I am told on good authority that at the Socialist International Congress in Amsterdam this week several European delegates proposed the adoption of a resolution recommending specifically the imposition of economic sanctions against South Africa. The British Labour party delegation headed by Mr Harold Wilson himself strenuously opposed the move. The Socialist International had therefore to content itself with a resolution which hardly went beyond recommending an arms embargo which the Security Council had approved weeks earlier.
This story should not come as a surprise to anyone who has followed the position of the Labour party on the question of arms sale. Once Mr Wilson had called for an arms embargo against South Africa at a rally in observance of the anniversary of the Sharpville tragedy but later he was busy qualifying his statement. He said that he wanted the embargo to be limited to arms which could be used to suppress the Africans. He did not go into details. He then made it known privately that if he was returned to power he would honour the Simonstown agreement. It is this agreement that the South African Foreign Minister, Mr Eric Louw, has threatened to abrogate if Britain applied economic sanctions.
The agreement entitles the British Government to use the Simonstown naval base in case of war and commits it to sell to South Africa the necessary equipment to keep the sea lanes clear. British military planners attach considerable importance to it in view of the fear that in the event of a war the Suez Canal would be closed. The critics contend that this argument is used as a smokescreen to justify the unwillingness to act. If that is so the Labour leadership is a party to it and inevitably so because like the Conservatives it accepts the necessity of British military presence east of the Suez.
Usual Silence
This, however, might not be the end of the story. On March 18, 1962 The Observer expressed the fear that a secret defence pact might exist between Britain and South Africa. The charge was not denied. The Observer subsequently repeated the charge. While the British Government maintained its usual silence, the South African Defence Minister lent credence to the fear. Mr Fouche said that except in the case of the Simonstown agreement South Africa’s defence relations with friendly countries had never been based on written agreements and that he had “the fullest trust in the United Kingdom”. The Labour leadership made no attempt to establish the truth or otherwise of the charge regarding the secret agreement.
In spite of the Security Council’s resolution on arms embargo the British Government had not made its position on this question clear. Two points deserve attention. First, on July 24, 1963, The Times quoted the South African Defence Minister as saying that Britain had requested South Africa not to ask for small arms and ammunition. “We do not buy that type of stuff. We sell it ourselves,” he added. This obviously disposes of Mr Wilson’s demand that Britain must not supply weapons which can be used for the suppression of the Africans.
Secondly, The Financial Times reported on August 9, 1963, that Britain had contracted to supply something like 20 Buccaneer naval aircraft at a cost of about £20 million for delivery from early 1965. Britain was also selling anti-submarine frigates and helicopters under the Simonstown agreement. Mr Fenner Brockway’s repeated and valiant efforts to seek official confirmation were frustrated and he found little support from the Labour leadership. This report in The Financial Times also said that France had similarly agreed to sell South Africa 16 Mirage fighters of which probably half had already been delivered. France had also sold Alouette helicopters and some bombers and South Africa was believed to be considering the purchase of French tanks to replace the Centurion.
The Army
South Africa is by far the strongest military power in the area. The police force nearly 30,000 strong is armed with revolvers, sub-machine guns and Saracen armoured cars. The strength of the standing army equipped with modern weapons is to be raised to 60,000 by 1966. The army would then be organised into 12 tank and infantry regiments. In addition there are the voluntary rifle commandoes organised on military lines, an air force equipped with jet fighters, turbojet transport machines, long-range Shackletons and a helicopter squadron and a small navy equipped with an extensive coastal radar system. Each commando unit consists of 300 men and 15 officers. The total number of the commando units is not known but it is estimated to be around 50.
The arms build-up has been stepped up since 1960. In 1961 the military budget rose by £14 million to around £36 million. In 1962 it was increased to £60 million. In 1961 for the first time 10,000 white youths were compulsorily called in for military service. The figure rose to 15,000 last year. Even white women have been and are being trained to handle rifles and revolvers. There is no question that this whole machine is intended for the suppression of the African freedom movement. The South African Government makes no pretence about it.
It remains doubtful how far the Security Council’s resolution will be implemented by Britain and other western countries. When Mr Wilson spoke of an arms embargo against South Africa there was a spate of reports in British papers showing how anxious France, West Germany, Italy and Belgium were to seize the orders. Even if direct supplies are withheld the resolution can be effectively circumvented. South Africa already possesses a sizable arms industry and this can be expanded with the assistance of western arms manufactures. African Explosives which is engaged in manufacturing ammunition is, for instance, half owned by De Beers and half by Imperial Chemical Industries. De Beers which virtually controls the diamond industry throughout Southern Africa is part of the massive Anglo-American group.
Britain has great stakes in South Africa. Her investment, according to published figures, amounts to £900 million, second largest after those in America and three times those in India. South Africa was compelled to leave the Commonwealth in 1961. In March 1962 she was extended all the trading privileges as far as Britain was concerned. During the debate on the South Africa Bill the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs put the position quite succinctly. An export market in South Africa worth £150 million – the figure for last year was £155 million representing nearly five per cent of Britain’s exports – was not to be jeopardised lightly nor were the invisible exports of the order of £100 million. He placed South African exports to Britain at £50 million – non-official sources place it around £100 million – and advocated continuation of the ten per cent preference on the ground that South Africa might otherwise withdraw from the sterling area. With 70 per cent of the world’s gold production coming from the Union and being sold through the London market such a prospect was not to be countenanced.
No Likelihood
Financial interests have influenced if not determined British policy not only in respect of South Africa but also in respect of Katanga’s attempt to secede from Congo, Portuguese possessions of Angola and Mozambique and the Central African Federation. Unless there is a major revolution in British approach to both strategy and economy of which there is no likelihood in the near future even if the Labour party is returned to power, Britain would continue to lend support to South Africa in one form or another.
This appreciation of British policy makes it difficult to understand why the South African Foreign Minister, Mr Louw, found it necessary to hold out the threat to sell gold elsewhere – South Africa produces gold worth about £275 million a year and sells it in the London market – and repudiate the Simonstown agreement. The one possible explanation is that Mr Louw realises that as the frontier of Black Africa moves further south Britain with all her ingenuity will not be able to avoid the choice between the goodwill of independent Afro-Asian States and financial advantages from the present relationship with South Africa. The Labour party in power can make the choice in favour of commonsense and decency more easily.
The Times of India, 14 September 1963