot help matters because this has not superseded and cannot possibly supersede thought and behaviour patterns developed over long centuries. But the view may be hazarded that the Chinese concept of morality and ideology obliges them to put forward formulations like those in connection with Sikkim which conform to their theory even though in actual practice it may have no intention to go by it. Ideology doubtless does not come into play in China’s dealings with friendly governments. Pakistan has all along provided an excellent illustration of Chinese pragmatism. But even in other cases, China’s attitude is far from rigid. Witness the skill with which it maintained some kind of communication with the United States from mid-’fifties to 1971 when Mr Kissinger visited Peking and kept on trading with the Soviet Union even after the ideological splits
The Times of India, 13 August 1975