Earlier this month the Institute of Strategic Studies said in its study, “The Military Balance 1963-64”, that apart from 17 Soviet divisions in the Far East, troops already in Central Asia and a few detachments beyond Lake Baikal, the Soviet Union had no military formations other than border guards along its frontier with China. It hazarded the assessment that there was unlikely to be any shift of forces from Europe or European Russia. It said that though there might be military pressure for a reactivation of the cadre divisions and a reorganisation of air and naval defence it was doubtful whether such a policy would be put into effect.
As opposed to it, Newsweek this week said that last month the Soviet military command secretly airlifted two of its best para-troop divisions from Moscow to Alma Ata, capital of Kazakhstan which shares a 1,500-mile long border with the Chinese province of Sinkiang. According to Newsweek,the Soviet authorities had moved four other crack divisions from Eastern Europe to be deployed along the Chinese frontier since last August. Similarly there have been several reports of the Chinese having shifted troops from Kwangtung and Kiangsi provinces opposite Formosa and even from our border to reinforce their already sizable garrisons in Sinkiang. China’s best known soldier, Marshal Lin Piao, is believed to be in command of the forces on the Sino-Soviet border.
Authoritative
The Institute is an authoritative body. Only earlier this week the American Defence Secretary, Mr McNamara, gave figures of the relative strength of the western alliance and the Soviet bloc which more or less tallied with those contained in the study by the Institute. The first Deputy Commander-in-Chief of the Soviet strategic rocket force also quoted the Institute’s study in support of his claim that the Soviet intercontinental ballistic missiles had more powerful war-heads and rocket engines than similar American missiles. But Newsweek’s version also cannot be dismissed out of hand because the information could have come from some top source in Washington where it is a common practice to leak such items of intelligence. On the political level at my rate the assessment here is that neither Russia nor China is likely to ignore the troubled-Sinkiang frontier.
This is a cheering prospect for the West. Though it is no longer taunted by the nightmare of Russian hordes descending on it – some of the American experts have claimed that the West is stronger than the Soviet bloc even in terms of conventional forces – it naturally welcomes the prospect of the diversion of Russian strength. Russia remains the West’s principal preoccupation for a variety of reasons. To mention only some of them, the military presence of Russia in Central Europe accounts for the continued division of Germany. The problem of Berlin erupts into headlines again and again to remind even the common man of the possibility of conflict. Russia as a world power raises inconvenient problems for the West. Moscow’s recent decision to offer military aid to Somalia and the latter’s decision to accept it, for instance, has caused a great deal of concern here even though it is known that one reason behind the Soviet move was to undermine the Chinese influence there. Finally, China is regarded as a paper tiger. The general calculation is that it will be decades before the Chinese are in a position to make good their verbal threats.
Obsolete
According to the Institute for Strategic Studies there has been a gradual debilitation of Chinese military power over the past five years. Though the size of the armed forces has grown and may grow further – it is currently placed at 2,476,000 – their effectiveness has not increased. The last deliveries of Soviet military equipment were in 1960 and some of the equipment is beginning to become obsolete. Artillery and ammunition are scarce and the supply of light weapons up to anti-tank weapons is barely adequate. The army is tied to a rudimentary railway network and faces heavy transport and logistic problems. Of the perhaps 2,000 first line aircraft some 25 per cent are light bombers and bulk of the remainder MIG-15s and 17s. The pilots are not adequately trained for want of fuel.
Last year the study, “The Spread of Nuclear Weapons”, which had seen prepared by Leonard Beaton and John Maddox for the Institute, had come to the conclusion that the Chinese were not likely to explode their first nuclear device before 1964 and in fact it might well be delayed beyond that year. Now the Chinese Foreign Minister, Marshall Chen Yi, has confirmed the assessment that it would be some years before China is able to explode the first device. The same study came to the conclusion that without Soviet assistance the Chinese were unlikely to have an effective delivery system before 1975. These inclusions may not offer much of a consolation to us but the point in the present discussion is that the western world is not going to regard China as anything more than a regional power for another decade and possibly more.
It is against that background of China’s military and economic weakness that different western countries are seeking to develop a policy towards China. Their primary purpose is to try to ensure that the Soviet Union is not able to weaken and finally break the resistance of the Chinese leadership. Increasing trade is to be sought with Peking not only as an end in itself but as an instrument of stiffening China’s resistance against the Soviet Union. For Britain Hong Kong is an additional consideration. There are strong reasons to believe that by itself the policy of expanded trade with China will not add up to much.
There has been a great deal of speculation here whether the visit of the former French Premier, Monsieur Edgar Faure, reputedly as President de Gaulle’s personal emissary, to China, indicated that the General proposes to recognise the Communist regime. Reports of alleged French intrigues in Saigon with the former rulers and the cold attitude towards the military junta now in power there have been quoted here in support of the contention that President de Gaulle is about to strike out on an independent course, independent that is of America, in the Orient. The other view is that he will try first to influence the American administration to revise its attitude towards China. France’s recognition of Peking is likely to influence a number of African States and as such its importance is obvious.
The more important issue, however, is whether France is willing to allow China substantial credits. In the first seven months of the current year the French exports to China totalled $50 million and imports only $12 million. For the comparable period last year the export figure was $26 million and import $7 million. The West German trade with China amounted to $107 million in 1960 and declined to $65 million last year. The recent Japanese visit to China produced an agreement for two-way trade worth just $160 million. No meaningful increase in the West’s trade with China is possible without credits.
Not Easy
To put it mildly the decision to grant credits to China will not be an easy one. It will put a heavy strain on the unity of the Atlantic alliance because no American Government can for domestic, if no other reason, connive at it.
It is, therefore, difficult to figure out how the West collectively or individual countries severally can work out a consistent China policy in spite of their natural desire to take advantage of the Sino-Soviet split. The approach is therefore likely to remain tentative and as such need not cause us much concern. Two inter-related points may turn out to be of greater significance for us. First, in view of the primary concern with Russia, and increasing emphasis on conventional weapons, Pakistan is likely to continue to enjoy priority in the calculations of the Pentagon. Secondly, the Chinese road through Aksaichin is a cause of some concern to the Russians as well. The disclosures about Soviet unwillingness to support the Chinese claims that the People’s Daily made from November 1 1959 onwards is interesting. Only on October 1 and 14 last year, on the eve of the Cuba crisis, did Mr Khrushchev lend support to the Chinese. The Chinese launched their invasion on October 20.
The Times of India, 23 November 1963