The dramatic, though not altogether unexpected, deterioration in Britain’s relations with Indonesia has once again brought into sharp locus questions relating to future military strategy. In view of Britain’s firm military commitment to the Malaysian Federation and the continuing threat to India, there is a general acceptance of the need to strengthen British military presence in the Indian Ocean. It is ironical that her military commitments in that area should visibly increase with the liquidation of the last remnants of the empire. The argument here is about the country’s ability to meet these obligations and not about their desirability.
In the Far-East British, strategy is fully co-ordinated with America as far as the Chinese menace is concerned. No British action is either contemplated or possible without the fullest American cooperation. In fact the initiative will be American. Britain’s own principal preoccupation is with Malaysia. Four battalions of infantry, a Royal Marine commando and a considerable force of supporting troops are already committed in Sabah (North Borneo) and Sarawak and one brigade group is positioned. It is quite likely that this force may have to be strengthened. There is already talk of flying reinforcements out of the strategic reserves in East Africa and Aden since there is hardly any possibility of reducing the force of a little over six battalions in Hong Kong.
Doubtful
The forces that are now available in the former Borneo territories and the reinforcements that can be sent are regarded as adequate to deal with the problems of internal security arising from either the opposition of the Chinese minority there or Indonesian trained and equipped guerillas. It is however doubtful if they can perform even a holding operation against a direct Indonesian assault. If the British military planners are not unduly perturbed it is because they regard such an assault as highly improbable. The present level of commitment is however going to extend over years.
The long-term plan is to keep in readiness naval task forces supported by transport aircraft and the joint RAF-Naval vertical takeoff planes in the area. A similar force is to be established in West Asia with Aden as the principal base. The forces now in East Africa are to be withdrawn within a year or so and will be available for deployment elsewhere in emergencies. Only recently the British Government ordered an aircraft carrier to be built at a cost of £60 million. This is expected to be serviceable till the late ’seventies. The clear assumption is that British military presence, in both West Asia and the Far-East, would extend into the ’seventies.
This strategic plan is obviously based on a number of political calculations which are open to challenge. That apart, on recent performances, the effectiveness of the existing forces itself remains doubtful. The inadequacies of the British military machine during the Suez expedition is an old story. The landing in Kuwait in 1961 is not so old. Barely two years ago the British forces were not in a position to repel an Iraqi invasion of the Sheikdom without the use of nuclear weapons, according to the well-known commentator. Mr Wayland Young.
West Asia
It took the British authorities eleven days to reach one brigade to the Sheikdom in spite of a long build-up in West Asia and the implementation of a plan to deal with local incidents. The troops had not been acclimatised to the hot climate. The war office itself admitted that 10 per cent of the troops who went from Britain were out of action within five days on account of heart disorders. Unofficial figures were much higher. The necessary equipment, stores and rations did not get there at all. Proper arrangements were not made to guide the aircraft into the country. Aircraft that got in were ineffective; Hunter fighters, for instance, were not equipped with search radar and air-to-air missiles. Enough civilian workers were not available to prepare the airfield for use by RAF planes. The only saving feature was that the Iraqis did not intend to attack. In fact, Kuwait’s ruler himself did not take the threat seriously.
The plain fact of the matter is that British resources are stretched to breaking point. The current year’s defence budget is £1,837.7 million, over £116 million more than last year. It is expected to rise to £2,000 million next year and still be inadequate to help Britain meet effectively the obligations she has assumed. Recruitment for the army has dropped so badly that it is feared the target of 180,000 men has become difficult to reach. The planners demand a much bigger force. Almost one-third of the army is tied up in Europe.
The European scene is truly fabulous. American strategists are now convinced that the Russian posture in Europe is and has all along been defensive. The British authorities share this view though they differ on their assessment of the total number of divisions the Russians can put on the field. Yet neither of them proposes to reduce their forces in Europe. In fact Britain remains under pressure to increase the strength of her forces beyond the agreed figure of 55,000 men. Just as the Americans are haunted by the fear of Germany drawing closer to France, the British Government is, if anything, more concerned with the increase in West German influence in NATO as a result of the reduction of its forces in Europe than with possible Soviet invasion.
As is well known American strategists believe that it is possible to meet a Russian invasion, which is considered altogether too improbable, with conventional forces. The British believe that to plan on that basis is to reduce the value of the nuclear deterrent. The British argument must be related to the fact that the army on the Rhine is incapable of fighting except with the use of tactical nuclear weapons. It is no simple matter to re-equip it adequately for a conventional war. The cost would be quite heavy. Yet under pressure the British army on the Rhine is being re-equipped with modern tanks, armoured troop carriers, conventional artillery and a modern communication system. Supplies for 30 days are to be kept in the operational area.
The British independent nuclear force around which has ranged the whole defence debate for years also relates to Europe. It has cost Britain one billion pounds to put up the present Vulcan bomber force which many commentators regard as totally irrelevant to western defence. It costs £170 million a year to maintain this force. It is to be reinforced with TSR-2 reconnaissance aircraft which will be equipped with homing missiles. The TSR-2 has cost about £500 million to develop and unless other countries agree to buy it its future may be in doubt.
Polaris
When President Kennedy agreed to provide Britain with Polaris missiles in place of the Skybolt, which had been scrapped, at Nassau last December, Mr Macmillan believed he had made a wonderful bargain. Soon it was found that the Americans believed the offer was contingent on British willingness to join in the proposed multilateral nuclear force. This force is planned to consist of 25 surface vessels carrying 200 Polaris missiles. No one believes it would add to the West’s strength. It is being pursued because it is hoped that it would stop West Germany’s drift towards France. The British Cabinet is said to be divided on the issue but the odds are that if America decides to go ahead with it Britain will join. All this adds up to show that by far the largest part of British defence expenditure will continue to be made in terms of NATO. In real terms her military presence east of Suez would remain rather ineffective. It appears as if it will be a long time before the talk of China being a greater danger than Russia gets translated into military terms.
To put the record straight, it is now admitted in Whitehall that the South African Simonstown naval base is no longer vital to British strategy east of Suez. There are easy alternatives for safeguarding the Cape route. Small island bases at Seychelles and Mauritius off the east coast of Africa, at Helena in the South Atlantic and Falkland Islands off the tip of South America, can fill the gap. The need for the Simonstown base is said to have greatly decreased with the scrapping of troopships. This is important because South Africa cannot blackmail the British Government into supplying arms by holding out the threat of scrapping the agreement and the British Government cannot use the base to justify the supply.
The Times of India, 21 September 1963