As President Zia-ul-Haq enters the seventh year of his harsh reign in Pakistan, it does not look as if he is about to face a serious challenge. The eight-party movement for restoration of democracy (MRD) put up a show of resistance on July 6 to draw attention to the fact that it was on that date six years ago that General Zia had seized power from Mr. Bhutto in a military coup. But it was such a feeble affair that it only helped to underscore the conclusion that the General is there to stay. On this reckoning, he may last as long as General Ayub Khan – 10 years – and even longer. But there are significant differences between them and they are unfavourable to General Zia. General Ayub Khan sent the army back to the barracks soon after coming to power in 1958; by 1962 he had given the country a constitution with adult franchise even if elections under it were not to be held directly to the National Assembly; and he was a modernizer who kept the mullahs in their place and gave women new rights. General Zia has moved in the opposite direction. He has not only maintained martial law for six long years but also institutionalized military rule; military officers now hold in Pakistan all kinds of jobs earlier reserved by and large for civilians. It does not look as if he proposes to give the country any kind of constitution which can loosen the military’s stranglehold on the people. In the name of religion, he is degrading the position of women and exposing men to punishments which belong to very different times. All in all, he has put the clock back and in the process damaged Pakistan’s future prospects.
External circumstances have helped General Zia in a big way. Friendly Arab governments have been flush with petro-dollars and thus in a position to pour big money into Pakistan for the nuclear programme and weapons. Their development programmes have made it possible for Pakistan to export its unemployment and earn billions of dollars by way of remittances year after year. The United States has got a cold warrior as president who has been willing to assist Pakistan in order it can serve as America’s surrogate in the gulf in place of Shah’s Iran. The general has been lucky with the weather as well. Good monsoons have assured him good crops for four consecutive years. But such advantages do not last for long. A country’s stability and progress depend essentially on its success in building viable institutions and pushing through necessary economic, social and political reforms. The general’s record is abysmal on both these, in fact negative. When his reign is over as a result of a coup or a popular upsurge, Pakistan is likely to find itself in a worse position than it was in 1977 when he usurped power from an unsuspecting Bhutto who had hand-picked him, superseding several senior generals, for the job of the chief of army staff.