Earlier this week, the British Government took the security wraps off the TSR-2 (T for tactical, S for strike and R for reconnaissance) which is claimed to be the most versatile plane the world has ever seen. Though originally designed as a tactical bomber, it is said to be capable of a strategic role as well. In fact, it is the strategic role that is being emphasised. The plane is described as a manned missile which can fly 1,000 miles in one hop and thousands of miles if refuelled in flight at a speed of 800 miles an hour at treetop level all the way and drop a hydrogen bomb into a beer barrel.
This is a graphic way of saying that the plane can beat the most sophisticated radar and air-defence system in existence and is capable of such precision that the margin of error is reduced to a few feet. This margin in the case of jets which were in service at the time of the Suez was 1,000 yards. Alternatively it can fly nearly 12 miles high at 1,500 miles an hour in which case it has a range of over 2,000 miles.
A forward-looking radar enables the plane to follow the contours of the terrain at a preset height either automatically or by manual flight. Information goes to computers and is fed to the automatic pilot which can fly the plane to and from a pre-selected target without visual reference to the target. The two-man crew can override the robot system and take control at any stage of the flight. Two other radar systems record moving and stationary objects on the ground and a television system on it can supply a home station with reconnaissance pictures as they are taken in flight during both day and night. The aircraft’s one major qualification is that it can operate from crude airstrips of about 600 yards.
TFX Project
The decision to release these details came after the announcement from Canberra that the Australian Government had decided to buy in preference of the British TSR -2 the American tactical nuclear bomber, the TFX, which is still at the drawing-board stage. Subject to the qualification that production costs rise manifold during the programme, the TFX project is estimated to cost £2,143 million. Since the Americans propose to build as many as 1,700 planes, the cost per aircraft comes to £1.2 million inclusive of research and development expenses. The TSR-2 project has cost £400 million and at present the proposal is to build 100 planes. Thus each plane will cost £4 million.
When the research and development costs are deducted one TSR-2 is estimated to cost £2.25 million. The comparable figure for the American TFX is not known but the total comparative costs suggest the figure to be around half a million pounds. The Australian government gave the lower cost and attractive package deal offered by the American administration to be the main reason for its decision. Whatever the reasons, the Australian decision caused a great deal of resentment here. In this context the commentators assumed that Whitehall had decided to publicise the TSR-2 to attract orders.
Undoubtedly a serious problem because this country cannot just afford the fantastic cost of the arms research and development programme without foreign orders. But there is another aspect to this publicity drive. In this pre-election year, the Conservatives are anxious to create the impression that they can maintain an independent nuclear deterrent after the present Vulcan bomber force becomes obsolete in another four years or so and without exclusively relying on the American Polaris missiles.
The research and development expenditure has been rising year after year with just one exception since 1949. It rose from £69 million in 1949 to £246 million in 1961. Along with production costs the figure has been as high as £591 million in 1954. The last year for which the figure is available is 1959. It was £508 million. Including imports from abroad, Britain has spent £7,500 million on equipment.
Scientists
These figures conceal another aspect of the cost. According to a survey by the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research in 1956, 40 per cent of all qualified scientists and engineers in the country were engaged in defence projects. In 1959, 3,750 scientists and engineers were employed in defence research in government establishments and 5,500 in similar work in private industry. These, of course, did not account for all scientists and engineers engaged on defence work because not all of them were on research and development. The Department of Scientific and Industrial Research puts the figure at 20,000. The total number of persons engaged in defence research and production is estimated at 440,000.
Inevitably there are casualties in such an ambitious research programme. Since 1951 the British government has had to cancel five major transport aircraft, 13 operational aircraft and 12 missile projects after having spent £238 million. The cancelled projects included the Blue Streak ballistic missile which cost £84 million. The British government had pinned all its hope of staying an independent nuclear power on this missile. But what hurt the British even more in another sense was the cancellation of the Blue Water surface to surface missile last year. Unlike the Blue Streak, the Blue Water project was dropped not because of technical difficulties and mounting costs, but because under pressure West Germany decided to buy the inferior American counterpart. Britain had already spent £32 million but it was not worth going ahead with its actual manufacture solely for the requirements of the British army on the Rhine. This cancellation finally put Britain out of the battlefield nuclear missile business just as the Blue Streak fiasco had put her out of the strategic missile field.
In previous years the British government had faced similar disappointments. The Lightning fighter, for instance, was designed to NATO specifications but the NATO countries preferred the American Star fighters in Europe. The method that is employed in this struggle for orders is illustrated by the fact that the man who was the head of the military aid advisory group in Bonn when the Star fighter was chosen is now senior Lockheed representative in West Europe. According to British experts, the Star fighter is an unsatisfactory aircraft and many crashes had caused the United States Air Force itself to consider it obsolescent. It is also said here that Germany, Italy, Belgium and Holland whose air forces are being re-equipped with Star fighters are upset at the soaring costs.
West Germany sets the pace and the British Government has not had much luck in Bonn. In 1955 the Germans turned down the jet Provost trainer in favour of a French plane. In 1956 they preferred the Canadian Sabre fighter to the Hunter. In 1957 they chose the Italian Fiat F-86 against the Javelin and the American M-48 tank against the Centurion. The British government had to cancel SR-177 fighter which was designed to climb into the sky at the speed of a missile and fly at twice the speed of sound because the Germans did not agree to buy it.
Critical
The Australian decision to go in for the American TFX bomber in preference to TSR-2 is seen here to point to the same danger of high pressure American salesmanship driving the British out of the market. The British papers have carried highly critical references to the American plane. It has, for instance, been said that the TFX has too many ideas that have been used in aircraft before. Collapsible wings is one such idea. It is difficult for a layman to say how far the criticism is genuine. The Daily Telegraph made the additional point that “Britain in her competitive arms tenders has entered an era in which the United States government sponsors and underwrites its manufacturers regardless of the eventual impact on the taxpayer.” Powerful arms manufacturers are all the time breathing down the neck of the Defence Secretary in Washington.
It appears that the blaze of publicity for TSR-2 is at least as much for home consumption as for promotion of sales abroad. It is common knowledge that the American administration and the British government have been interpreting the Nassau agreement over the supply of the Polaris Missiles differently. It is not equally well known that one reason behind the American pressure for the formation of the mixed-man nuclear force is to circumvent the Nassau agreement. The TSR-2 promotes the hope that the life of the Bomber Command can be prolonged. This can make it difficult for a prospective Labour Government to contract out of the nuclear deterrent.
The Times of India, 2 November 1963