On his return from his controversial visit to Karachi and New Delhi last Monday the Commonwealth Relations Secretary, Mr Duncan Sandys, did not make any statement to the press. He avoided questions at the airport. Unlike at the time of his previous visit to the sub-continent he has not invited British journalists for an off the record briefing. More conspicuous has been the fact that he has not made even a formal report to the House of Commons as is customary on such occasions and he does not propose to do so.
These are clear indications not only of his disappointment with the result of the visit but also of his anxiety to prevent a controversy at home on the question of arms aid to India. This might be just as well for India if only because it ensures that the forthcoming negotiations between the Minister for Economic and Defence Co-ordination, Mr Krishnamachari, and the British Government will take place in a calm atmosphere not bedevilled by a public debate. Unlike in America the question of economic aid here has never been the subject of public discussion and that is another reason to hope that an unseemly controversy can be avoided on the issue of military aid to India as well.
Complex Issues
There is a case for discretion on India’s part as well. India should not feel too assured by Mr Sandys’s statement that military aid is not related to the Kashmir issue. The issues remain complex. We have for the first time a situation in which the Pakistan Government faces the direct choice between making good its threat to quit at least SEATO and exposing itself to public ridicule on the ground that it should have held out threats which it was both unwilling and unable to carry out. Since the British Government would like to resolve this dilemma every attempt will be made to soften the unintended blow at the prestige of the Pakistan Government. The attempt to introduce a third party mediator is part of this effort.
It is worth recalling that the first wave of anti-Western or, to be precise, anti-American propaganda swept Pakistan, which in fact means only West Pakistan, in the wake of Mr Kennedy’s election as President of the United States and his rather flattering references not only to India and Mr Nehru but to the role of neutral nations in general. His election platform contained critical references to SEATO and CENTO and the same criticism was implicit in his inaugural address. The second wave was whipped up in 1961 when the international consortium allowed over $1200 million of aid to India and $320 million to Pakistan. Both these grievances were met because President Ayub Khan was assured that the West had no intention to downgrade or disband SEATO and CENTO and aid to Pakistan was considerably stepped up restoring the old ratio of one to two with India.
A similar solution in the form of increased arms aid to Pakistan is theoretically possible now. Only it is doubtful if Pakistan can use it in view of the small defence budget of less than Rs 100 crores. Pakistan’s economy and political conditions do not admit of a sizeable increase in taxation. The exception could be the air force and Pakistan has been keen to acquire a second squadron of F-104 Star Fighters. Pakistan’s demand could be figuring in the West’s calculations in settling the question of India’s air defence requirements.
It is also well known that last year the West agreed to support Pakistan’s demand for the revival of the Kashmir issue in the Security Council though it did not believe that such a debate would either bring the issue any nearer to solution or that it would serve the West’s own interests. This was a sop to the Pakistan Government which sought through this device simultaneously to distract popular attention from the growing demand for constitutional government and to assuage anti-Western sentiment that it had itself promoted.
Mr Sandys has once again provided Rawalpindi a similar escape route by apparently (not in fact) linking arms aid to India with the settlement of the Kashmir dispute. It also might not be a mere coincidence that the Western aid to Pakistan of $425 million for the current year has been settled and announced in advance of a similar decision for India and that though the British Government had announced last year that it would be unable to make further contributions to Pakistan’s current plan it has now made a commitment of $22.4 million.
India infuriated the West by taking up the position of neutrality between it and its principal challenger for world supremacy, the Soviet Union. But this policy was at least partly credible in that Russia is a growing source for capital goods. Pakistan by choosing to be neutral between India and China on the side of the latter has not earned the displeasure of the West to any serious extent. In fact there is no evidence of annoyance at least here and Pakistan’s border settlement with China was even acclaimed for its realism.
Readjustment
It is only too obvious that the problem of readjustment of relations with Pakistan in the new context of military assistance to India should have been more acute for America than for Britain. Ever since the mutual defence pact was concluded between America and Pakistan in 1953 British influence in the latter country has been rather small. The British on the other hand have competed successfully with America and Russia for influence in India notwithstanding frequent complaints that Whitehall was responsible for prejudicing the White House on the question of Kashmir. In terms of both present investment and future trade prospects there has hardly been much of a choice for the British Government between India and Pakistan.
All the same Mr Sandys took the headlong plunge into the Kashmir imbroglio. There are several theories why he did so. The official version remains that India and Pakistan can be defended either jointly or not at all. This might be too jejune to be taken seriously but it is there. It is likely the British Government made a genuine miscalculation in convincing itself that the shock of the Chinese invasion was so great that Indian public opinion would be prepared to make major concessions on the future of the Kashmir valley. Alternatively it could not resist the temptation to regain its influence in Pakistan.
The latter theory is somewhat insubstantial because it is not quite clear what it would seek to do with this influence as long as Pakistan depends both for economic aid and arms on America and how it would seek to retain it in the long run. If the British Government really misjudged the temper of the Indian people, a part of the blame must be accepted by some Indian politicians and journalists who created a wholly wrong impression through their pronouncements and writings. The Government of India encouraged the miscalculation by appearing to yield to pressure
Old Habit
It has also been said here that Mr Sandys has not got over the old British habit of behaving in a patronising manner in dealing with former dependencies. The way he talked both to British journalists, privately and in the House of Commons after his previous visit to India and Pakistan, gives credence to this theory. But it is rather rash to think that personal disposition can be decisive in so vital a matter. It would appear that in spite of all the facts to the contrary, the British Government continues to assign to Pakistan a major role in the Middle East just as India is allotted a similar role in South-East Asia.
Even though it might not be possible to define precisely and accurately the importance of Pakistan in British thinking it can be safely assumed that it is considerable. The fact that Pakistan’s bluff is being called might help India to some extent but not much because every effort will continue to be made to placate Pakistan. Pakistan’s membership of CENTO is important. CENTO was never a military factor of any importance. It was and remains a transmission belt for political influence.
Even though military aid to India is a joint undertaking on behalf of America on the one hand and Britain, Australia and Canada on the other, it would be surprising if it was not seen as a threat to British influence in India. Commentators have noted that at the time of the Chinese invasion India looked primarily to America for assistance. Mr Patnaik did not even come to London for discussions. India is too used to thinking in terms of the West as one entity to pay sufficient attention to these rivalries. As India gravitates towards America the British attachment to Pakistan could grow.
Finally, if the experience economic aid is any guide, India would have to canvass military assistance on a continuous basis. No direct evidence is available in support of this contention because the whole issue is shrouded in secrecy. Since however the modernisation of the defence forces is no less complex an operation than economic development, our present dependence is not likely to end soon. On the whole the question is far more complex than we have cared to admit.
The Times of India, 11 May 1963