The French ‘yes’ to the Maastricht treaty on European Union amounts to a virtual ‘no’. As such, it can at best help mitigate an immediate and dramatic aggravation of the crisis that had overtaken the European Community’s exchange rate mechanism (ERM) in the previous week. It cannot help salvage the treaty. Indeed, it can only strengthen widespread doubts about the future of the proposed European Union.
Even a more decisive French ‘yes’ would not, however, have assured steady and smooth progress towards Union. The enterprise has been worse than flawed since last year when the Maastricht treaty was rushed through. It was misconceived. It cannot but remain vulnerable to frequent crises till the treaty is suitably modified and the grand illusion of a United States of Europe given up in favour a looser arrangement. Persistence in this misadventure cannot but immobilize Europe with dire consequences for it and the world.
Political Union
The Maastricht treaty, it is common knowledge, was pushed through by European leaders and bureaucrats principally in response to German reunification as if it was a disaster which had to be contained at once. They convinced themselves that Germany would return to its rogue elephant role unless it was firmly tied up not only in an economic but also a political union which would dilute its sovereignty. Clearly they did not regard the existing arrangement, including Nato under US leadership, good enough for the purpose.
It is open to question whether the German ‘problem’ can be said to have survived the monumental changes that have taken place in the German situation and psyche as a result of the shattering defeat in World War II and the Federal Republic’s happy experience as a member of the Western military and economic system. On the face of it, the answer has to be in the negative.
It is less than fair to quote history in the face of such significant changes as the emergence of Germany as the third biggest economy in the world, the embourgeoisment of a majority of the people in the large part of the country (the former Federal Republic), successful pursuit of democratic norms in that dominant area, and the rejection of the militarist tradition so much so that the Germans are reluctant to participate in UN peace-keeping operations. Surely the rise of small neo-Nazi groups in former East Germany, suffering from massive unemployment and dislocation, cannot be said to negate this transformation.
It is also notable that while West European leaders have paid so much attention to German history, they have disregarded their own. That history should have warned them that the United States of Europe is a mirage.
Not to speak of the political realm, Europe has never been united in the religious one. The Roman See (Papacy) has never prevailed throughout Europe. Till the sack of Constantinople during the fourth crusade in the middle ages, the Byzantium was the dominant Christian state in the world. Incidentally, to no small extent the spread of Christianity itself was the handiwork of German princes. Indeed, the culture of that time was moulded more by the German than by the Christian spirit for when the two clashed, say in literature, authors quietly gave the German their preference.
In their search for the United States of Europe on the strength of the success of the Economic Community, European leaders have ignored two obvious realities. First, by virtue of its critical role in assuring their economic recovery and security, Washington has in all but name served as their capital which they cannot possibly replace by one of their own. Secondly, since the Soviet threat, which had provided the impetus for launching the European Community, has ended with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, a thorough review has become unavoidable.
The pull of multinational corporations in need of a unified European market apart, distrust of the very concept of nationalism has become deeply entrenched in the minds of a lot of West Europeans in leading positions. But this is a classical case of a Pavlovian response. It bears no relation either to the situation resulting from the liquidation of European empires, cause of intra-European wars, and unprecedented levels of prosperity in the former imperial states, or to the new challenges emerging from the collapse of the Soviet Union.
US Leadership
Two points should have been evident to discerning West Europeans in the wake of the disintegration of the Soviet empire, especially in view of the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait. First, US leadership remains essential if regional bullies such as Saddam Hussein are to be restrained and Western interests protected. Secondly, it is necessary to help former members of the Soviet bloc, including Russia itself, rehabilitate economies and lands if there is to be order and peace in Europe.
West European leaders have moved in a contrary direction on both counts. They began to think of developing an independent defence capability within months of the vacation of Iraqi forces from Kuwait. And instead of widening the scope of the Economic Community to cover East Europeans in some way, they decided to deepen it to take care of foreign policy and defence matters as well. That is the meaning of the Maastricht treaty.
It is difficult to say whether the disintegration of the Soviet Union could have been postponed to give Moscow a chance to promote a commonwealth of free peoples if the West Europeans had not been so supportive of independence for Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia, to begin with. But it is fairly obvious that the tragedy of ‘ethnic cleansing’ in Bosnia-Herzegovina has been precipitated at least partly by Western Europe’s reckless recognition of claim to independence by Muslims who account for only around 40 per cent of the population. And having extended recognition, they have done, and can, on their own, do, precious little to enforce it.
German Problem
In any case, it is self-evident that the future peace and prosperity of Europe will depend above all on whether Russia rebuilds its economy reasonably quickly and moves towards order and democracy, or whether economic failure pushes it once again towards disorder, authoritarianism and chauvinism. The German ‘problem’, however defined, must pale into insignificance in the face of the Russian ‘problem’. The movement towards European political union is certainly not designed to look after it.
The supreme irony is that in the bid to contain Germany, West Europeans have delivered themselves as hostages to it. The currency upheaval on account of Bundesbank’s refusal to reduce its interest rate should clinch this issue. The proposed European central bank can be no more than a new name for Bundesbank in view of the strength of the German economy.
A United Europe, as argued earlier, is inconceivable. But if it is, it has to be a German Europe. Nations that agree to surrender their sovereignties, evolved to distinguish them from the Germans in several instances, cannot contain this old-new giant. Mrs Margaret Thatcher is right in this matter.
The Times of India, 24 September 1992