We should ignore the Afghan President, Maulana Rabbani’s references to Kashmir during his visit to Islamabad and concentrate on the purpose of his mission and the reasons for its failure. For a failure it has been. This much is obvious from his critical remarks regarding the Jamaat-e-Islami chief, Qazi Hussain Ahmed, and the Pakistani press.
Rabbani went to Islamabad to plead that Hekmatyar should not continue to receive support from within Pakistan. Islamabad could not possibly oblige him in view not only of the Jamaat’s closeness to Hekmatyar but also of Saudi Arabia’s support for Hekmatyar’s Hizbe Islam. Hizbe is Riyadh’s instrument in Afghanistan and beyond. Its agents have been active in Tajikistan.
During the visit, Pakistani leaders reaffirmed their official position that they would not allow their territory to be used for anti-Kabul activities. But that was so much hogwash. Islamabad is in no position to control what goes on some miles beyond Peshawar and it cannot be seriously interested in clipping Hekmatyar’s wings.
Hekmatyar is in effect seeking to restore Pushtoon hegemony in Kabul, though it would be wrong to question his commitment to Islamic fundamentalism. Islamabad has a stake in the continuation of that effort since it gives it leverage in dealing with the northern predominantly non-Pushtoon coalition now in control of Kabul.
Implicit, however, in the above observations is recognition of Pakistan as an independent, even if not a decisive, actor in respect of Afghanistan. But for all we know, Pakistan itself might be caught in the maelstrom enveloping Central Asia.
Developments in Afghanistan continue to be discussed against the backdrop of the jihad against Soviet-backed regimes in Kabul. But in the changed geo-political situation it is dangerous to try and anticipate the course of events amidst the kind of confusion that prevails in Afghanistan. Even so, we can take note of some basic facts such as that Afghanistan came into existence as a result of the need for a buffer between two powerful empires, that it was held together by a ‘government’ in Kabul which did not interfere with the lives of people organised locally along tribal lines and that the status quo ante cannot be restored. One conclusion is obvious.
Afghanistan is in for a prolonged period of conflict even if Hekmatyar surprises us and agrees to cooperate with the coalition in Kabul. For in that unlikely event, it would be reasonable to expect a realignment and a new struggle.
The northern alliance is held together by the threat posed by Hekmatyar; no group has emerged as the dominant leader of the alliance; without such a leader, no coalition ever survives on its own.
For Pakistan, the logic of its interests points in one direction and of its compulsions in another. While its interests demand that like the British, it helps Pushtoons regain their dominance in Kabul, its compulsions oblige it to be seen to be working for reconciliation. The US and Iran are opposed to Hekmatyar, though for quite different reasons, optimal for the US on account of his commitment to Islamic fundamentalism and Iran on that of its stake in a coalition arrangement which can provide room for the Shias. As a result, Islamabad does not have and cannot easily evolve an Afghanistan policy.
Pakistan cannot opt for a de facto partition either. That has to be preceded by a lot of bloodshed; no Pushtoon leader can accept it; Hekmatyar has, in any case, to stick to the Islamic and ‘one Afghanistan’ platform. He is a commoner and he comes from an unimportant tribe. And while a small unadministered belt is one proposition for Pakistan, a virtual Pushtoonistan is quite another.
Pakistan’s problems can, however, offer us little comfort. Islamabad has been trying to redirect the fanaticism of mujahideen towards Kashmir. Its efforts have not been too successful because the gaze of the Pushtoon Mujahideen has been turned towards Kabul. But Islamabad has not given up. It was in keeping with this policy that President Rabbani was asked pointedly by Pakistani media persons whether Afghanistan was prepared to extend material support to Kashmiris in their struggle against India. Indo-Pa kistan relations are in for pretty rough weather on account of the upheaval in Afghanistan.
The Economic Times, 3 October 1992