The news of the Syrian coup last week received a single column treatment on page one in the mid-day edition of a leading evening paper here. In the evening edition it was safely tucked away on an inside page. It was allotted the fourth place in the mid-day news bulletin of the BBC. The government quickly recognised the new regime. Some of the leading papers have not even cared to comment editorially on this development. This contrasted sharply with the intense interest in the overthrow of General Kassem in Iraq a month earlier. One explanation is that the Syrian coup was expected to follow the one in Iraq anyway. Only it was much quicker than expected.
On the surface the government is playing it cool. In fact it is deeply concerned over the possible repercussions of these dramatic changes in the balance of power in West Asia. It is feared that one result of the emergence of mutually sympathetic regimes in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Yemen – for the first time in history – might be increased pressure on Jordan and Saudi Arabia. Britain is committed to the defence of the regime in Jordan as America is to that of the one in Saudi Arabia. Even graver apprehension is that in case of trouble in Jordan the Israelis might occupy the area on their side of the Jordan river as a measure of self-defence and this might precipitate a general war between Israel and the Arabs.
Communism
It is generally, though rather belatedly, realised here that the movement of Arab nationalism as represented by President Nasser (with its emphasis on the elimination of foreign domination and feudalism and medievalism) has become irresistible. Also in view of the ruthless suppression of the local communists in Egypt and Iraq it can no longer be claimed that the traditional monarchical regimes are essential to stop the march of communism in this area of vital importance. Since Russia herself has become a big exporter of oil it is obvious that West Asian countries cannot find an alternative market to western Europe for its principal export item. This eliminates the old fear of interruption of oil supplies.
To put it differently many of the foundations on which British policy in West Asia was based in the past have visibly collapsed. In this regard, at least Indian policy of regarding President Nasser as representing the wave of the future has turned out to be sound. That was General Kassem’s principal grievance against India and it led him to line up with Saudi Arabia and other forces of obscurantism in espousing the case of Pakistan on the Kashmir issue. Ostensibly it was done at unofficial level but that could not deceive anyone. That, however, is a separate question. As far as the British Government is concerned it is now faced with the task of fashioning an altogether new policy in West Asia unless it chooses to retire from this area in favour of the Americans who are already playing a paternal role in the Arab world.
Though there is no desire here at all to get embroiled in the inter-Arab conflicts this task of fashioning a new policy is not going to be easy. The continuing unwillingness to recognise the republican regime in Yemen shows that the pull of the past is still considerable. Much depends on whether those who speak in the name of Arab renaissance and unity are willing and able to show sufficient restraint to allow peaceful even if necessarily slow transition to take place in countries like Jordan and Saudi Arabia and to come to terms with Israel. Issues relating to Jordan and Israel are viewed here as being interrelated.
Tenuous
The Financial Times summed up the British attitude last Monday when it said editorially: “In the long run there is probably no better alternative either for the West or for the Arabs themselves than a string of ‘nationalist’ regimes throughout the Middle East and Africa….. but the danger is that if an attempt is made to precipitate this state of affairs – instead of simply allowing it to evolve – the West could be antagonised and the Israeli conflict set alight.” The paper described as tenuous the hope that the coups in Jordan and Saudi Arabia “might be executed with such rapidity that their repercussions could be contained”. The British might accommodate themselves to this prospect of overnight coups provided they do not threaten to provoke an Israeli-Arab war.
The British reaction to the American recognition of the republican regime in Yemen has been unhappy. The popular press has derived satisfaction from the fact that the American hope that this move would lead to the withdrawal of the Egyptian forces on the one hand and the end of Saudi Arabian support to the Imam on the other did not materialise. The British forces in Aden have been strengthened to deal with the possible overflow of the conflict in the Yemen to the adjoining protected sheikhdoms. Here the short-term as well as the long-term prospects are gloomy unless the United Nations can find some solution to the conflict in Yemen. Britain is principally interested in the maintenance of the Aden base and still has tied its fortunes with those of the outdated sheikhdoms and emirates loosely brought together in the South Arabian Federation.
It is not only in West Asia that British foreign policy is in disarray. It is exposed to tremendous stress and strain in Africa as well. Somalia is threatening to sever diplomatic relations with Britain as a protest against the decision to retain as part of Kenya a northern district inhabited by Somalis. The local inhabitants have repeatedly proclaimed their preference for Somalia. The British government sees the justice of the demand. But now that Kenya is about to become independent it cannot transfer the district in question to Somalia without the consent of Kenya’s popular leaders. It does not want to risk another constitutional crisis in Kenya. In the long run this is likely to prove an unwise decision with unhappy consequences for Kenya.
The problem of Southern Rhodesia is proving even more intractable. The dissolution of the Central African Federation would not solve the problem of avoiding the perpetuation of their rule by the small minority (barely 250,000) of European settlers on the African majority of three million. In fact this problem and the consequent outbreak of racial violence is likely to be aggravated with the dissolution of the Federation. The white population in Southern Rhodesia intends to make common cause with the Union of South Africa in its determination to deny the African population their rights. The consequences of such a move would be grim beyond words.
The British government has used the internal autonomy of Southern Rhodesia as an argument for inaction. The constitutional validity or otherwise of this plea is however irrelevant in the face of disastrous consequences of inaction. The Deputy Prime Minister, Mr R. A. Butler, who is dealing with the problem of the Federation, has set his heart on preserving the existing economic links between Northern Rhodesia, Southern Rhodesia and Nyasaland when the Federation is dissolved. On the key question of the rights of the Africans in Southern Rhodesia he talks of moral persuasion.
Misconceived
There might have been merit in dealing with the questions relating to the Federation one by one, first with the question of revising Northern Rhodesia’s Constitution to give the African majority a chance of forming the government and then with Nyasaland’s right to secede. On both these questions the Government showed commendable firmness of purpose and approach. All this good work would, however, pale into insignificance in the face of failure in Southern Rhodesia which could revive the possibility of major powers becoming involved in a military conflict in Africa which was barely averted in the Congo. This emphasises the importance of a comprehensive plan to dispose of the legacy of the misconceived policies of the past in Central Africa.
It is difficult to say for certain how far the British government’s approach to Southern Rhodesia has been influenced by the fear of revolt on the part of the Conservative backwoodsmen. Whatever the reasons, in Africa as in West, Asia the British government has still to go a long way before it can come to terms with the dominant force of nationalism and change.
The Times of India, 16 March 1963